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HIGH CHURCHMEN AND POLITICS, 1845-1865

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THESIS

HIGH CHURCHMEN AND POLITICS, 1845-1865

(Summary)

During the mid-Victorian period, religion played an integral part in political life, High Churchmen, in particular, with their belief in the all-important role of the visible Church within the community, were convinced that political action was necessary to safeguard their principles. They were to find it impossible, nevertheless, to establish a common front to deal with the confused situation caused by the break-up of the Conservative Party in 1846.

This was because many of the crucial issues in these years were concerned with the problems of church establishment, a matter over which these Churchmen themselves were fundamentally divided. On the one hand, the Protestant High Churchmen maintained the traditional principles of "the Constitution in Church and State". They believed that the spiritual and material welfare of Britain depended on the continued establishment of the Anglican Church. On the other, the Anglo-Catholics feared the control of that Church by a State in which both Nonconformists and Roman Catholics now had considerable influence. They believed that the Church should be given the same liberty enjoyed by the other religious bodies in the community. As a result, they proved to be much more in accord with the Liberal temper of the age than did the authoritarian Protestant High Churchmen.

The religious policy of Russell's Government between 1846 and 1852 did much to confirm the hostility of the Protestant High Churchmen for the Whigs. They became convinced that only an effective alliance with the Conservatives could safeguard the Established Church. They were, however, unable to restore this alliance in the eighteen-fifties because of their antagonism towards both factions of that Party which existed in this decade. They disliked the Peelites because of the strong Anglo-Catholic element amongst its leadership; they disliked the Conservative rump under Derby because of the growing influence within it of Disraeli. It was only when Disraeli made clear his acceptance of their principles after 1861 that they were prepared to give his Party their support.

Although the Anglo-Catholics had also disapproved of the Whig Government's religious policy, they were more prepared to seek some understanding with them, especially because of their distrust of the Low Church group in Derby's Conservative Party. This appeared to have been achieved with the formation of the Coalition Government in 1852. Before the fall of the Coalition in 1855, however, the controversies over church patronage and the revival of an active Convocation had proved the incompatibility between Whig and Anglo-Catholic religious principles. These Churchmen were to be even more hostile to the succeeding Government under Lord Palmerston. They were especially concerned about the concessions made to the Dissenters after 1859, which they believed would damage the apostolic nature of the Anglican Church. As a result, many of them, while still disliking the erastian principle of establishment, were now anxious to defend the status of the Church of England. Like the Protestant High Churchmen, they once again looked to the Conservative Party as the best instrument to ensure this.

One obstacle still remained to prevent the complete re-unification of these two groups of High Churchmen. This was the influence of Gladstone amongst the older Anglo-Catholics. Their admiration for him which had developed since he became Member of Parliament for Oxford University in 1847 survived even his decision to join Palmerston's Government in 1859, which most other High Churchmen saw merely as political expediency. It was not until the eighteen-eighties that they finally lost their confidence in him.

Gladstone's rejection at Oxford in 1865 by the younger Anglo-Catholics, indeed, proved clearly the weakness of High Church Liberalism on the one hand, and the innate Conservatism of High Churchmen as a whole on the other, both of which had been disguised by the exceptional political circumstances of the years after 1845.

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HIGH CHURCHMEN AND POLITICS, 1845-1865

by

John Kenyon

A Thesis submitted in conformity
with the requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the University of Toronto

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J. KENYON
1967

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
Introduction:		
	Religion and Politics in Mid-Victorian England	1
Chapter I		
	Protestant High Churchmen and Anglo-Catholics	13
Chapter II		
	The Conservative Schism, 1845-1846.	51
Chapter III		
	Peelites and Puseyites	76
Chapter IV		
	High Churchmen and the Whigs: Part I, Opposition, 1847-1852	109
Chapter V		
	High Churchmen and the Whigs: Part II, Coalition, 1852-1855	204
Chapter VI		
	High Churchmen, Lord Palmerston and the Conservative Reaction, 1855-1865	279
Chapter VII		
	Gladstone and the Representation of Oxford University, 1847-1865.	354
Conclusion:		
	'The High Church is now broken to bits' . .	444
Appendix:		
	High Church Members of Parliament, 1841-1865	464

Table of Contents (Continued)

	Page
Bibliography	472

INTRODUCTION

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN MID-VICTORIAN ENGLAND

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the political behavior of one particular group in the Church of England, the High Churchmen, during the period between 1845 and 1865. This choice of subject makes it necessary to provide a preliminary justification first for taking such an ecclesiastical view of the politics of these two decades, and secondly for studying the activity of a group whose members were very much in a minority within the Church and who were divided amongst themselves over many issues, both religious and political.[1]

In the first place, it must be recognized that this was essentially "an age of religious warmth and excitement".[2] Professor Burn has recently reminded us what a topic of absorbing interest religion was for the mid-Victorian generation, especially for those who still held the preponderance of political power in the community, and whose writings and conversation helped to make public opinion.[3] Contemporary observers were equally impressed by this fact. When the Saturday Review reviewed a book of reminiscences written by country squire, it drew particular attention to the large

proportion which was devoted to religious issues, and commented that "the increased interest which all classes take in questions affecting religion is undoubtedly one of the most remarkable phenomena of the day".[4]

This interest was clearly evident in political affairs. Religious controversies themselves occupied a great part of the time of Parliament. It was once calculated that of fifty divisions taken in one session before Easter, twenty-six were concerned with secular, twenty-four with ecclesiastical matters.[5] Moreover, the confused political situation of these years did much in itself to emphasize the great importance attributed to such issues. On the one hand, the break-up of Peel's Conservative Party in 1846 had forced the leading politicians to seek new combinations in their attempts to re-establish a stable government. They were to find that their differences of opinion in this field might well cut across traditional political affiliations and have a considerable effect on the making of these alliances and coalitions. On the other, party leaders were to discover that the strength of religious convictions amongst their nominal supporters was to be a major obstacle to the effective exercise of their authority in Parliament. In this period of transition between the eighteenth century system of government by patronage and the party discipline of the twentieth, the

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members of the House of Commons possessed far greater freedom than before or since to act according to their own convictions. In particular, there was full opportunity for extended debate over ecclesiastical legislation brought before Parliament, which might well prove the existence of a wide divergence of opinion within the political groups. Such matters had, therefore, to be approached with considerable caution, resulting, as the Saturday Review noted, in a paradoxical situation:

> Church legislation ... strictly belongs to the political or partisan business of the House, but it is not conducted upon the ordinary principles which govern party fights. It creates a wider and deeper interest in the country than any other contentious proceedings in Parliament; it affects elections more powerfully and draws forth politics more largely; but yet it is a matter upon which neither Government nor Opposition as such profess to have a policy.[6]

The widespread interest over religious matters throughout the country was, therefore, strongly reflected within Parliament. Under these circumstances, it was not surprising that the Church of England, with "its vast social influence and immense electioneering weight"[7], should have played a powerful role in the politics of mid-Victorian England. Certainly its members showed little reluctance to take an active part in political affairs. It was Lord Robert Cecil, the future Marquess of Salisbury and Prime Minister, who provided the most forceful justification of their right and even the duty to engage themselves in

parliamentary warfare. Cecil believed that their failure to do so, indeed, would prove a most serious threat, not only to the temporal privileges of the Church, but also to its very existence itself. For, like any other institution in the community, it was involved in what amounted to a constant struggle for survival. Cecil was convinced that the great vitality possessed by a constitutional state like England in comparison with the moribund European despotism was the absence of any absolute sovereign power which could have prevented such a struggle: "conflict in free states is the law of life". At the same time, this entailed considerable danger for the Church of England, meaning that, despite its status as an Established Church, it could never afford to abdicate its responsibility for its own defence. To allow its enemies to win unchallenged control over Parliament, in particular, would enable them to exercise a decisive influence even over its faith and creeds. It was, indeed, necessary for Churchmen to become committed politicians during these years in order to protect the spiritual integrity of the Anglican Church.[8]

In the contemporary climate of opinion, it is clearly impossible to understand the politics of the mid-Victorian years without taking into consideration the religious factors involved, and in particular the role of the Church of England. During this period, High Churchmen

were to play a very decisive part. In the first place, their leading representatives were men of exceptional distinction: Pusey and Keble, William Palmer and Samuel Wilberforce, Church and Mozley amongst the clergymen; Sidney Herbert, Roundell Palmer and, above all, Gladstone amongst the politicians. Secondly, their ecclesiological emphasis made them much more conscious of the need to defend the interests of the Church than most other Anglicans. They saw the Christian Church as a divine institution, giving continuous witness to the incarnation of the Son of God in the affairs of this world. They believed that, as such an institution, the functions of the Church were two-fold. It alone could provide the channel of sacramental grace by which all Christians are bound together and made members of Christ's Mystical Body. It alone could guarantee the teaching of sound doctrine as this had been enshrined both in the Bible and in the Church's own tradition. English High Churchmen firmly believed that, whatever its imperfections, the Anglican Church had always been and still remained a living branch of the Universal Christian Church. Although it could no longer claim visible union with the rest of Catholic Christendom, its bishops and ministers were able to trace their line of succession directly from the first Apostles: they continued to administer the two major sacraments of

Baptism and the Eucharist: they still acknowledged the same Scriptures and Creed as had the whole Church in the days of perfect union. If they were correct in what they claimed, then High Churchmen were justified in maintaining that the position and authority of the Church of England was fundamentally different in nature from that of any other religious body, and that these must be protected by what ever means were necessary, political or otherwise.

Such a 'high' conception of the Church was, indeed, significantly different from that possessed by the other major group in the Church of England, the Evangelicals. The Evangelicals laid far greater stress than did the High Churchmen on individual as compared to corporate religion, and thus were more prepared to encourage the growth of undenominational feeling within the Church. For them, the central fact of Christian dogma was the atonement rather than the incarnation: the reconciliation of individual man with God by the once and for all sacrificial death of Christ. What distinguished a member of Christ's Church from those outside it was his assurance of personal salvation. As a result, the Evangelicals had far less concern for the outward framework of any visible church, even the Church of England. In order to spread their message as widely as possible, they were prepared to ignore the organizational structure of that Church if necessary, and even the incumbent within his parish. They also saw no reason why they

should not be on friendly, if aloof, relations with the protestant dissenters from that Church, and were more prepared to recognize their grievances against it.

This difference over the sacramental aspect of the Church, however, would hardly have caused by itself the bitter antagonism which developed between Evangelicals and High Churchmen during these years, although it certainly made it one much more difficult to resolve than it might otherwise have been. It seemed, indeed, that the two kinds of religious belief were complementary rather than imcompatible with each other, and until the eighteen-thirties, there had been much more reason to expect co-operation rather than hostility between these church parties. Even in matters of doctrine, it had proved possible to combine evangelical principles with a 'high'conception of the Church. Daniel Wilson, Rector of Islington from 1824 to 1832 and one of the most influential Evangelical leaders in London, had seen nothing strange in adopting as his customary practice in religious worship early communions, saints'-day services and the use of the litany in mid-week. When he became Bishop of Calcutta, he had no hesitation in claiming spiritual authority over the members of his church on the grounds of primitive apostolic order.[9] Further, the shock of the French Revolution had converted most Evangelicals in the first decades of the nineteenth century into deter-

mined defenders of the Establishment as a bulwark of order against the threat from both radicalism and theological liberalism, and thus had made them into acceptable allies for the 'high-and-dry' orthodox churchmen.

Above all, this alliance between Evangelicals and High Churchmen was apparently firmly consolidated during the eighteen-thirties by their fear of the growing strength of the latitudinarian spirit within the Church of England. Thomas Arnold, in particular, appeared the embodiment of that eighteenth century rationalism, which had done so much to provoke the evangelical revival itself and which was so incompatible with catholic churchmanship. Neither the Evangelicals as upholders of Biblical authority nor the High Churchmen as upholders of ecclesiastical authority could tolerate the attempts by men like Arnold to subject the very basis of their religion to the test of philosophical or historical or scientific investigation. Both groups found it impossible to conceive of religion being separated from dogma, which they believed would be the inevitable outcome of this speculative thought. As a result, they both rose in wrath against the appointment in 1836 of Dr. Hampden as Professor of Divinity at Oxford University, a man who was closely, if unjustly, identified with this school of opinion.

The combined opposition to Hampden proved, however, the end of the alliance between Evangelicals and High

Churchmen. From this time on, relations between them grew steadily worse. This was the result of the bitterness caused by developments during the later stages of the Oxford Movement. On the one hand, these had emphasized the growing influence of the more extreme Tractarians in that Movement. Men like Ward and Oakely, in particular, who seemed determined to magnify the catholic nature of the Church of England at the expense of its protestant character, now appeared to have seized its leadership and to be compelling the older generation, especially Newman himself, to adopt their views. They were to become the objects of a deep-seated suspicion on the part of the Evangelicals, who believed tham to be acting as traitors within the Church itself, bent on betraying it to Rome. For their part, the Tractarians could never forget nor forgive the leading part played by the Evangelicals in their persecution at Oxford after the publication of Tract 90 in 1841. This was the start of a feud which was to persist and become even more bitter during the eighteen-fifties and -sixties, the result of which was to weaken considerably the Church as an effective political force. As Disraeli warned his constituents during the general election of 1857:

> there is an attempt at the present day to play the parties which exist, and always have existed to a certain degree, in the Church against each other for political objects. This is a dangerous course for Churchmen to sanction. The Church, which

> irrespective of its highest functions, is one of the greatest guarantees of English happiness, has foes enough without seeking for them in her own bosom; and it would appear to me that instead of quarrelling among themselves, Churchmen should evince mutual forebearance, and unite on grounds of ecclesiastical polity. [10]

High Churchmen as such were, thus, to be intimately involved in the politics of the mid-nineteenth century. They were to suffer, however, from one major weakness. They proved so divided amongst themselves over some of the major issues of the day that, despite the pressure exerted by the intensified party spirit within the Church in the eighteen-fifties, they were unable to establish any common policy to deal with the difficult political situation created by the break-up of Peel's Conservative Government in 1846. In this sense, it is impossible to talk about the existence of a 'High Church party', and any study of High Church politics in these years must be concerned mainly with the response of individuals to the major developments within the Whig Party under Lord John Russell, the Liberal Party under Lord Palmerston and the Conservatism of Derby and Disraeli.

Such a study will, nevertheless, be more than a footnote to the political history of this period. English High Churchmen had to define their position in one of the great contemporary religious controversies, the attempt to reconcile Catholicism with the dominant Liberal ethos of the time. Their need to do so was primarily the result of the tortuous advance of Gladstone to the leadership of the

Liberal Party. He forced both his followers and opponents amongst the High Churchmen to face problems that had now become a matter of European debate. One contemporary, indeed, could compare his influence in this respect with Newman and Montalembert within the Roman Catholic Church.[11] It is expected, therefore, that this examination of the political behavior of High Churchmen between 1845 and 1865 will throw some light on that most elusive of concepts, Liberal Catholicism.

NOTES: INTRODUCTION

[1] According to W.J. Conybeare, "the Low Church party is (including its lay and clerical members) more than twice as numerous as the High Church party". See his 'Church Parties', Edinburgh Review, XCVIII (1853), p. 337.

[2] Gladstone used this phrase in his speech on Jewish Disabilities, December 16, 1847. Hansard, 3d ser., XCV, 1302.

[3] W.L. Burn, The Age of Equipoise: a Study of the Mid-Victorian Generation (New York, 1965), p.16. See Also, G.M. Young, Victorian Essays (London, 1962), p. 153.

[4] Saturday Review, VII (1859), p. 239.

[5] Hansard, 3d ser., CIL, 514.

[6] Saturday Review, XIV (1862), p. 129.

[7] Ibid., XII (1861), p. 536.

[8] [Lord Robert Cecil], 'The Church in its Relations to Political Parties', Quarterly Review, CXVIII (1865), pp. 196-206.

[9] S.L. Ollard, A Short History of the Oxford Movement (London, 1963), p. 33.

[10] The Times, March 19, 1857, p.9.

[11] Guardian, December 21, 1864, p. 956. See also, [M. MacColl], Mr. Gladstone and Oxford, By Scrutator (London, 1865), p. 42.

CHAPTER I

PROTESTANT HIGH CHURCHMEN AND ANGLO-CATHOLICS

During the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the most controversial issue for High Churchmen was the proper relationship between Church and State. This was because the constitutional revolution of the years between 1828 and 1832 had made irrelevant the assumptions behind the Reformation settlement of the sixteenth century. The repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts had ended the formal principle of Anglican monopoly in central and local government; Catholic emancipation had admitted Roman Catholics to the legislature; the Reform Act had given greater political strength to the opponents of the Established Church, who were now firmly entrenched among the newly enfranchised ten pound householders. As a result, Churchmen had to reappraise their attitude towards the principle of establishment. The danger of maintaining the status quo under these changed conditions was very apparent. Dissenters from the Church of England could now expect to exercise considerable influence within a Parliament which had been its legislative body ever since Convocation was reduced to impotence in 1717. It was the Prime Minister responsible to Parliament who appointed

its bishops and dignitaries. A committee of the Privy Council had since 1833 been responsible in the last resort for deciding its doctrine. There was in particular under these new conditions danger that the temporal interests of the Church might be sacrificed for the exigencies of political warfare. On the other hand, to make the Church of England completely independent from the State would raise equally grave difficulties. It would be necessary to come to terms with a neutral, secular state. The position of the non-Anglican and non-Christian groups in the community would have finally to be settled. Above all, it would be necessary to determine whose was the responsibility for national education.

It was over this issue of Church-State relations that High Churchmen were to be so divided amongst themselves during the mid-Victorian years. Although there proved considerable differences on points of detail, it is possible to classify the opinions which were held into two main schools. On the one hand, Protestant High Churchmen still affirmed their traditional belief in the principles of 'the Constitution in Church and State', and thus emphasized the vital necessity to maintain the Established Church as long as this was possible.[1] On the other, Anglo-Catholics were much more conscious of the threat to the spiritual nature of the Church from its too close connection with an unsympa-

thetic state. Just how far apart these two groups were in their attitudes towards the Establishment can best be seen in the writings of three of their representative figures: William Palmer on the one side; John Keble and Edward Pusey on the other. Each of these men believed equally strongly in the divine authority of the Church, each was to play an important part in the Oxford Movement, each continued to exercise great influence in the Church after the secession of Newman and his disciples to Rome in 1845. There was, nevertheless, little in common between the policy suggested by Palmer and that by Keble and Pusey to meet the crisis which faced the Church of England in the eighteen-thirties.

William Palmer, Fellow of Worcester College, Oxford, and not to be confused with his name-sake of Magdalen, the brother of Roundell Palmer, is perhaps the least remembered of the leaders of the Oxford Movement. Between 1830 and 1850, however, in spite of his forbidding personality, he had enjoyed a great reputation both in the Church and at Oxford.[2] His early upbringing and environment had undoubtedly exercised a great effect on the way he thought about religion.[3] He was the son of an Irish army officer, and his religious training had not been like so many of his contemporaries in the Evangelical school, but in the sacramental principles of the high Anglican tradition.[4] Palmer's graduate study at Oxford confirmed for him his belief that

that Church still represented the primitive Christianity of the Church of the Apostles, which had been so seriously distorted elsewhere by the later developments of Roman Catholicism, "the mother of superstition and error".[5] He was convinced especially that "the Irish branch of the United Church of England and Ireland was a true branch of Christ's Catholic Church".[6] The Reformation of 1560 had merely restored to Ireland the practices of its native Church founded by St. Patrick and St. Columba, and which had been corrupted by the foreign authority of the Papacy, which had only been introduced into that country by the Norman conquerors as late as the twelfth century.[7] The bitter hostility felt by Palmer was also aggravated by the more secular consideration that its control over the majority of the Irish population might prove a serious threat to the privileged position of his class in the community.

Palmer supported the Established Church in Ireland, therefore, as a bulwark against an aggressive and corrupt Roman Catholicism. He saw no reason to doubt that the Church of England played the same role. His reading of seventeenth century history in particular had convinced him that Roman Catholicism, with its spiritual intolerance and its divided allegiance between papal and national authority, had always proved as great a danger to the security and well-being of the State as it had to the Church. The British people had,

in fact, suffered their worst humiliations in the period when Charles II, secretly, and James II, openly, had attempted to restore Romish absolutism.[8] In sharp contrast to this, the special relationship created between the Anglican Church and the State as a result of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which alone guaranteed that Britain would remain a Protestant nation, had brought about a period of unrivalled greatness and prosperity. Church Establishment and the Protestant ascendancy therefore, became two major axioms in Palmer's thought.

As a result, Palmer could not ignore the challenge against these principles which was implicit in the Whig Government's Irish Church policy after 1833, with its proposed wholesale reconstruction of the Established Church in that country. It was inevitable because of his influence both within Oxford and the Church as a whole that he should play a leading part in the opposition to that policy. In June 1833, he attended the famous conference at Hadleigh, with H.J. Rose, Arthur Perceval and Richard Hurrell Froude, which was to mark the effective opening of the Oxford Movement. It soon became apparent, however that he differed radically even at this time from his colleagues in this Movement, and especially those influenced by Froude, over the correct policy which should be adopted to meet this threat to the Church. This was most obvious with regard

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to the major question of its establishment.

Palmer was well aware that the constitutional changes which had taken place between 1828 and 1832 had done much to destroy the conditions which had previously justified the intimate connection between the Church and the State. In spite of this, however, he had little sympathy for the growing demand for its disestablishment, which was now being urged by Froude in particular as the best safeguard for its integrity. Palmer believed that such action would certainly be premature and might prove disastrous. It would entail the sacrifice of its endowments on which was based the whole Anglican parochial system, and which alone made possible the dissemination of religious truth possessed by that Church. The collapse of this system would allow the triumph of an aggressive Roman Catholicism, and also make easier the spread of infidelity.[9]

Palmer recognized, however, that the Church of England could only justify its still privileged position in the community by performing effectively its responsibilities as an Established Church, and this was impossible so long as it was divided into antagonistic groups. He believed, therefore, that it was urgently necessary to end 'party-spirit' among its members so that they could unite behind a common policy. This was his purpose when, in 1834, he became chiefly responsible for the formation of 'Associations

of Friends of the Church', which he hoped would

> unite all the Church, orthodox and evangelical, clergy, nobility and people, in maintenance of our doctrine and polity.[10]

He was greatly encouraged by the combined protest made by both Evangelicals and High Churchmen against the appointment by the Whig Government in 1836 of Dr. Hampden as Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford. As such, Hampden, who was, so they believed, a man of 'the boldest latitudarianism', determined to throw doubt on the authority of the Creeds, would have great responsibility for the education of the future Anglican clergy at the University. On May 5th, 1836, a majority of the University Convocation formally expressed their condemnation of Hampden's opinions by depriving him of his powers in the appointment of select preachers at Oxford.[11]

Hampden's condemnation was, however, the last success of Palmer in his attempts to reunite the Church against the threat to its integrity. From now on, it was the Anglo-Catholics who more and more assumed the leadership of the Oxford Movement. Palmer could have little sympathy for their principles, which sought to emphasize the catholic nature of the Church of England, and thus inevitably alienated the Evangelicals. Palmer disliked especially the ideas expressed in Tract 90, although he bitterly resented what he considered the persecution of

Newman after its publication.[12] For his part, Newman found it equally difficult to appreciate the policy suggested by Palmer. The portrait he drew of him in his Apologia is much the most unfriendly of those of his former colleagues in the Church of England:

> He was the only really learned man among us ... But he was deficient in depth ... nor had he any insight into the forces of personal influence and congeniality of thought in carrying out a religious theory ... Mr. Palmer had a certain connection, as it may be called, in the Establishment, consisting of high church dignitaries, arch-deacons, London rectors and the like, who belonged to what was commonly called the high-and-dry school... Of course, their beau ideal in ecclesiastical action was a board of safe, sound sensible men. Mr. Palmer was their organ and their representative; and he wished for a committee, an association with rules and meetings, to protect the interests of the Church in its existing peril.[13]

The gulf between these schools of opinion remained even after Newman and his more extreme disciples had left the Church in 1845. As a result, it still proved impossible for Protestant High Churchmen and Anglo-Catholics to combine effectively behind a common policy. Palmer, indeed, believed at this time that Keble and Pusey, who had now become the leading members of the Catholic group, would prove as great a danger to the interests of the Church as Newman had been, although he was later to acknowledge that their policy had in fact been chiefly responsible for saving it from disintegration.[14]

The partnership between Pusey and Keble, both men of great spiritual and moral influence within the Church of

England, was to be of primary importance for the development of Anglo-Catholicism in the middle years of the nineteenth century. On most major issues, they acted together with an identity of purpose which made them a most effective force in church affairs. There were, nevertheless, significant differences of opinion between them, which can be explained as the result of dissimilar experiences during the formative periods of their lives.

Like Palmer, John Keble had been brought up in the 'high-and-dry' tradition of churchmanship, and he was to be influenced by the memories of his father's teaching of its principles for the rest of his life.[15] As a result, he always possessed considerable sympathy for those who continued to regard the Established Church as "the pride and comfort" of their lives.[16] Even though he himself had already begun to question the value of establishment during the eighteen-twenties,[17] he was still prepared to play a leading part in the opposition to Peel in 1829, when that statesman sought re-election for Oxford University after having reversed his policy on Catholic Emancipation. Keble did so on the ground "that the settlement of the Catholic question in the way now proposed involved a great and certain danger to the Church Establishment."[18]

The fundamental change in church-state relations after 1832 made it necessary, however, that Keble should

reconsider his position on this matter. He proved much more prepared than Palmer had been to recognize the full consequences of this revolution. He now believed that it was possible "to form an exaggerated opinion of the necessity and sacredness of the alliance of Church and State; to sacrifice more or less of the very being of the Church... in order to secure its well-being".[19] With his innate reverence for all forms of authority, Keble still recognized the claims of the State to act as "a nursing father" to members of the Church.[20] He realized, nevertheless, that to do so was to risk the danger that the State might abuse its power, as the Whig Government had done in 1833 by its attempt to interfere with the Established Church in Ireland. If such action remained unchallenged, the State might succeed in extending its control over "the doctrinal purity and integrity of the most Sacred Order", and the result would be the creation of "a mere Parliamentary Church" in England.[21] Rather than allow this, Churchmen must be prepared to sacrifice the material benefits of Establishment, whatever the practical consequences might be, in order that the Anglican Church might recover her independence and apostolic character. For such reasons, Keble saw the events of 1688 in a very different light from that of Palmer. He believed that it was not the Whig Revolutionaries but the Non-Jurors who, because they had been ready to abandon their

benefices rather than break their sacred oath to the King, had chosen the better way at this time.[22]

Keble was also much more prepared than Palmer to accept the possibility of disestablishment because he did not see the need for the Church of England to act as a bulwark against an aggressive Papacy. He never shared the same fear of the Roman Catholic Church which so dominated the minds of the Protestant High Churchmen. Although he disapproved of the papal system which had grown up within that Church, he was also prepared to believe that the Anglican Church, since it had recovered its independence at the Reformation, had been equally guilty of distorting the principles of primitive Christianity.[23] During the early stages of the Oxford Movement, much to the dismay of his brother Tom, he had drawn steadily closer to Hurrell Froude and Newman.[24] After the death of Froude in 1836, he was responsible with Newman for the publication of his Remains, which were to cause such great offence to the Evangelical members of the Church of England, especially for its attacks on the character and motives of the English Reformers of the sixteenth century. Keble's reply to their criticisms in the preface he wrote for the second volume, in which he strongly defended Froude's opinions, did little to improve matters.[25] His reputation in the Church was now such as to prevent any direct challenge against him by his opponents,

but he had to suffer the indignity of seeing his curate at Hursley, Peter Young, rejected for Priest's Orders on the ground of his presumed unsound doctrine by his Diocesan, the leading Evangelical bishop, Charles Sumner of Winchester.[26] Keble's confidence in the Anglican church as a true portion of the Universal Church was still further shaken as he began to realize the extent of Newman's disillusionment with it, for it had been on the authority of Newman that he had so greatly relied as its surest guarantee.[27] His doubts and difficulties which were the result of these developments became so apparent that it was generally assumed in 1845 that he would soon follow Newman into the Roman Catholic Church.[28]

As a result, when Keble explained his reasons for remaining in the Church of England, it was natural that he wrote especially with those people in mind, who, like himself, were haunted by the thought: "what if the exclusive claim of the Roman Catholic Church be true? What if it should prove that as yet I have been living without the pale of Christ's Kingdom?"[29] He was able to appreciate fully this fear, and thus could never " reject all scruples concerning our Church with a strong moral abhorrence as he would any other evil imagination."[30] He was also able to understand the humiliation felt by many Anglo-Catholics as members of a Church which, when compared with the Roman Catholic Church,

could not but appear as a small and disunited body, which, moreover, did not possess any definite system of doctrine or ritual, and whose very existence seemed to have depended mainly on the secular ambitions of the Tudor monarchy.[31] In this defence of the Anglican Church, Keble made little constructive effort to resolve these difficulties. He depended rather on the method used by his most admired teacher, Bishop Butler, in insisting that men could never hope to achieve certainty in religious matters, but must base their actions on the principle of 'probability'. This meant that, however strong the claims of the Roman Catholic Church might be on the allegiance of all Christians, Anglicans had always to balance against these the necessarily harmful consequences of leaving the Church in which they had been raised: the danger of disturbing the faith of others, for example, or the agony caused by the separation from friends.[32] Keble was above all concerned to emphasize what the Guardian once described as "the legitimate influence of the hereditary Church".[33] For him, this was to remain always man's first loyalty: "wherever he has been called, there let him abide with God ... in whatsoever state you are, therewith be content until you discern an unequivocal manifestation of God's Will calling you out of it."[34]

Though Keble was to remain a faithful member of the Church of England until his death in 1866, his attitude

towards it was very different from that of Protestant High Churchmen like Palmer. He was much more aware in particular of the essential need to maintain its catholic character so that those who thought as he did could nevertheless remain within it without compromising their fundamental beliefs, even if this meant its disestablishment. By 1845, Edward Pusey had also come to the same conclusion. It was their agreement on this all-important matter that allowed the two men to form such an effective partnership during the next two decades. They had reached it, however, by significantly different paths.

During the eighteen-twenties, indeed, Pusey had proved that he was able to combine with his high church opinions such liberal principles as would have been anathema to Keble. It had been from his mother, Lady Lucy Pusey, that he had learned the necessity for an apostolic Church which alone could transmit the Grace and Mercy of God through the Sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist. Her teaching on the Prayer Book and the Catechism of the Church had convinced him, once and for all, that the Anglican Church was, indeed, such a Church.[35] He had, however, no sympathy with the 'high-and-dry' tradition of Anglican churchmanship. He considered its negative attitude towards spiritual religion would prove as great a danger to the Church in England as the sterile orthodoxy of seventeenth

century Lutheran theology had been in Germany, especially as it would encourage in reaction the growth of rationalism and infidelity. On this matter he was to engage in a bitter controversy with H.J. Rose, one of the leading Protestant High Churchmen.[36] Pusey had also strongly reacted in his youth against the ideas of his father, Philip Pusey, a most inflexible Tory who believed that Whiggism and atheism were practically identical terms.[37] Pusey's refusal to accept this judgement was strengthened when, in the interval between leaving Eton and going up to Christ Church, he became the pupil of the Rev. Edward Maltby, the future Bishop of Durham. According to Liddon, Maltby was a man of great kindliness, massive learning, Whig politics and doctrinal latitudinarianism: a combination of qualities which made a great impression on the young Pusey.[38] It was not surprising that, as a consequence, he won for himself at Oxford the reputation of being a liberal both in his religious and his political opinions. He disliked especially the privileged position in the community claimed by members of the Church of England, because he felt it the cause of "the bitterness of party spirit among Christians agreeing in the same essentials of faith" which was so prevalent in England.[39] His attitude towards catholic emancipation was in consequence a most tolerant one. Alone among the future leaders of the Oxford Movement, Pusey continued to support Peel at Oxford

after that Statesman had reversed his position on this issue.[40] In 1833, therefore, there seemed little in common between him and the men who were organizing the resistance to the Whig Government's religious policy. It was not surprising that he was not invited by Rose to attend the conference at Hadleigh that June.

By the end of the year, however, Pusey had made it clear that he was prepared to support the opposition to the Government. Newman, who realized the great assistance his influence and authority at Oxford, the result both of his great learning and his social background, could give the Movement, was overjoyed at the decision. As he wrote later: "no intimate friend of his could ever doubt he would be found on the right side in any time of peril."[41] What destroyed Pusey's confidence in the good intentions of the Whigs and made him a colleague of their bitterest opponents was not, however, their Irish Church policy. Unlike Palmer, he was not concerned about the implications of this policy for the cause of Church Establishment and the Protestant Ascendancy. As he later told Newman, he was "not at all at home on Church and State questions",[42] and he still felt no hostility towards the Roman Catholic Church, although he might disapprove of "the large practical system of Popery going beyond their formularies" which had developed within that Church.[43] The reason for Pusey's change of policy must

rather be sought in his growing concern over Whig interference in the affairs of Oxford University itself. Pusey was convinced that the great danger of the age was the spread of rationalism and infidelity. He believed that the University formed one bulwark against this in England, especially because of her responsibilities for the training of the clergy of the Church of England. In the circumstances of the eighteen-thirties, Pusey saw the two major threats against the University's performance of this duty as the challenge first from an aggressive dissent which seemed determined to destroy her essential character by the abolition of undergraduate subscription to the Thirty-Nine Articles, and secondly from the growth of a liberal theology among an influential section of its own members.[44] As a result, he could no longer approve of a Whig Government which was prepared to co-operate with the Dissenters for political reasons and to appoint Dr. Hampden as Professor of Divinity as a reward for his political activities on their behalf at the University.

From now on, it was Pusey's high church opinions which remained uppermost in his mind. Because of his standing both at Oxford and in society, he was quickly recognized as a leading member of the Oxford Movement. 'Puseyism' and 'Tractarianism' became, in fact, interchangeable terms. Pusey never suffered, however, the same agony of

doubt over the claims of the Roman Catholic Church to be the truly Universal Church as Newman and Keble did during the eighteen-forties. His faith in the Anglican Church remained unquestioned. He emphasized, nevertheless, that the authority of that Church could in no way be traced back to the Reformation settlement of the sixteenth century, but was the result of its success in maintaining the traditions of primitive Christianity.[45] By 1846 therefore, Pusey had reached the same conclusion as Keble about the essential need to preserve the 'catholic' as distinct from the 'protestant' elements in the Church of England. Like Keble, too, he was prepared to accept the sacrifice of the material benefits of establishment in order to ensure this. These two men were, as a result, ready to adopt an attitude towards the relations between Church and State that was much more in accordance with the growing secularization of society than that of the more orthodox Protestant High Churchmen. It was this fact which was to keep both men as staunch supporters of Gladstone in his struggle to retain his parliamentary seat at Oxford between 1847 and 1865, even though they might disapprove of some of the steps in his advance to political liberalism. It was also this fact that was to convince R.W. Church that Pusey was indeed one of the great religious leaders of all ages.[46]

After 1846, indeed, the younger generation of Anglo-

Catholics of whom Church was a leading representative, regarded Pusey and Keble with great admiration. Their relations with these two men were, nevertheless, uneasy. What distinguished the two generations was their different understanding of the complex problems of their world. Despite their enthusiastic involvement in contemporary events, especially Oxford politics, both Pusey and Keble saw these from the standpoint of a cloistered University and a country vicarage. The younger men were much more conscious of the need to discover "the true relationship between the mind of Oxford and what is possible in this time".[47] It is significant that their main centre was no longer at Oxford but in London, where the direction of their affairs was assumed by laymen rather than clerics. Here the dominating figure was Frederic Rogers, the future Lord Blachford. Rogers had been the last and favourite pupil of Newman, and he had rewarded his teacher's confidence by a highly successful university career, culminating in a double first and a fellowship at Oriel.[48] Elected to that College in 1833, he quickly came under the spell of Froude, learning from him his extreme views of the catholic nature of Anglican Church, which he was however to modify after he left the University.[49] In 1842, he came to London in order to read law, earning his living in the meantime by writing for the Times. He entered the civil service in 1844,

becoming an Assistant Under-Secretary in the Colonial Office a year later, in which department he was to spend the rest of his professional life. Rogers' great contribution to the Anglo-Catholic cause was the major part he played in founding the Guardian.[50] This was a weekly newspaper, first published on January 21st, 1846, under the editorship of Montague Bernard, a future Professor of International Law at Oxford. Rogers realized that if the paper was to exercise a wide influence, it must not be restricted to reporting news of a limited religious interest. The extent of the Guardian's coverage of secular affairs, of international politics, for example, or scientific and intellectual developments, does indeed emphasize the different attitude taken towards such matters by the second generation of Anglo-Catholics as compared with the leaders of the Oxford Movement itself.

Among the most prolific contributors to the Guardian was R.W. Church, who between 1846 and 1871 wrote at least one article a week for it.[51] Church had played an important personal part in the later stages of the Oxford Movement, and by some he was considered the most illustrous representative both of the Oxford of his day and of the Anglo-Catholic tradition.[52] By 1847, he had begun to realize, as a result of his travels on the Continent, that the liberal tendencies of the age could no longer be dismissed out of hand as an anti-religious phenomenon. During his stay in

Greece, in particular, he had watched with considerable sympathy the constitutional struggle against authoritarian rule. Although he disapproved strongly of the excesses of the revolutionary movements in 1848, he opposed equally strongly the conservative reaction which succeeded them. Church was now prepared in fact to judge all types of government strictly on their own merits, whether these might be socialist regimes as in France or clerical tyrannies as in Italy, both of which might prove harmful to the interests of their subjects.[53] It was this same refusal to accept dogmatic certainties, even if these were firmly maintained by his teachers at Oxford, that was to persuade Church to reconsider openmindedly the speculative theology of such Broad Churchmen as Frederick Temple, Jowett and Arthur Stanley. As his biographer has emphasized, Church could not be an Anglo-Catholic with a closed mind, even if this meant differing from Pusey and Keble over some fundamental issues.[54]

During the critical years after 1833, therefore, High Churchmen were never able to act together as an effective party because they were so divided amongst themselves, and especially over the critical issue of church establishment. The effect of this was to be as pronounced in political as it was in religious affairs. It was to

determine especially their relationship to the Whig and Conservative Parties. Both the Protestant High Churchmen and the Anglo-Catholics were to have their spokesmen in Parliament. Until the great debate on the Maynooth question in 1845, it was the former group who exercised the greater influence there. Their strength did not depend on numbers but in the fervour and conviction with which they upheld their opinions. Above all, in Sir Robert Inglis they had a leader who possessed great authority in the House of Commons.

Inglis's own religious principles are difficult to classify exactly. For a time, indeed, just before the general election of 1841, there was considerable confusion among his contemporaries over his relationship with the Tractarians, which was deepened when he refused to make clear when challenged in the Commons to do so how far he agreed or disagreed with their principles.[55] It was claimed by his opponents, as a result, that, because he was aware of their growing influence at Oxford, he was prepared to be "a Protestant in one college and a pseudo-Catholic in another" in order to safeguard his university seat.[56] Once safely re-elected, however, Inglis had no further hesitation in emphasizing his belief in the essential Protestant nature of the English Church.[57] Inglis, in fact, was able to combine Evangelical opinions, which he perhaps owed to his

close family connection with the Thorntons, who were leading members of the Clapham sect,[58] with well-established high church principles, which he clearly and forcibly expressed in the House of Commons during many debates in the eighteen-thirties and -forties. He was convinced, in particular, that the Church was in no sense of the term a voluntary association enunciating hap-hazard opinions, but instead a divinely constituted depository of Divine Truth.[59] As such, its function was to act as the conscience of the State, in the manner described in "the remarkable and admirable book by Mr. W.E. Gladstone".[60] It was, therefore, "the most precious deposit in the Constitution of England" as this had been settled in 1689, and under which England had enjoyed a level of civilization and comfort never equalled in any community before.[61] Inglis claimed that it was indeed the members of the old Tory party like himself who were now the true representatives and successors of the great men of the Revolution, for it was they alone who defended its principles.[62] He was, moreover, prepared to go to extreme measures in order to preserve these principles. In 1829, he had, for example, urged the Government to send the Duke of Cumberland with thirty thousand men to Ireland to crush the agitation for Catholic Emancipation there, rather than make concessions that would threaten the interests of the Established Church.[63] He was forced to

accept the fact that after the surrender of the Conservative Government over this issue, "the Constitution in Church and State" had inevitably been slowly but steadily eroded. He himself, however, had no doubts about its continuing validity. Even in 1845 he could still maintain that

> the Protestant colours were still at the mast head; and so long as a single shred of the old flag lasted, he for one would endeavour to nail it to the mast, and he would fight as unflinchingly for it and under it as when in brighter days it waved entire and untorn over an Empire.[64]

Such views were very similar to those held by such Protestant High Churchmen as William Palmer, and they were quite prepared to accept the leadership of Inglis in Parliament. Here he had already established a reputation for himself even before his successful challenge to Sir Robert Peel in 1829 over the issue of Catholic Emancipation, when he had captured the seat at Oxford University from that statesman.[65] His commanding personality, however oppressive it might prove in his family circle, was well suited to the atmosphere of the House of Commons, and when he died in 1854, it was claimed that he had a larger circle of acquaintances there than any other public man.[66] His interests were those of an independent country member, but at the same time he had succeeded in acquiring a parliamentary skill and knowledge which enabled him to play a full part in the business of the House of Commons. Looking "the very impersonation of good humour", he was to prove a far

more effective champion of the Church than the new type of High Churchman could ever hope to be, with his 'pale face, cadaverous complexion, austerity and bodily leanness".[67]

It was inevitable that both Inglis and the Protestant High Churchmen, believing as they did in the principles of 'the Constitution in Church and State' should be hostile towards a Whig Government which, after 1833, seemed determined to make an end of it once and for all. They believed that the Government was prepared to sacrifice these principles because of its need for the political support of the Dissenters and, particularly after 1836, of the Roman Catholic 'Irish Brigade' in the House of Commons. This did not prevent, however, the attitude of these Churchmen to the new Conservative Party created by Sir Robert Peel after 1832 out of the ruins of the old Toryism, as being anything but an equivocal one. In the political circumstances of the time, it might seem natural that they should have accepted the claims of that Party to inherit the role of the traditional defender of the Church against the aggression of the latitudinarian Whigs. William Palmer, indeed, welcomed enthusiastically, as did many other Churchmen, the comparative triumph of the Conservatives in the 1835 election, which did much to reverse the disasters of 1831-1832.[68] The Conservative Party strategists were naturally anxious to make full advantage of this support as they gradually succeeded in

reviving their political fortunes.[69] In Sir Robert Peel, moreover they possessed a leader who never forgot the traditional principles of Church and State which he had learnt during his youth.[70] His determination above all to preserve the Establishment was made evident in all his speeches and letters dealing with the crisis facing the Church. When he was returned to office in 1841, he was able to work closely with the all-powerful Bishop Blomfield of London, a man of the most impeccable churchmanship.[71] It was the policy put into effect by these two men, and in particular the reorganization of the financial structure of the Established Church, which made possible, contrary to all expectations, its survival until the present. There would, therefore, have seemed little reason why the alliance between high Churchmen and the Conservative Party under such a leader should not be a strong and permanent one.

In spite of this, there was during this period a most pronounced feeling of mutual distrust between the Conservative politicians and High Churchmen, which was always clearly evident and could never be overcome. This was due to the fact that what appeared to the politicians as a policy of political realism in a complex set of circumstances was dismissed by the Churchmen as nothing more than political expediency. Men like Inglis could never forget Peel's surrender over Catholic Emancipation

in 1829, and they always feared he would betray them again. For their part, Peel and his colleagues were convinced that any extreme claims put forward on behalf of the Church of England would only serve to alienate the moderate non-Anglicans, and if they became associated with them, might prove electorally disastrous. Goulburn, Peel's future Chancellor of the Exchequer, for example, refused to add his name to the Address to the Archbishop of Canterbury, which had been drawn up by Palmer in 1833 in protest against the ecclesiastical policy of the Whig Government, on the grounds that it emphasized too much the authority it claimed on behalf of the clergy over the laity. He urged that instead greater emphasis should be laid on the threat implicit in that policy against the property rights of the Church, as the defence of such rights as a matter of principle would have a far wider appeal in the country as a whole.[72] In 1842, to take another example, when the Conservatives were once again in office, their leaders were equally concerned about the proposal made by Inglis in the House of Commons that the Government should greatly increase its aid for the building of new churches. Sir James Graham, the Home Secretary, feared the effect on public opinion of this use of public money in the interests of the Established Church. He warned Peel that:

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will be safer to moderate some proposal made by Inglis than to venture on a measure of our own.[73]

The Conservative Party was, thus, well aware of the need to prevent their complete identification with the views of the more extreme High Churchmen. They were even more conscious of the electoral danger in being associated with the extravagances of the Anglo-Catholics, especially after the publication of Tract 90 in 1841, which appeared to many as a betrayal of the Church of England by some of her own members. The spirit of 'No Popery' was too strong in the land to allow Peel and his colleagues to be tolerant in this matter even if they had wished to be so. On the other hand, the suspicion felt by men like Inglis in the intentions of the Conservative leaders became downright hostility on the part of Newman and his disciples. They were convinced that, in order to recover and retain power, Peel was quite prepared to sacrifice his religious principles and accept the implications of the rational, utilitarian spirit of the age. Newman was especially bitter in his criticism. When Peel made a more than usually pompous electioneering speech in 1840 about the over-riding necessity to develop a system of national education, he attacked his arguments in a series of sarcastic letters to the Times under the thinly disguised anonymity of 'Catholicus'.[74] In them he accused Peel, in his search for an effective party-cry, of adopting the liberal 'heresy' that education was a good thing in itself

irrespective of its nature and content. Newman maintained that, as in the case of Catholic Emancipation, Peel was prepared to steal from the Whigs whatever might give him some political advantage. This charge hit that statesman in his most sensitive spot, and it was not therefore surprising that when Peel was again in office, he made it clear that Newman and the Tractarians could expect no preferment in the Church from his Government.[75]

Until 1845, the Anglo-Catholics could never hope to exercise in Parliament the same kind of influence as did the Protestant High Churchmen. According to Newman, in 1839, their views were represented in the House of Commons by a single county member.[76] In the 1841 Parliament, the leadership which they lacked might have been provided by Lord John Manners, the eldest son of the Duke of Rutland, and a founder of the 'Young England' group, which has recently been described as "that curious translation of the Oxford Movement by Cambridge from religion into politics".[77] It was when he was at Cambridge that Manners had come under the influence of Frederick Faber, one of Newman's disciples. He first heard Faber preach in the church at Ambleside during the long vacation of 1838, and, like his close friend George Smythe, fell immediately under his spell.[78] It was from Faber that he learned to believe in the essential role that the Anglican Church would have to play in the

regeneration of the newly industrialized English society. At this time, however, Manners was less prepared than either Faber or George Smythe to accept that its disestablishment was the essential first step to enable it to fulfill this purpose.[79] The great contribution Faber made to Manners's religious development was to convince him of the catholic nature of the Anglican Church, and in doing so made it possible for him to adopt a far more tolerant attitude towards the Roman Catholic Church itself than most of the English landed gentry took at this time. This tolerance was to survive even the shock of Faber's own seccession to that Church in 1845, which was to result in the break-up of their personal friendship.[80] Manners had no hesitation in making his unorthodox opinions in this respect widely known, especially within the House of Commons itself. His demand in 1843 for the repeal of the law of Mortmain, which would make it possible in future for religious bodies to inherit landed property, was made not only on behalf of the Church of England, but also in the interests of the Roman Catholic Church in England. This did much in particular to establish his reputation as a Puseyite.[81] The seriousness with which Manners took his high church principles was made clear when he persuaded his colleagues in the Young England group to accept these as the primary bond of union between them.[82]

This decision, however, assumed a degree of unanimity

on religious matters between this small group of nine or ten politicians which certainly did not exist. Even in the inner circle of its leadership, A.B. Cochrane never claimed at this time to have any sympathy with anglo-catholic beliefs, although he was always anxious to disassociate himself from the extreme 'No Popery' element in the Conservative Party and was later to be classed by the Guardian amongst the High Church parliamentarians.[83] Disraeli, on the other hand, boldly professed these doctrines at this time, but his sincerity in doing so was very much in doubt, even amongst his colleagues. George Smythe found considerable amusement in observing "his attempts to explain, mysticise, adumbrate, obscure, evolve Puseyism"[84], and once remarked that "Dizzy's attachment to moderate Oxfordism is something like Bonaparte's to moderate Mahommendanism".[85] As for Smythe himself, he never pretended to feel deeply about religious matters, and confessed he had no great belief in 'catholic verity'.[86] All this was to weaken the image of 'Young England' as the champion of Anglo-Catholicism in the House of Commons after the members of the group had come together in 1843, and made Lord John Manners himself far less effective as its spokesman than he might otherwise have been.

By 1845 English High Churchmen had indeed much cause to feel pessimistic about the contemporary political situation. The record of the Whig Government in the eighteen-thirties

had done much to confirm their distrust of the religious principles of that party. This had not resulted, however, in consolidating their alliance with the Conservatives. Both the Protestant High Churchmen and the Anglo-Catholics could never overcome their suspicion of Sir Robert Peel in particular. The first group were constantly on their guard against a betrayal of their principles such as they had experienced in 1829; the second had nothing but dislike for his erastian approach to the problems of the Church. It was in this frame of mind that High Churchmen shaped their attitude towards the political crisis of 1845-1846, which was to bring about the disintegration of Peel's Conservative Party.

NOTES: CHAPTER I

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[6] English Review, III (1845), p. 329.

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[22] W. Lock, John Keble (London, 1893), p.4.

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[25] Lock, John Keble, p. 95 for the attribution of authorship of this preface.

[26] Battiscombe, John Keble, pp. 223-226.

[27] Ibid., p. 257.

[28] Lock, John Keble, p. 147.

[29] Keble, Sermons, p. iii.

[30] Ibid., p. vi.

[31] Ibid., pp. xxv-xxvi.

[32] Ibid., pp. vi-viii.

[33] Guardian, February 4th, 1852, p. 77.

[34] Keble, Sermons, pp. xviii-xix.

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[36] Ibid., I, p. 165.

[37] Ibid., I, pp.2-4.

[38] Ibid., I, p.20.

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[44] Liddon, Life of Pusey, I, pp. 285, 293.

[45] Ibid., II, p. 140.

[46] B.A. Smith, Dean Church: the Anglican Response to Newman (London, 1959), p. 148.

[47] Stafford Northcote, quoting R.W. Church, to Gladstone, January 13., 1853. Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. Mss., 44216, f. 199.

[48] G.E. Marinden, Letters of Frederic, Lord Blachford (London, 1896), pp. 6, 15.

[49] Ibid., p. 27.

[50] Ibid., pp. 118-119: Smith, Dean Church, pp. 74-81.

[51] Ibid., p. 78.

[52] See especially Northcote to Gladstone, August 2., 1847. Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. Mss., 44216, f.55.

[53] Smith, Dean Church, pp. 91-105.

[54] Ibid., pp. 139-142.

[55] Hansard, 3d. ser., LXIX (1842), 561.

[56] Ibid., 551.

[57] Ibid., 576.

[58] E.M. Forster, Marianne Thornton: A Domestic Biography (London, 1956), pp. 74-76.

[59] Hansard, 3d ser., LV (1840), 311.

[60] Ibid., 282.

[61] Ibid., XCV (1847), 1254.

[62] Ibid., IX (1832), 435.

[63] Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. Mss, 44790, f.59.

[64] Hansard, 3d ser., LXXIX (1845), 52.

65 Fraser's Magazine for Town and Country, XXXIV (1846), p. 648.

66 Ibid., p. 649: Gentleman's Magazine, new ser., XLIII (1855), p. 640.

67 Fraser's Magazine, XXXIV, pp. 651-652.

68 Palmer, Narrative, p. 115.

69 G.A. Cahill, "Irish Catholicism and English Toryism", Review of Politics, XIX (1957), pp. 62-78.

70 G. Kitson Clark, Peel and the Conservative Party: a Study in Party Politics, 1832-1841 (New York, 1964), p.40.

71 P.J. Welch, "Blomfield and Peel: a Study in Co-operation", Journal of Ecclesiastical History, XII (1961), pp. 71-84: O.J. Brose, Church and Parliament: the Reshaping of the Church of England, 1828-1860 (Stanford, Calif., 1959), pp. 43-97.

72 Ibid., p. 59: Palmer, Narrative, pp. 216-217.

73 Brose, Church and Parliament, p. 60.

74 J.H. Newman, "Tamworth Reading Room, in Newman: Prose and Poetry, ed. by G. Tillotson (London, 1957), pp. 75-112.

75 Welch, "Blomfield and Peel", J. Ecc. Hist., XII, p. 76.

76 J.H. Newman, "Prospects of the Anglican Church", Essays and Sketches. 3 vols. (London, 1948), I, p. 335. Newman did not identify this member further than saying that his constituency was in the centre of England.

77 R. Blake, "The Rise of Disraeli", Essays in British History presented to Sir Keith Feiling, ed., by H.R. Trevor-Roper (London, 1964), p. 235.

78 R. Chapman, Father Faber (London, 1961), pp. 46-51: C. Whibley, Lord John Manners and his Friends. 2 vols. (London, 1925), I, pp. 67ff.

79 Ibid., I, p.67.

80 Ibid., I, pp.73-74.

81 Hansard., 3d ser., LXXI, 99-109.

82 Whibley, Lord John Manners, I, p. 153.

83 J.W. Daly, 'Peel and Tory Paternalism, 1839-1846', unpubl. M.A. Thesis, University of Toronto (1960), pp. 166, 176: Guardian, April 15th, 1857, p. 290.

84 Whibley, Lord John Manners, I, p. 185.

85 Ibid., I, p. 153.

86 Ibid., I, p. 185.

CHAPTER II

THE CONSERVATIVE SCHISM, 1845-1846

The break-up of the Conservative Party in these years was the result of the reaction both in Parliament and in the country to two acts of Peel's Government: first, the increase of the grant to the Roman Catholic training college at Maynooth in 1845, and secondly, the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. Both these were issues of primary concern for English Churchmen of all shades of opinion.

The controversy over Maynooth was indeed to provide one of the great parliamentary crises of the mid-Victorian years, bringing about, in Lord John Manners' words, "the wreck of parties".[1] The responsibility of the Government for the college was, indeed, by now generally accepted. William Pitt had originally founded it in order to promote the education of the Roman Catholic clergy in 1795 as part of his policy of conciliation towards Ireland during the French Revolutionary war, which policy he hoped would prevent that country from rising in rebellion. He had justified his action in England on the ground that the clergy could no longer expect to receive their education in the Catholic seminaries on the Continent as they had done previously.

Pitt had also arranged that the Government should pay an annual subsidy of £8000 towards the expenses of the college, and this was reconfirmed after the passing of the Act of Union in 1800. It was necessary, however, that Parliament should vote this money each year in a committee of supply, thus giving those members who opposed the principle behind it the recurring opportunity to challenge the action of the Government. Churchmen like Sir Robert Inglis in particular, who believed that by paying this grant the Government was implicitly recognizing the standing of the Roman Catholic Church in the community, maintained that it was a most serious threat against the status of the Established Church of England.

Bad as this was, the situation from the point of view of these High Churchmen was made even worse by the new policy adopted by the Conservative Government in 1845. Although by this time the grant had been increased to £9500, Peel was now convinced that even this amount was not sufficient to provide a good education for the Catholic clergy, which was so necessary because they would inevitably exercise a great authority among the Irish people. On April 3rd, 1845, he announced to the House of Commons his proposals to correct this situation.[2] The Government intended to transform the annual grant into a permanent one, to increase it to £26000, to provide a subsidy of £3000 for new buildings and to incorporate the trustees of the college. Peel firmly denied

that any new principle would have been introduced into the relationship between the Government and the college if these proposals were put into practice, or that any sort of bargain had been made with the Roman Catholic leaders in Ireland. In spite of this disclaimer, the rest of the parliamentary session was mainly devoted to a sustained attack on his policy. As a result, Maynooth became the issue which was to split the regenerated Conservative Party almost twelve months before the better known crisis over the repeal of the Corn Laws. This split was clearly evident in the division on the third reading of the Bill, when there was a majority of Conservatives who actually voted against the Prime Minister, making it necessary for Peel to depend on the support of the Whigs in order to avoid defeat.[3]

The Conservatives were equally divided amongst themselves over the Government's proposal to repeal the Corn Laws in order to meet the emergency caused by the failure of the potato crop in Ireland during 1845. For many of them, this was another, perhaps the greatest, example of Peel's political apostasy, since he had won his electoral triumph in 1841 by making their defence his primary concern. The ending of Protection also carried with it serious implications for English Churchmen, even if this time in connection with their secular rather than their religious interests. Ever since the commutation of tithes in 1836,

their income had depended on the selling price of grain. According to the scale fixed that year, the £100 tithe owner was to receive each year in future the money-equivalent of 94 bushels of wheat, 168 bushels of barley, and 242 bushels of oats, this being calculated according to the average price over the previous seven years.[4] It was feared that repeal would result in the reduction of clerical income by more than a quarter, and it thus appeared a direct threat to the status of the clergymen in the community.[5] It was this fear which, according to Beresford-Hope, was "to convert the mass of country clergy into acrimonious politicians".[6]

By 1846, therefore, the Conservative Party had broken up over the two major issues of the Maynooth grant and Protection. The effect of this was to persist through the eighteen-fifties, though protection no longer existed as a live political issue after the 1852 general election and the annual debate on Maynooth had become "a mock duel, a sham fight, a playing at Parliament".[7] In particular, it meant that the politics of the period were complicated by the existence of two Conservative factions: on the one hand, those who had accepted the leadership of Lord Stanley (Lord Derby from 1851), and, very reluctantly from the sheer force of necessity, of Disraeli in the House of Commons; on the other, those who still maintained their

loyalty to Peel, even after his death in 1850, the so-called Peelites, who included among their leaders most of the Conservatives who had had governmental experience, and who did not finally disappear as an independent group until 1859 when their last remnants finally joined one or other of the two major political parties. These same two issues of Maynooth and Protection were to be equally responsible for making even clearer the growing differences between the political attitudes of Protestant High Churchmen and Anglo-Catholics at this time.

The Government's proposal for Maynooth finally destroyed whatever confidence the Protestant High Churchmen still retained in Sir Robert Peel. In spite of all the changes which had taken place since 1828, they were still convinced of the essential need to preserve the union of Church and State, "which gave the state a conscience, making it another phase of the Christian Church".[8] The maintenance of this union, however, required that the state should recognize one Church alone as being the true one. These High Churchmen were convinced that the new system of government aid for Maynooth proved that the Conservative leaders had now finally abandoned this principle. They thus gave wholehearted support to the most hostile attacks made by Sir Robert Inglis on the Government in the House of Commons.[9] Inglis was completely unable to accept Peel's claim that no question of principle was involved in the changes he was

proposing. By making the grant a permanent one which was no longer subject to a vote of Parliament, the Government was in fact going beyond the recognition and the toleration of the Roman Catholic Church, bad as that had been in itself. Inglis argued that the inevitable next step would be the actual endowment of the Church. As a result, the new policy towards Maynooth would prove to be the greatest concession ever made by English Protestantism to its ancient enemy, not even excepting the Emancipation Act of 1829. Peel was proposing nothing less than a revolution in the system of Church-State relations which had been accepted since the Reformation. The only defence he could put forward would be one of political expediency; the need to conciliate Irish public opinion in order to safeguard the Union. The experience of the eighteen-thirties surely proved, however, that such a policy had little chance of success. The demands of the Irish would only increase the more that was conceded to them. Whatever its effect in Ireland, moreover, it would certainly place Peel in a dangerous position both in Parliament and in England as a whole. He could only expect to pass his measure through the House of Commons by appealing for the support of his opponents. The evidence of the great number of public meetings which had been called to protest against the proposal proved how decisively opinion in the country was against him over this issue. As

in the case of Catholic Emancipation in 1829, Inglis could still argue that, even if Peel won the support of a majority in the Commons, this would not fairly represent the opinion of the electorate which had sent them there, even in spite of the passing of the Reform Act.[10]

The Protestant High Churchmen certainly shared in this widespread popular opposition to the Government's policy. Their mouthpiece, the English Review, which had been established by the Rev. William Palmer in 1844, now thundered forth its discontent:

> we regard Sir Robert Peel's ministry from this moment as essentially hostile to the Church. He has thrown himself on the support of parties to whom the Church has ever been obnoxious, and he will be compelled to give way to their wishes.[11]

The mistaken policy of the Government was due in fact to a fatal flaw in Peel's own character:

> Peel has the qualities of reason to constitute a great man: the qualities of his heart lower him to the stature of inferior minds. Perception, clear judgment, absence of passion, tenacious memory balanced by want of nerve, self reliance, moral resolution so as to damp his mind and make it fall before the flatteries or threats of his opponents.[12]

The Conservative Party as a whole was most likely to suffer as a result of it at the next general election:

> our politics are diametrically opposed to those of Lord John Russell and Mr O'Connell; but if we were called on to decide between a friend of Sir Robert Peel's and one of Mr O'Connell's, we should without hesitation vote for the latter, in order to mark our reprobation of political apostasy.[13]

Even before that election, however, Peel had given these Churchmen a further great cause for offence by his reversal of policy over Protection. Once again, the English Review expressed its disgust:

> it shows us that the Prime Minister is prepared to throw overboard every principle on pressure; it warns us that no faith can be placed on his past assurances; that no trust can be reposed in his general principles; that his policy is the work of chance and pressure; and that, if occasion serves, he will give up every institution in England... . If anyone tells us that Sir Robert Peel is attached to the Church that he has promised to maintain, who can forget that he declared himself the ardent friend of the Corn Laws, and that the sound of his assurances are scarcely past before he abandons them.[14]

The Review's condemnation of Peel on this issue was supported to a certain extent in the House of Commons by the parliamentary High Churchmen, a small majority of whom voted against the Government in defence of protection.[15]

The Maynooth grant and the repeal of the Corn Laws had confirmed the hostility of the Protestant High Churchmen towards Peelite Conservatism. Their dislike of Peel was indeed to be transferred to those of his followers who remained loyal to him after 1846, irrespective of their previous record in church matters. By 1847, the Review was already denouncing them in comprehensive terms which admitted no exception:

> From the Party which adheres to that statesman, the Church has no good to anticipate; she is only indebted to them for the repeal of the Test and

> Corporation Acts in 1828; Emancipation in 1829; for the Endowment of Maynooth and the 'Godless Colleges' in 1845; for the admission of Jewish legislators in 1847. Amidst professions of regard for the Church, they have on every opportunity betrayed her to her enemies and refused to promote her interests.[16]

The course of events during the eighteen-fifties did nothing to make these Churchmen any more favourable to the Peelites. In particular, it was felt that their need for support from the more liberal elements in the House of Commons made it impossible for them to defend the interests of the Church wholeheartedly, however much they might profess their desire to do so.[17]

At the same time, the Protestant High Churchmen could feel little more confidence in those Conservatives who had broken with Peel. They were unable, as Peel was, to visualize a political future with "Inglis in his proper place as the leader of a real old Tory Church of England, Protectionist, Protestant party; and Lord Stanley acting in concert with him."[18] The English Review was now convinced that it would be impossible to form any such ministry based on the traditional principles of Church and State, especially as "every young man of rising talent" had deserted those who still tried to maintain these principles.[19] Further, it was to find much in Stanley's religious thinking to criticize as harshly as it had that of Peel, thus preventing it from accepting wholeheartedly his leadership.[20]

It might have been thought, indeed, that Lord Derby - to use his more customary title - had done enough by 1846 to commend himself to high church opinion. He had never disguised his belief in the virtues of church establishment. He was convinced that the Anglican Church was an essential part of the British way of life, and he was especially concerned to protect it against any challenge to its privileged position within the community.[21] He made this most clear when he was Secretary for Ireland between 1831 and 1833. He was well aware of the anomalous status enjoyed by the Established Church in that country, and he showed himself prepared to accept the reform of its more unacceptable features. But he would never support any action of the Government of which he was a member which he felt would weaken the principle of establishment itself. It was because of this that he asked to be relieved of his post as Irish Secretary in February 1833 when it became clear that his colleagues were not prepared to enforce the collection of tithes: it was because of this that he resigned from the Whig Government in May 1834 when he became convinced that it was prepared to devote a portion of the Irish Church's revenues for purely secular purposes.[22] It was this resignation for such a matter of principle that should have finally established Derby's reputation amongst High Churchmen of all shades of opinion. It pleased the Protestant

High Churchmen because it was essentially a defence of church establishment; it pleased the Anglo-Catholics because, after all, it had been the Whiggish aggression against the Irish Church which had begun the Oxford Movement itself.

There was, however, another side of Derby's religious thinking which did much to destroy this good impression. Despite his resignation from the Government, Derby always retained much of the Whig attitude towards life, which had pervaded the family background in which he had been brought up.[23] This was especially so in matters of religion where he never discarded the traditional principles of that party. For this reason, while he always remained a sincere Protestant, believing that the Reformation had been one of the great blessings in English history, he was nevertheless prepared to recognize that beneath the differences separating the various denominations there was a common basis to Christianity as a whole.[24] Like most of the Whigs, therefore, Derby was far more tolerant of Roman Catholicism than the Protestant High Churchmen approved. He had been a strong supporter of Catholic Emancipation during the eighteen-twenties, making this his grounds for accepting office under Canning in 1827.[25] As Secretary for Ireland after 1831, he had proposed a scheme of national education for that country, which would have allowed both Protestant and Catholic children to be educated together by dividing religious from

literary instruction.[26] As Colonial Secretary in the same administration, he was ready to acknowledge the claims of the Roman Catholic Church to a special status in those British territories overseas which contained a large Catholic population, and he continued the same practice when, after breaking with the Whigs, he held the same office in Peel's conservative ministry formed in 1841.[27] As a result, it was not surprising that Protestant High Churchmen tended to find much more to dislike than to admire in Derby as a religious statesman. The English Review was particularly bitter in its condemnation, maintaining that he had been

> the steady supporter of Romanism and Secretarianism in the Colonies, the enemy of the Church of Ireland and Wales, the determined opponent of any measure for an increase of episcopacy in England, the author of the unprincipled and unholy education system in Ireland, the man who dared to threaten the prelates of England with the loss of their seats in Parliament if any addition was made to the number of episcopal sees.[28]

The Protestant High Churchmen thus clearly had considerable justification for feeling pessimistic about the political situation in 1846. They believed that Peel had betrayed the interests of the Established Church over Maynooth and the Corn Laws: they had little more confidence in Derby who, because of his parliamentary standing, would inevitably become the leader of those Conservatives who had broken with the Prime Minister over these issues. As a result, they foresaw a future in which it would be most

difficult to maintain the traditional alliance between the Church of England and the Conservative Party.

For the Anglo-Catholics, on the other hand, the outlook for the Church was not so foreboding. Over the two crucial issues of Maynooth and the Corn Laws, they had indeed taken the opposite point of view from that of the Protestant High Churchmen, thus establishing that political division amongst English High Churchmen which was to be maintained during the next two decades. In particular, they saw nothing to fear in the increased government aid to the Roman Catholic training college. During the Maynooth debate, a speech by Sir Walter James, the future Lord Northbourne, proved how far apart these two groups of High Churchmen were on this matter. He was especially hostile towards the arguments used by Inglis:

> If Sir R. Inglis believed the Roman Catholic Church to be the enemy of Christianity - to be anti-Christian - then he was justified in opposing it... . But he had been brought up in a different way and entertained very different opinions. He believed that there was in the Church of Rome something to admire and yet much to deplore; but he did not think that he was bound to consider that Church otherwise than as a Christian Church.

James went on to maintain that his own religious faith would be completely undermined if Roman Catholicism was proved to be in actual fact as "idolatrous, as anti-Christian, as abominable as Inglis suggests".[29]

The most far reaching result of this debate was,

however, to break up the 'Young England' group in so far as this was united by common religious principles.[30] The most striking division was that between Disraeli on the one hand and Lord John Manners with George Smythe on the other. When on April 11th., 1845, Disraeli made a most powerful speech against the measure, the Anglo-Catholic Viscount Castlereagh believed that he had committed his friends to vote against Peel:

> he had witnessed the first alliance and flirtation between ... Sir Robert Inglis and the Representative of the Chivalry of his Party and the beauty of Young England... . Of that Union he did not think there would be any fruit; the best they could look for would be spawn.[31]

In his speech, Disraeli had nevertheless made it clear that his opposition to Peel was the result of political rather than religious considerations. Unlike Inglis, he had little concern about the effects of the Maynooth Act on church-state relations. He was prepared to acknowledge that the 'Constitution in Church and State' which had been established at the Reformation was no longer valid in the changed conditions caused by the 1828-1832 revolution, and that any attempt to maintain its principles might do more harm than benefit to the Established Church. That Church would be in a far stronger position to defend her interests if she was allowed her independence from the State. What persuaded Disraeli to vote with Inglis was not his fears for the ecclesiastical but for the secular constitution of the country.

He emphasized, as Inglis had done, that the majority of the Conservative Members of Parliament were opposed to the bill, and thus it could only be carried by the Government if they were prepared to rely on the support of the Opposition. Disraeli was convinced, therefore, that this was part of Peel's determination to destroy the party system as the basis of English politics, and thus allow him to become the unchallenged dictator of the country. Disraeli emphasized, with all the force at his command, that the vital requirement of the time was the overthrow of the Government, which would ensure the survival of constitutionalism in England.[32]

When Lord John Manners and George Smythe spoke in the debate five nights later, however, they both gave far greater weight to religious considerations than Disraeli had done. Manners, in particular, took this opportunity to make a most violent attack on the Irish Established Church, thus incurring the wrath of William Palmer and his English Review.[33] He argued that, in order to safeguard its material benefits, the Church of England in Ireland had been ready to form an alliance with the Irish Presbyterians against the Catholics, and, in doing so, separate themselves as a result from the rest of Catholic Christendom. On the other hand, Manners believed that the Roman Catholic Church still remained a true, if far from pure, part of the Universal Catholic Church. It was necessary, moreover, to accept the fact

that her priests were indeed recognized by the Irish peasantry as their proper representatives, and that the future of the union between England and Ireland depended on the priest's readiness to co-operate with the English government. For that reason it would be in the interests of England to make sure that they were not fanatics in their devotion to their own religion, and Manners believed that this could be best guaranteed by giving them as good an education as possible.[34] It was on such grounds that both he and George Smythe voted in support of the Government's measure, even though Smythe was as infuriated as Disraeli by what he considered another example of Peel's 'ratting'.[35]

The controversy over Maynooth in 1845, therefore, marked a critical stage in the relations between Protestant High Churchmen and Anglo-Catholics. There could, indeed, be no compromise between the ideas expounded by a man like Inglis and those of Manners as to what should be the proper policy of the Government towards the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland. Even more significant was the proof it gave of the existence of an Anglo-Catholic group in the House of Commons, which was prepared to follow the example of Lord John Manners in voting for increased government aid to Maynooth.[36]

The parliamentary High Churchmen were less prepared as a group to accept Peel's arguments for the need to repeal

the Corn Laws. A small majority of them, indeed, voted against the Government in defence of Protection.[37] Outside Parliament, however, the Anglo-Catholic Guardian had no doubts about the correctness of this policy. It recognized that there would be a real threat to the living standards of the clergy if the price of grain fell as expected after the introduction of free trade. Despite this, it believed that any sustained opposition by Churchmen to repeal would prove far more disastrous in the long run, for it would only serve to bring into prominence the material aspects of church establishment. It would be far better for the Church instead to make up any future reduction in its income by the better management of its estates and the voluntary contribution of its members.[38] In using such arguments, the Guardian reflected the conviction of the Anglo-Catholics that the fact of its establishment had seriously harmed the spiritual influence of the Church in the community. Their support for Peel over repeal as on Maynooth clearly illustrated how widely they now differed from the Protestant High Churchmen on this major religious issue. It is significant that, while the Anglo-Catholics shared the doubts of the Protestant High Churchmen about Derby as a political leader, they did so not because of his religious opinions, but because of his stubborn refusal to abandon Protection.[39]

As a result of their support for Peel during this

crucial period, the Anglo-Catholics did much to establish the belief that there was an affinity between them and his political followers, the Peelites. This belief could not but be strengthened by the success of one of the most effective publicists of the day, A.J. Beresford-Hope, in popularising the principles of both groups.

Beresford-Hope made no secret of his Anglo-Catholic principles. The strong conviction of the essential catholic nature of the Anglican Church was due, so he himself maintained, to his family background, which was not one of country landowners, but of international merchant bankers, as firmly established in Holland as in England.[40] It was this "foreignism of temperament", he believed, that enabled him to approach contemporary religious controversies free from the limitations which restricted the thinking of so many of his class.[41] In particular, he was very conscious of two major weaknesses in the Church of England, both the result of the Reformation of the sixteenth century. In the first place, it had then become an isolated national Church, although, as Hope pointed out, it was now in fact rapidly losing this character as the English people spread themselves widely through the world. Secondly, during the fifteen-thirties, because of political and dynastic necessities, it had been forced to adopt much from the Lutheran religion of the German Protestant states, which had weakened its claim to be a branch of the primitive Christian Church.[42]

As a result, Hope was ready to acknowledge that the Roman Catholic Church possessed far more of the qualities of a truly Universal Church than did the Church of England. He was not prepared, however, to follow the example of his earlier mentors, Newman and Faber, in seceeding to that Church. He believed that the best solution would be the reunion of the Roman and Anglican Churches, but he saw the main obstacle to this in the popular corruption and superstition which the papal system had introduced into the former, and which must first be eliminated. Until this was done, Hope saw the major need from the Anglican point of view as preventing the victory of the ultra-Protestant faction within the Church of England. He set out, therefore, with the declared intention of summoning "the High Church party for the crucial battle for Anglo-Catholicism now arraying."[43]

Hope was a man of strong political ambitions as well as definite religious views, and he believed that he would further these by becoming a recognized leader of the High Church party.[44] He had no doubt about the necessity for the repeal of the Corn Laws, although he had considerable reservations about the manner in which Peel had carried this through the House of Commons, feeling that he had betrayed his supporters in the course of doing so. As a result, Hope had stood for Maidstone during the general election

of 1847 as an independent Conservative free of any party ties. In the following years, however, he had established the practice of voting with the Peelites, and it was not surprising, therefore, when in 1850 he was invited to contribute to the Morning Chronicle, which had become the mouthpiece of that group.[45]

The history of that paper had been a chequered one. Founded in 1769, it had reached the height of its influence between 1800 and 1820, when it was considered the greatest of the Whig journals. Even in the eighteen-forties, it was still a close rival of the Times, but it suffered a serious setback by the establishment of the Daily News in 1846, which represented the same liberal opinions, cost less and above all had Charles Dickens as its editor. The Morning Chronicle suffered a considerable decline in circulation as a result, and by 1848 it was in the market. It was bought by a syndicate including both Sidney Herbert and Lord Lincoln as the organ of the Peelites, and they had the good fortune to choose as their editor one of the great Victorian journalists, John Douglas Cook.[46] By 1840, it had won for itself the reputation as "the only daily paper which has not flown against Christianity".[47] In the autumn of that year, Abraham Hayward, a leader writer on the paper, arranged with Beresford-Hope to contribute a series of 'Letters on Church Matters', which he was to write under the pseudonym of D.C.L.

In March 1851, Hope was made the 'quasi-theological' editor of the paper, which he converted into a platform for his strong Anglo-Catholic views.

It was this fact that during the controversial years between 1850 and 1855 Beresford-Hope expounded most forcibly in his widely-read Letters on Church Matters the principles of both the Anglo-Catholics and the Peelites which did much to establish in the public mind the belief that there was a natural affinity between the two. This belief, which has persisted until the present day, was expressed most clearly in 1866 by an editorial writer in the Pall Mall Gazette, who described

> the other curious note of a Peelite, which Sir Robert Peel and Sir James Graham had not, but which yet seemed to belong to the genius of the Party - Puseyite leanings (as) the cautious stand taken on existing institutions, the reverence for authority so long as authority does not claim any reactionary or revolutionary change of moral attitude, the love of a tenable half way house between the voice of antiquity and the claims of today, the tendency to test truth not by its springs but by its issues - (these) were all marked criteria of the Peelite Liberal-Conservative creed, were all marked criteria of the Puseyite party in the Church.[48]

In order to understand the political attitude of the Anglo-Catholics in the years between 1845 and 1865, it is necessary to consider how far their identification with the Peelites was in fact justified.

NOTES: CHAPTER II

[1] Hansard, 3d ser., LXXIX (1845), 824.

[2] Ibid., 20-37.

[3] N. Gash, Reaction and Reconstruction in English Politics, 1832-1852 (Oxford, 1965), p. 151.

[4] G.F.A. Best, Temporal Pillars: Queen Anne's Bounty, the Ecclesiastical Commissioners and the Church of England (Cambridge, 1964), p. 466.

[5] English Review, V (1846), p. 451. This prophecy proved pessimistic. According to the septennial averages published each year in the Guardian, taking 1836 as £100, the relevant figures for the period 1845 to 1864 were as follows:

1845:	£103-17-11	1852:	£93-16-11	1859:	£108-19-6
1846:	£102-12-8	1853:	£91-13-5	1860:	£110-17-8
1847:	£99-18-10	1854:	£90-19-5	1861:	£112- 3-4
1848:	£102- 1-0	1855:	£89-15-8	1862:	£110-13-6
1849:	£100- 3-7	1856:	£93-18-1	1863:	£107-5-2
1850:	£98-16-10	1857:	£99-13-1	1866:	£103-3-10
1851:	£96-11-4	1858:	£105-16-3		

[6] A.J. Beresford-Hope, The Church Cause and the Church Party, Reprinted from the Christian Remembrancer (London, 1860), pp. 6-7.

[7] Saturday Review, I (1855/56), p. 485.

[8] English Review, XI (1849), p. 387.

[9] Ibid., III (1845), p. 439.

[10] Hansard, 3d ser., LXXIX (1845), 38-52, 1022-1023: G.A. Cahill, "The Protestant Association and the Anti-Maynooth Agitation", Catholic Historical Review, XLIII (1957), pp. 273-308.

[11] English Review, III, (1845), pp. 438-439.

[12] Ibid., IV (1845), p. 200.

[13] Ibid., III (1845), p. 441.

[14] Ibid., IV (1845), p. 464.

[15] See Appendix.

[16] English Review, VIII (1847), p. 433.

[17] Church and State Review, I (1862), p. 105.

[18] Peel to Graham, January 2., 1845. C.S. Parker, Life and Letters of Sir James Graham, Second Baronet of Netherby, 1792-1861. 2 vols. (London, 1907), II, p.62.

[19] English Review, IX (1848), p. 162.

[20] Ibid., III (1845), p. 438.

[21] W.D. Jones, Lord Derby and Victorian Conservatism (London, 1956), p. 189.

[22] Ibid., pp. 29-43.

[23] Ibid., Chapter I.

[24] Ibid., p. 188.

[25] Ibid., p. 12.

[26] Ibid., pp. 40-41.

[27] Ibid.

[28] English Review, III (1845), p. 438.

29 Hansard, 3d. ser., LXXIX (1845), 1173.

30 C. Whibley, Lord John Manners and his Friends. 2 vols. (London, 1925), I, pp. 180-181.

31 Hansard, 3d ser., LXXIX (1845), 615-616.

32 Ibid., 555-568.

33 English Review, III (1845), p. 436.

34 Hansard, 3d ser., LXXIX (1845), 833-840.

35 Ibid., 836.

36 See Appendix.

37 Ibid.

38 Guardian, July 18., 1849, p. 473. Similar arguments were used by Gladstone in a letter written to Manning on March 10., 1846. Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. Mss., 44247, ff. 293-296.

39 Guardian, July 18, 1849, p. 473.

40 H.W. & I. Law, The Book of the Beresford-Hopes (London, 1925), pp. 130-132.

41 Ibid., p. 143.

42 [A.J. Beresford-Hope]. Letters on Church Matters by D.C.L. 11 pts in 4 vols. (London, 1851-1854), II, pp.211-213.

43 Law, Book of the Beresford-Hopes, pp. 147-148.

44 Ibid., p. 213.

[45] Ibid., p. 148.

[46] For the history of the Morning Chronicle, see M.M. Bevington, The Saturday Review, 1855-1865 (New York, 1941), pp. 10-15.

[47] Law, Book of the Beresford-Hopes, p. 147.

[48] Pall Mall Gazette, September 11, 1866. Quoted in Earl of Selbourne, Memorials, Part II; Personal and Political, 1865-1895. 2 vols. (London, 1898), I, pp.37-38.

CHAPTER III

PEELITES AND PUSEYITES

Despite their approval of the increased grant to Maynooth College and the repeal of the Corn Laws, the Anglo-Catholics certainly never possessed any sympathy with the religious thinking of the older generation of Peelites. Their antagonism towards Peel himself remained especially marked. After his death in July 1850, the Christian Remembrancer, a leading mouthpiece for the more liberal element amongst them, had to admit that

> many excellent individuals who participate in our theological views... (think) it a serious moral offence against Sir Robert Peel that, considering the amount of power which he wielded and the time during which he was in office he should have done so little for the Church and done that little in so unsatisfactory a manner.[1]

The Remembrancer did its best to modify the harshness of this judgement. It urged its readers to remember how difficult it had been for Peel to escape from the climate of opinion in which he had been brought up. He had entered political life very early in life, and always been deeply involved in politics and the cares of office. As a result it was not surprising that he had had no time to keep up with the current theology of the day or to realize the transformation

caused in religious thinking by the Oxford Movement of the eighteen-thirties. It was inevitable, therefore, that he should give an entirely different meaning to the term 'Church' than did the later generation of Anglo-Catholics.

Peel had always remained, in fact, "a most respectable Establishment Christian of the school which had existed when he was a young man".[2] This meant that he believed in a form of Protestant religion which had been established in England by an act of Parliament, with its doctrine drawn from the Bible as interpretated by the private judgement of the Reformers, and which had resulted in a mixture of Lutheranism and Calvinism with an accidental episcopacy superadded. The chief moral duty of Churchmen, so Peel believed, was to set a good moral example and a respectable appearance, especially by going "to Church once every Sunday, unless the weather was too bad or business too pressing".[3] Even holding such beliefs, however, Peel had sincerely undertaken schemes of Church Reform and Church Extension during his terms of office, which were at least honestly intended if ill-conceived, and which proved how favourable his churchmanship had compared with that of the Younger Pitt for example. Nevertheless, despite all its efforts in his defence, the Remembrancer had finally to confess its own belief in

> the inconceivable ignorance and darkness which overspread the judgement of such public men whenever they

> stepped aside from tariffs and treaties and the budget to legislate for the rights of God and the good of souls.[4]

Ten years later, A.J. Beresford-Hope attempted to draw up a similar balance sheet with regard to Peel's church policy. Once again, it was his strongly held Erastian opinions which were emphasized as the major factor nullifying the good effects of his church appointments and his measures for church extension.[5] Finally, Gladstone, at the end of his own long political career, gave his own judgement in a magisterial fashion, maintaining that, while Peel was a religious man, he was at the same time

> wholly anti-church and unclerical and undogmatic... . By habit and education, he was quite incapable of comprehending [the anti-Erastian] movement in the Church, the strength it would reach and the exigences it would entail.[6]

There was, thus, little common ground between the religious principles held by Peel on the one hand and the Anglo-Catholics on the other. The same can be said with regard to the two other leading members of that generation amongst the Peelites: the Earl of Aberdeen and Sir James Graham.[7] Aberdeen had, indeed, been brought up in the Church of England, and was to remain a member of it all his life, taking part in its service of Holy Communion every Good Friday. He had close personal relations, moreover, with Howley, the High Church Arch-bishop of Canterbury. At the same time, when he was in Scotland, he was careful to

describe himself as a member of the Established Presbyterian Church of Scotland, especially because of his concern about the social mischief that could be caused if the Scottish nobility and landowners differed in their faith and worship from that of their tenants. Between 1818 and 1828, indeed, he was a lay representative in the General Assembly of that Church. His nominal membership of these two Churches was made all the easier by the fact that he claimed to see little difference of doctrine and discipline between them.[8] The Evangelical Christian Observer could as a result believe that he was almost of their party: "his early initiation in the Catechism of the Scottish Church must have rendered him familiar in a measure with the genuine feelings of Scriptural religion".[9]

The attitude taken by Lord Aberdeen towards church establishment, which was the primary religious issue of the day, equally confused his contemporaries. According to Gladstone, he was "altogether enlightened in regard to it and had cast it off, so that he obtained from some the soubriquet (during his Ministry), of 'the Presbyterian Puseyite'".[10] On the other hand, Beresford-Hope, writing in 1851, emphasized how much Aberdeen had continued to maintain his belief in the Established Church as a bulwark against the anarchical conditions he had seen in Europe during the Revolutionary Wars.[11] It was certainly true that the part Lord Aberdeen played in the events leading up to the

disruption of the Church of Scotland in 1843 won for him the reputation of being strongly erastian in opinion, which he did not perhaps fully deserve. The controversy which split that Church in the decade after 1843 did as much as the contemporary Oxford Movement to force the re-examination of church-state relations. The right of presentation to the parish of Methlic which Aberdeen possessed involved him in the earliest stage of the conflict, which was concerned with the relations between the lay patrons and the parishioners, especially over the latters' power of veto. It seemed that Aberdeen would have been prepared to accept a much greater right of popular election of ministers, but he allowed himself to be over-influenced by James Hope, the Dean of Faculty, into dropping this from the parliamentary measure he was responsible for in 1840. The result was that this proved unacceptable to the General Assembly, the crisis was not solved before it broke up the Church of Scotland and Aberdeen himself became identified as the champion of the temporal power over the spiritual.[12] This, of course, did him no good in the eyes of the Anglo-Catholics.

This controversy in the Church of Scotland was one link between Aberdeen and Sir James Graham, the other senior member of the Peelite group. As Home Secretary in the Conservative Government between 1841 and 1846, Graham had been responsible for the exercise of the large amount of

Crown patronage in Scotland. Although he was prepared to accept the wishes of the parishioners in the selection of a minister provided only that they were unanimous amongst themselves, he remained adamant in his insistence that the Crown must have an unfettered power of choice if there was any divergence of opinion. He refused, above all, to consider the possibility of a veto, whether this was exercized directly or in a disguised form through the Church courts. As Graham had told Gladstone earlier, "It is but one step from the veto to voluntaryism", a thing which he abhorred above all.[13]

The part Graham played in this controversy, indeed, did much to reinforce his strongly-held erastian sympathies, which he was never to modify during his life.[14] Graham was able, in particular, to combine a Whiggish love of religious liberty, even for Roman Catholics, with a reverence for the traditional principles of 'the Constitution in Church and State' which would have delighted Sir Robert Inglis: he maintained that

> those genuine Whig principles, which, as I understood them on my first entrance into public life... were not incompatible with the firm maintenance of the Established Protestant religion, that religion of perfect freedom, which the Revolution of 1688 bore triumphant over Popery and regal tyranny.[15]

He possessed, also, an extremely low view of the functions of Bishops in the Church. In a notorious speech he made to the House of Commons on July 21st., 1847, he expounded his

belief that their main duties were in charitable work, in the exercise of clerical patronage, in the social leadership of the clergy and in the most infrequent visitations of their diocese for the purpose of confirmation and ordination.[16] This brought an immediate and most indignant rejoinder from Gladstone[17], and it was never to be forgiven him by the Anglo-Catholics. In May, 1852, the Guardian refused to consider him as a future leader of the Peelites because of "his most degraded conception of the function of the Bishops"[18], and it was generally hoped by them that he would soon rejoin the Whigs.[19]

There was, therefore, little sympathy between the religious views of the elder generation of Peelites and the Anglo-Catholics. Even among the younger leaders of that group, a man like Edward Cardwell, for example, relied on the hope that in any subsequent Peelite ministry, the exercise of church patronage would remain "in the hands like those of Lord Aberdeen himself, free from that bias which Gladstone obeys and which my feelings and my convictions unite to keep me free."[20] It is also certainly true that the great majority of the rank-and-file could never have been classified as High Churchmen of any sort.[21] The identification of Peelite Conservatism and Puseyism must depend ultimately, therefore, on the prominent part played in the activities of this group by men like Sidney Herbert,

Lord Lincoln (the Duke of Newcastle from 1851), Roundell Palmer and, especially, Gladstone, all of whom were of decided Anglo-Catholic opinions.

Even amongst this section of the Peelites, there proved to be some significant differences of opinion over ecclesiastical matters. Lincoln, for example, had been one of those who had fallen under the influence of Newman and Pusey while an undergraduate at Oxford.[22] He had strongly supported Peel's action in increasing the government grant to Maynooth, which had brought him into serious conflict with his father, who was a Churchman of orthodox views, and the two men were not to be fully reconciled until the latter's death bed.[23] He was always ready to deny, nevertheless, being "what is foolishly called a Puseyite".[24] Sidney Herbert, again, was prepared to dismiss with scorn what he described as "Puseyite tomfooleries", and he was maintaining as early as 1850 that "Tractarianism has had its day".[25]

It was perhaps, Roundell Palmer, once described as the most characteristic of the Peelites,[26] who, in fact held the most divergent views, especially on church establishment, from most Anglo-Catholics. He was extremely annoyed, indeed, when he was described at the end of 1860 as a 'Tractarian' and a 'Puseyite', which, he observed, were terms which "most men apply to every degree of churchmanship which is higher than their own."[27] He firmly repudiated them if they implied

any inclination to Romish doctrines or practice, any disaffection to the principles of the Reformation, any disposition to exult the authority of the Church over that of the Bible or any connection with the party who were so bitterly hostile to Evangelical men and doctrine and wanted to exclude them from the Church of England. He was, on the other hand, ready to accept them if they meant he believed "in the natural sense and without reservations" in the doctrine of the Thirty-Nine Articles and the Church's Catechism, that he was well satisfied with the Prayer Book as it stood and that he thought "that the mission of every true Church is from God and not from Kings or Parliament, and that the doctrines of absolute prerogative, which have been long exploded in civil matters are quite out of place in spiritual.[28]

Palmer proved able, nevertheless, to combine his concern for the possible abuse of the royal supremacy over the Church of England with a strong belief in the virtues of church establishment. He held this in particular with reference to the situation in Ireland. He was prepared to defend the position of the Church of England in Ireland not only on the grounds of justice and of policy, as being essential for the maintenance of the Union, but also in the understanding that "church establishment, even with all its faults, ensures the life and working power of the Church organized under it."[29] It was on this issue that he was to

differ so fundamentally from Gladstone, even to the point of refusing to join his Government in 1868 because of the proposal to disestablish that Church. As early as 1856, indeed, Palmer was expressing his doubts whether, because of their differing religious views, he could ever form an effective political partnership with Gladstone.[30]

It would seem, therefore, that to a great extent, the popular identification of the Peelites and the Puseyites must depend on the role of Gladstone himself, the one politician who held most completely the tenets of both parties. It is thus necessary to investigate in some detail his religious development.

> Politics would become an utter blank to me were I to make the discovery that we were mistaken in maintaining their association with religion.[31]

So Gladstone wrote to Henry Manning on a Sunday evening in April 1835, expressing a fear which was never to be realized at any time during his life. He remained always convinced of the intimate connection between his religious opinions and his political activity. It is impossible to understand his career as a statesman without always taking this factor into account.

Gladstone had been brought up in an Evangelical household. Unlike Pusey and Keble, however, he had received little direct teaching on religious matters from his parents;

his father was too busy, his mother too ill to provide it. It was the example of their sincere piety, and, even more, the devotion of his eldest sister, which made the greatest impression on his youthful understanding. His experiences at school and university were to have little effect on the way he thought about such matters. At Eton he found that "the actual teaching of Christianity was all but dead". While an undergraduate at Oxford he remained "of mildly Evangelical opinions, without any real idea of the Church, but without any factitious energy of private judgement". The only way in which he appeared to be distinguished from the majority of his contemporaries was by his support for Catholic Emancipation, and this was due more to the family tradition of loyalty to the memory of Canning rather than to any great sympathy for the principles involved.[32]

It was only after he had gone down from the University and during his subsequent tour of Europe during 1832 that Gladstone acquired a more profound conception of the visible church than his early training in evangelical principles had given him. During his travels, he was to discover to his surprise the vital religion he was searching for, not in the Protestant faith of Switzerland, but in the Catholic ceremonies of Rome. On March 31st., he visited St. Peters, where he experienced a vision of a Christian unity which had been previously hidden from him.[33] Six weeks

later, when in Naples, he read carefully for the first time the Occasional Offices in the Prayer Book:

> it was my first introduction to the august conception of the Church of Christ. It presented to me Christianity under an aspect in which I had not yet known it; its ministry of symbols, its channels of grace, its unending line of teachers, joining from the Head.[34]

During the eighteen-thirties, Gladstone gradually developed his high church principles. At this time, however, he was much more influenced by the ideas of the Protestant High Churchmen than by those of the Anglo-Catholics. He was, indeed, later to deny that the Tracts had exercised any direct effect on his way of thinking:

> they had little to do with my conversion; nothing to do with it at all, I should be inclined to say, except in so far as it was partly, and very considerably, due to them that Catholicism, so to speak, was in the air, and was exercising an influence on the religious frame of men without their knowing.[35]

Gladstone was much more conscious of the great contribution made to the revival of the Church by the Rev. William Palmer, who was, as we have seen, the most forceful of the orthodox High Churchmen. He always maintained that it was Palmer's Treatise on the Church of Christ, written in 1838 to defend the claims of the Anglican Church to be a true part of the Universal Church, which had given him

> the clear, definite and strong conception of the Church which, through all the storm and strain of a most critical period, proved entirely adequate to every emergency, and saved me from every vacillation.[36]

Concerned by the disastrous impact on public opinion of Tract 90, Gladstone sought to convince its readers that it was possible to profess the great Catholic principles without being tainted by the Romanizing tendencies of the Puseyites,[37] and he therefore welcomed enthusiastically Palmer's Narrative of Events connected with the Publication of the Tracts for the Times, published in 1843, which set out to prove just that.[38] Like Palmer, too, Gladstone was at this time certain that the Roman Catholic Church would prove a most dangerous rival to the Established Church in Ireland, and thus resolved to oppose any more concessions to it, and this in spite of his earlier support for Catholic Emancipation.[39] The most direct connection between Gladstone and the Protestant High Churchmen was, however, the publication of his first book, The State in its Relations with the Church in 1838, which contained a most eloquent justification of church establishment on the highest grounds. Gladstone argued in particular that the state, having a moral conscience, should by its very nature be able to recognize only one church.

Gladstone's link with the Protestant High Churchmen was further strengthened during this period by his activity as a member of Parliament. On such questions as the admission of dissenters to Oxford and Cambridge Universities, the Irish Church, church rates, the Maynooth grant and national education he voted with that small group in the

House of Commons who acted under the leadership of Sir Robert Inglis. It was only over the Canadian Clergy Reserves in 1840 that he and these "stern, unbending Tories" took different sides. On many of these occasions he was to find himself in opposition to the ecclesiastical policy of the Conservative Party.[40] Because of this and the fact that his church principles were far from acceptable to the majority of that Party, it was not surprising that a keen observer like James Mozley believed that he "had damaged, if not destroyed, his prospects with the Conservatives".[41]

For these reasons, his decision to join the Conservative Government in 1841 was not an easy one, while Peel made certain that as Vice-President for the Board of Trade he would have little energy for religious controversies.[42] Despite his promotion to cabinet rank as President of the Board in 1843, it was generally felt that he was still out of sympathy with the ecclesiastical policy of the Government, and there was thus little surprise when he resigned from the Cabinet after Peel had made known his intention to increase state aid to Maynooth. On February 4th, 1845, Gladstone explained in the House of Commons his reasons for resignation. He had done so in order to be in a position to judge these new proposals honestly, without having his freedom of action limited by any prior commitment. At the same time, he went out of his way to emphasize that he still believed

his views on church-state relations as he had previously expressed them were "the most salutary and the best in every condition of the public sentiment that will bear their application." All that he seemed to promise the Government was not to promote a religious war over this matter.[43] It was not strange, that as a result, many people, like Sir Robert Inglis, who now invited him to lead the opposition to the measure, completely misunderstood the purpose of his resignation.[44] The shock was all the greater, therefore, when, on April 11th., he appeared to reverse his position by announcing his support for the Government's bill.

The extent of this misunderstanding provided a clear indication of Gladstone's failure to make known beyond his immediate circle of friends just how far he had altered his views on church establishment in the years before 1845, a change which had now brought him much more in sympathy with the Anglo-Catholic standpoint. As early as 1839, indeed, he had been seriously disturbed by some comments made by Keble in a review of his book, written for the British Critic, then the mouthpiece for the Tractarians. In it, Keble had asked in particular whether,

> however fearful the view which may be taken of a world anti-christianized by the downfall of Establishments, might not a sadder picture be drawn, and one as least as likely to be realized, of a Church turned anti-christian by corrupt Establishments.[45]

Gladstone told his friend, J.R. Hope, that, in making this

point, Keble had expressed a fear that he had himself experienced, but had not considered in his book.[46] In spite of his understanding of Keble's criticism, however, it is important not to over-estimate the influence of the Anglo-Catholics on the development of Gladstone's thinking on church-state relations at this time. He himself always emphasized that the major change in his thought did not take place until as late as 1844, when the controversy over the Dissenter's Chapel Bill forced him to reconsider his whole position. The problem here was how far the state should recognize the right of Unitarian congregations to maintain their possession of chapels whose founders had been Trinitarian in belief. Gladstone's speech on the question proved how far his opinions had changed since 1838, when he had argued strongly against allowing the Unitarians, because he did not believe their doctrine to be Christian in any sense, to continue to share in the money voted annually by Parliament for the partial support of Presbyterian ministers in Ireland.[47] Now he conceded that, while Unitarians might not accept all of the Puritan doctrine, they nevertheless sincerely adhered to the fundamental principle that Holy Scripture was the basis of faith, even though they insisted on the right to interpret its message for themselves. This was, he believed, all that the state could demand from any sect, and thus it must judge the claims of the Unitarians to hold possession

of the chapels on the general principle of equity and justice, which was undeniably in their favour. Gladstone's conclusion was, in fact, a considerable retreat from his previous conviction that the state must recognize only one Church as the embodiment of religious truth, and was to bring him much closer to those High Churchmen who were now challenging the principle of establishment under the changing conditions of the times. As Gladstone himself later maintained, this debate did much to heighten his churchmanship, even though it depressed his state-and-churchmanship.[48]

Gladstone's support for the increased Maynooth grant in 1845 was therefore, another stage in his advance to a belief in a religiously neutral state. Unlike many other of the supporters of the Bill, he did not attempt to deny that a major principle was at stake in the proposed change. The transformation of an annual grant into a permanent one guaranteed by an Act of Parliament would result in radically altering the relationship between the state and the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland. The threefold increase in the grant itself, moreover, implied that the Government had now tacitly abandoned its previous contention that this was merely a temporary arrangement which would be made unnecessary in course of time by contributions from the Irish Catholic community. Gladstone also agreed that the arguments of those who opposed the measure did, in fact, represent the

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opinion of most people in England, even though that majority would find it very difficult to agree between themselves on any constructive policy to put into its place. He emphasized that most of the support for Inglis came in part from those who wanted no state endowment of religion at all, in part from those who wanted to endow all Protestant religions but not Roman Catholicism. Finally, Gladstone re-affirmed his conviction that "it is the duty of Government, according to its just prerogatives and its opportunities, to form a judgement upon religion and to act in support of it."

Gladstone was thus aware of the strength of the opposition case to the Maynooth measure. Despite this, he was prepared to vote in support of it. He confessed that he was in part persuaded to do so for secular rather than religious reasons. He was impressed, for example, by the great weight of political authority on that side, including the leaders of the two main parties. He was also very conscious of the fact that its rejection would cause great discontent in Ireland, thus aggravating the hostility against the Union. His main reason for doing so, nevertheless, was his belief that, in this matter at least, the "rigid theory of exclusive support for the Church of England" was no longer tenable. It had, in fact, been so impaired in recent years "that I cannot think it equitable to urge it as forming

of itself a conclusive reason for the rejection of a measure that applies public money for the purpose of some other communion."[49]

The forceful arguments put forward in Gladstone's speech did not, however, succeed in convincing all who heard it. George Smythe, for example, even if he was to vote in the same lobby, was far from impressed:

> In all that cloud of variegated phraseology in which he as usual the other night wrapped and shrouded his mysterious divinity, there was only one phrase which was intelligible to vulgar minds like myself. He said that notwithstanding his cherished convictions, he would vote in favour of the bill.[50]

Many of those outside the House of Commons who had previously supported him because of his presumed orthodox high church principles, were equally dissatisfied by his explanation. Charles Wordsworth, whom Gladstone himself had helped to appoint as the first warden of the training college for clergy of the Scottish Episcopal Church at Glenalmond in Perthshire, was now completely disillusioned. He wrote to James Hope-Scott:

> For many years I looked upon Gladstone... as the man to save the country, or rather the nation: it was almost (if I may speak so strongly) his mission from God to do so - to serve it in the only way in which I believe it is to be saved (under providence) - viz., upon the principles of the constitution in Church and State: but in an evil hour, as I think, his faith failed him; fascinated by the practical abilities and power of Sir Robert Peel, he lost sight of his own position, and at last fell from the high ground he fancied to be untenable, but was not more so than

> the high ground has often been in faithless times... Not a year ago he told me that he had abandoned his first principles because he found so little support especially among the clergy.[51]

Gladstone was, indeed, well aware of the criticism directed against his decision to vote in support of the Maynooth bill, and was anxious to defend himself further. His argument that the publication of his book on church-state relations in 1838 had left him in the position of the last man on a sinking ship, and that he was thus justified in reappraising his basic principles, was perhaps over-ingenuous. There was, in fact, considerable support still in the country for these principles, which might have remained a powerful force under his leadership.[52] Gladstone was on firmer ground when he emphasized the revolutionary character of the age in which he lived, which meant that no statesman except the most reactionary could hope to escape the charge of inconsistency at some stage in his career.[53] He went on to suggest that there had been two major developments in ecclesiastical affairs between 1838 and 1844 which did much to justify his radical change of opinion on church-state relations. First, his theory of church establishment depended on the Church of England speaking with an united voice and representing at least the great majority of the nation. The religious revival of the eighteen-thirties had given him reason to believe that the Anglican Church was, in fact, becoming once again truly national in scope, embracing within its fold both

those who had previously dissented from it, and those, especially in the large industrial towns, who had never belonged to it. The sudden growth of new and extreme ecclesiastical divisions within the community, caused in part by the publication of the apparently pro-Catholic Tracts and in part by the revival of an aggressive dissent marked by the formation in 1844 of the Anti-State Church Association, had by that date ended these expectations. Secondly, Gladstone's experience in Peel's Government after 1841 had proved to him how little even a well-disposed minister could do for the interest of the Church without risking his electoral defeat. This had been made especially clear by the failure of the Government to carry through the House of Commons their attempt to give the Church of England special responsibility for the education of the poor in the 1843 Factory Act.[54]

It was for such reasons as these that Gladstone believed it now impossible to put into practice the principles of church-state relations he had so strongly expounded in his book. His conviction was further reinforced by his understanding of the radical transformation taking place in the nature of the English state itself. Gladstone once described this to Newman as the transition stage between the mediaeval conception of the state as a family, and the ultra-modern conception of it as a club. If the state was considered as a family, with its government having the position

and duties of parents, it was reasonable to think of it having a conscience embodied in the Established Church, but if it had become an impersonal club, with the Government merely as the organ of those influences which predominated within it, then this was no longer possible. In England, Gladstone maintained,

> the state is neither a family nor a club, but it is on the path of transition from the former to the latter. It is less like a club than America or France: it is less like a family (I mean, as to duties, not their fulfillment) than Austria or Russia.

When this transformation was completed, however, it would no longer be possible to apply to it the theories of church-state relations which he had expounded in his book.[55]

In spite of this, Gladstone was still firmly convinced that the principles that he had stated in 1838 were still the "genuine and proper theory of government as to religion". He was most unhappy about the need to sacrifice them under the pressure of events. As he confessed to Newman at the height of his disillusionment, he was prepared to consider whether, under these changed conditions, "the work of government had become absolutely unclean and ought to be abjured".[56] He had, in fact, to reconsider his whole position, and decide especially whether he wanted to remain in political life.

In two lengthy letters written to Manning during April, 1846, Gladstone discussed thoroughly the choice

before him.[57] The arguments for ending his political career at this stage of it and perhaps now fulfilling his earliest ambition of entering the Church were certainly very powerful ones. He conceded that it would still be necessary to defend the interests of the Established Church in Parliament, even although, because of the growing secularization of the state, it would no longer be possible to restore her former unique position within the community. Gladstone wondered, however, whether he was the right man to act as the spokesman of the Church in the House of Commons, or whether he might do more harm than good by his efforts on its behalf. He feared especially that his developing doubt about the validity of the Established Church of England in Ireland

> may be fatal to my capacity for doing any good in political life ... because of its sinister alliance with that suspicion of leaning towards the Church of Rome, and therefore of treachery, which now and for many years to come must attach, not without presumption of justice, to those whose names have ever been associated with the Oxford Constellation.[58]

He was, moreover, very conscious of his lack of sympathy with many of the more determined of the Church's defenders in Parliament. He had been dismayed, for instance, by the temper of Inglis, who, misunderstanding the purpose of his resignation over Maynooth, had invited him to lead the opposition to that Bill:

> In the course of this conversation, he went back to the fatal character and consequences of the Act of 1828, and wished that his advice had been taken,

> which was that the Duke of Cumberland should be sent as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland with thirty thousand men. As that good and very kind man spoke the words, my blood ran cold.[59]

Gladstone was convinced that the best hope for the Church to restore her popularity in the country was not by aggressive action in her own defence, but by proving her readiness to sacrifice some of her surviving privileges. Any attempt

> by a knot of men proposing and claiming everything, engaged in constant resistance and protest (like Montalembert in France where there is acute hostility between Church and State) will not suit English conditions.[60]

Holding such views, it would certainly be difficult for Gladstone to find any common ground with a man like Inglis. He was, therefore, quite prepared to apply to himself the advice he would give any young man entering life: "if you want to serve the Church, do it in the Sanctuary and not in Parliament."[61] He told Manning that, if he did decide to remain in public life for a time, it would be for secular and not religious reasons: in order to support the Queen and defend the Constitution during a period of revolution which he believed to be imminent.

Political fever was, however, too strong in Gladstone's blood to make it at all likely that he would withdraw from Parliament. Much more surprising was his decision to contest during the 1847 election the seat at Oxford University made vacant by the retirement of Bucknell Estcourt. The reasons he chose to stand for a constituency which had

so intimate a connection with the Church of England will be discussed in detail in a later chapter.[62] His success in winning the seat meant, however, that the development of his religious views in the next critical years were minutely scrutinized by a highly knowledgeable audience. The impression he made can best be judged through two quotations. The first is from a letter written by Charles Wordsworth, most vehement of Protestant High Churchmen, to Gladstone after his election as member for Oxford in 1847. In it, Wordsworth pointed out how different his previous behavior had been from that of his fellow University representative:

> Sir Robert Inglis has fought the battle of the Church in the House of Commons almost single handed for many years past... . He has not fought it perhaps... just in the manner I myself should have chosen, but he has fought it on principle - the principle which alone, as I think, is safe and right for us to fight on - viz., the Principle of the Constitution in Church and State. This he has done in every vote in respect to Ireland, in respect to the Dissenters, in respect to education ... now, in two out of three of these most important fields of political action you and he have not acted alike. You have spoken and acted as if you considered that the end at which I am sure you are both aiming - viz., the well-being and efficiency of the Church - was more likely to be gained by following a different course which, without offence, I may call one of accommodation and compromise rather than of principle.[63]

Almost five years later, in January 1853, after another bitterly contested election, one of Gladstone's principal supporters, Sir Stafford Northcote, explained to him why, in spite of the great inconvenience caused by these

frequent contests, the younger generation of Anglo-Catholics nevertheless continued to support him:

> they feel that you are after all a thoroughly Oxford man, one whose very faults (if there be any) are the faults of Oxford, whose views and principles and modes of thinking are essentially their own; that, if an Oxford man was challenged to show what his own system could produce, you would be the man of all others to whom he would point, and with pride. Then they feel that you have been placed in the most prominent public station, have been exposed to the struggle of real political life, have borne your full share of it; and they see by the effect it has had upon you what are the corrections and modifications the raw Oxford animal requires to make him a statesman... . And every step you take in advance forces them to look into themselves and their principles again and again.[64]

High Churchmen of all shades of opinion thus reacted strongly to the development of Gladstone's religious thinking during the eighteen-forties. In particular, Protestant High Churchmen judged his reappraisal of the relations between Church and State as a betrayal of fundamental principles of which he himself had once been the declared champion, and a surrender to the demands of political expediency which would be fatal to the integrity of the Church of England. On the other hand, Anglo-Catholics were encouraged both by his example and their deep admiration for his personal qualities to continue their own re-examination of their principles in the light of the changing conditions of the day.

This positive reaction, whether sympathetic or hostile,

aroused in High Churchmen by his religious thought was inevitably reflected in their attitude towards Gladstone's political activity. The Protestant High Churchmen watched his course through the confused situation of the eighteen-fifties with the deepest suspicion, becoming soon convinced that it confirmed their worst forebodings. The Anglo-Catholics, having become committed to his cause in the local politics of Oxford University, were nevertheless prepared to extend their support to him on a national level, although some of his actions were to strain severely the loyalty of the older generation. It was their readiness to do so which did much in the public mind to link them so closely in the public mind with the Peelites, and to persuade the Pall Mall Gazette that there was indeed some close affinity between the ideologies of the two groups.

As we have seen, such a belief cannot in fact withstand a detailed examination. There was little sympathy for tractarian principles amongst the other leaders and the rank-and-file of the Peelites. Even Gladstone himself would have denied as hotly as Roundell Palmer did that he was committed in any way to the excesses of the more extreme 'Puseyites'. Where he came closest to Pusey himself was in his changing attitude to the conception of church establishment.

After the break-up of the Conservative Party in 1846, therefore, the relationship between High Churchmen and the

two factions into which it was now divided was a complex one. Neither the Protectionists nor the Peelites were in a position to claim their unqualified support. As a result, their attitude towards the more liberal governments which, due to the weakness of that Party, were to hold office for most of the next two decades, was to prove far from clear-cut. To understand the politics of High Churchmen in these years, it is necessary to remember that many of them no longer possessed that sympathy with the Conservatives which had traditionally been their characteristic. It was this fact that did much to confuse their relations with the Whig Government under Lord John Russell between 1846 and 1852, with Aberdeen's Coalition Ministry between 1852 and 1855, and with Lord Palmerston who was to be Prime Minister for all but two of the succeeding ten years.

NOTES: CHAPTER III

[1] Christian Remembrancer, new ser., XX (1850), p. 393.

[2] Ibid., p. 397.

[3] Ibid., pp. 394-395.

[4] Ibid., pp. 396-397.

[5] A.J. Beresford-Hope, The Church Cause and the Church Party. Reprinted from 'the Christian Remembrancer', January 1860 (London, 1860), p. 7.

[6] Reminiscence written in 1897. Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. Mss. 44791, f. 77.

[7] [Beresford-Hope], Letters on Church Matters, II, pp. 155-157.

[8] Lord Stanmore, Lord Aberdeen (London, 1905), p. 129: F. Balfour, The Life of George, Fourth Earl of Aberdeen, 2 vols. (London, 1922), I, p. 29.

[9] Christian Observer, new ser., CLXXXII (1853), p. 144.

[10] Reminiscence written in 1897. Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. Mss. 44791, ff. 77-78.

[11] [Beresford-Hope], Letters on Church Matters, II, p. 156.

[12] Stanmore, Lord Aberdeen, pp. 121-151: Balfour, Life of Aberdeen, I, pp. 30-32.

[13] Graham to Gladstone, December 8., 1839. C.S. Parker, Life and Letters of Sir James Graham, Second Baronet of Netherby, 1797-1861. 2 vols. (London, 1907), I, p.375. See also, chapter XVII, passim.

14 Ibid., I, p. 397.

15 Graham to Stanley, June 4., 1834, Ibid., I, pp. 195-196. See also, p. 198.

16 Hansard, 3d ser., XVIV (1847), 642-643.

17 D.C. Lathbury, (ed.), Correspondence on Church and Religion of William Ewart Gladstone. 2 vols. (London, 1910), I, pp. 75-78.

18 Guardian, May 19, 1852, p. 329.

19 See for example, F. Rogers to Miss Rogers, April 1., 1851. G.E. Marindin (ed.) Letters of Frederic, Lord Blachford (London, 1896), p. 144.

20 Cardwell to Roundell Palmer, November 6., 1856. Earl of Selbourne, Memorials. Part I: Family and Personal, 1766-1865. 2 vols. (London, 1896), II, p. 306. See also, A.B. Erickson, "Edward T. Cardwell: Peelite", Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, new ser., XLIX (pt.2), (1959), pp. 1-8.

21 For example, of the 44 Peelites in the 1852-1857 Parliament, only 8 were described by the Guardian (April 15 1857, p. 290) as High Churchmen of any kind: H. Fitzroy, W.E. Gladstone, S. Herbert, Lord A. Hervey, Roundell Palmer, R.J. Phillimore, G.E.H. Vernon, C.B. Wall. Professor J.B. Conacher kindly supplied me with the list of Peelites.

22 Martineau, Life of the Duke of Newcastle, p. 19.

23 Ibid., p. 54: W.D. Jones, Lord Derby and Victorian Conservatism (Oxford, 1956), p. 119: Hansard, 3d ser., LXXIX (1845),

24 Martineau, Life of the Duke of Newcastle, p. 330.

25 Herbert to Graham, November 30, 1850, Lord Stanmore, Sidney Herbert, Lord Herbert of Lea: a Memoir, 2 vols. (London, 1906), I, p. 132: Herbert to Graham, December 4., 1850, Ibid., I, p. 135.

[26] Earl of Selbourne, Memorials, Part II, I, p. 37.

[27] Earl of Selbourne, Memorials, Part I, II, p. 76.

[28] Ibid., II, pp. 76-77.

[29] Palmer to Arthur Gordon, October 12, 1856. Ibid., II, pp. 290-300.

[30] Palmer to Arthur Gordon, November 9, 1856. Ibid. II, pp. 311-312. But compare Palmer to Cardwell, November 14th, 1856, where he appears to be more hopeful about joining Gladstone in spite of their religious differences, Ibid., II, p. 307.

[31] Gladstone to Manning, April 5., 1836. Lathbury, Correspondence, I, p. 23.

[32] D.C. Lathbury, Mr. Gladstone (London, 1905), pp. 3-4: Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. Mss., 44791, f.3.

[33] Lathbury, Correspondence, I, p. 222.

[34] Lathbury, Mr. Gladstone, p. 7.

[35] Ibid., pp. 226-227, p. 265.

[36] Ibid., p. 11. Gladstone to Hutton, October 6., 1890. Lathbury, Correspondence, I, pp. 406-407.

[37] See his unpublished letter to the Times dated January 1, 1842. Ibid., I, pp. 270-279.

[38] Gladstone to Palmer, October 16, 1843. Ibid., I, p. 280.

[39] Gladstone to Manning, April 23, 1847. Ibid., I, p. 39.

[40] R. Mashedar, The Rt. Hon. Wm. Ewart Gladstone, etc. etc.: a Political Review (London, 1865), p. 28.

[41] J.B. Mozley to Anne Mozley, January 16, 1839. A. Mozley (ed.), Letters of the Rev. J.B. Mozley (London, 1885), p. 87.

[42] J. Morley, Life of Gladstone, 2 vols. (London, 1905), I, pp. 241-242.

[43] Hansard, 3d ser., LXXVII (1845), 77-82.

[44] Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. Mss. 44790, f. 59. Compare the remarks of George Smythe in Hansard, 3d ser., LXXIX (1845), 836-837. Peel also took it for granted that Gladstone would oppose the bill after his resignation. Ibid., LXXVI (1845), 82.

[45] Lathbury, Correspondence, I, p. 17.

[46] Gladstone to Hope, November 6, 1839. Ibid., I, pp. 46-47.

[47] Mashedar, Gladstone, p. 77.

[48] Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. Mss., 44790, f. 58.

[49] Hansard, 3d ser., LXXIX (1845), 520-554.

[50] Ibid., 837.

[51] Wordsworth to Hope-Scott, July 1, 1847. C. Wordsworth, Annals of My Life, 1847-1856 (London, 1893), pp. 29-32.

[52] Gladstone to Newman, April 19, 1845. Lathbury, Correspondence, I, p. 72.

[53] W.E. Gladstone, 'A Chapter of Autobiography', Gleanings of Past Years. 8 vols. (London, 1879), III, p.116.

[54] Ibid., III, pp. 142-144.

[55] Gladstone to Newman, April 19, 1845. Lathbury, Correspondence, I, pp. 71-73.

[56] Ibid., p. 72.

[57] Gladstone to Manning, April 3, and April 19th, 1846. Gladstone Papers. B.M. Add. Mss. 44247, ff. 298-310.

[58] Ibid., f. 302.

[59] Ibid., 44790, f. 59.

[60] Ibid., 44247, f. 309.

[61] Ibid., f. 301.

[62] See Chapter VII.

[63] Wordsworth to Gladstone, July 15, 1847. Wordsworth, Annals of My Life, pp. 37-38.

[64] Northcote to Gladstone, January 13, 1853. Gladstone Papers. B.M. Add. Mss. 44216, ff. 199-200.

CHAPTER IV

HIGH CHURCHMEN AND THE WHIGS

PART I: OPPOSITION, 1847-1852

After the defeat of Peel's Conservative Government in July 1846 by a "factious and momentary combination"[1] between Whigs, Radicals and Protectionists over an Irish Coercion Bill, English High Churchmen were prepared to offer a degree of sympathy and understanding to the successive Whig Government under the premiership of Lord John Russell during its first months in office that appeared most improbably in the light of their bitter hostility towards that Party during the eighteen-thirties. They did so, however, not because they had now been converted to Whiggish principles, but because they feared even more the return to office of either of the Conservative factions that had come into existence. Whatever the cause, nevertheless, their attitude towards the Whigs was of such a nature that it seemed to many that a new era in English political and religious history had started. As a Constant Reader wrote to the editor of the Spectator: "Now, Sir, for the first time since the Revolution, the clergy were disposed to support a Whig Government".[2]

For his part, Russell was well aware of the need to

win the confidence of the High Churchmen. His minority Government could not afford their hostility, which indeed has proved a considerable factor in the overthrow of the previous Whig Administration in 1841. The Prime Minister had also learned from the experience of the eighteen-thirties the difficulties of establishing any effective political alliance with the Dissenters which would be strong enough to counterbalance this hostility. In spite of the leading part they had played in the campaign to repeal the Test and Corporation Acts in 1828, the subsequent alignment of the Whigs with the forces of Dissent, which had seemed such a threat to the Established Church in the next ten years, had always been in fact a most insecure one. It was never an 'union of hearts', but one rather which had been fashioned by the dictates of political necessity. The 1832 Reform Act, by extending the franchise to the £10 householders, had greatly increased the influence of the Dissenting interests amongst the electorate. The Whigs, struggling after 1834 to prevent the disintegration of their House of Commons majority in the face of a resurgent Conservative Party, were well aware of the value of their support, but even so, there was a limit to the price they were prepared to pay for it. The Government was ready to support legislation that had as its purpose the ending of specific Dissenting grievances, such as the compulsory Anglican

marriage ceremony for example. On the other hand, it soon found it necessary to abandon a more fundamental measure like the abolition of the church rates in 1838, because of the very vocal protests in the Commons from the Whig country members themselves, who, with their strong Anglican sympathies, saw in this an attempt to destroy once and for all the national character of the Church of England. From this time on, as Dissenting opinion became more extreme in its demands, the gulf between the two groups steadily widened. In particular, the Whigs, who still believed in the virtues of an Established Church, even if only as the bastion of social order, could never accept the growing demand for disestablishment made by their quondam allies. At first, this had indeed been restricted to the extremist element among the Dissenters, who acted under the leadership of Edward Miall, the Congregationalist minister at Leicester until 1841, when he resigned to become editor of the vehement Nonconformist. Even the moderate Nonconformists, however, became more militant in their attitude towards the Church of England after 1843, as a result of their campaign against the Conservative Government's Factory Act, which, so they believed, proposed to give that Church a monopoly over the education of working class children. By 1846, when he returned to office, therefore, Russell might well expect that more harm than benefit would result to the Whiggish cause

from any co-operation with political dissent.[3] It was not surprising, therefore, that he placed a higher value than previously on the support of Churchmen, and that, even before the defeat of Peel, he had gone out of his way, both in Parliament and the country, to emphasize his loyalty to the Church of England. The extent of his success can be measured by the fact that even from his distant exile in Rome, J.H. Newman could express his astonishment at "the phenomenon of the Whigs taking up the English Church."[4]

It was these two factors - the desire of High Churchmen to maintain the Whigs in office to prevent a possible worse alternative, the division between Whigs and Dissenters over the fundamental issue of disestablishment - that made possible the friendly relations between these two groups. The practical result of this was seen during the parliamentary debates on the new Government's educational policy. Spokesmen for the Church of England, in particular, gave a gratified welcome to the new minutes of the Committee of Council on Education, which were issued in August and December 1846. Their purpose was to improve the quality of the teachers in the elementary schools and to secure a higher standard for the profession, especially by the introduction of the principle of professional examinations and a system of rewards for efficiency, without at the same time disturbing the essential basis of English education. How far they

managed to achieve this purpose was proved in a speech by Sir Robert Inglis, who told the House of Commons that " he was content to take the plan of the Government - he would not say cheerfully but thankfully... . It was greatly superior to anything which could be expected from any other combination of parties in that House."[5]

Such words from the recognized champion of the interests of the Church could not but serve as a danger signal to the Dissenters, and increase their suspicions of the Government's good intentions. On hearing this speech of Inglis', John Bright burst out at once:

> Was there ever a good and beneficial measure for nonconformists proposed, that was ever received with such an exulting shout of gratulation by the Hon. Baronet, by the Bishops and all the Clergy of the Kingdom? I am wrong perhaps about the Hon. Baronet, he did not loudly exult, but he took the answer meekly, he took it thankfully,

and he went on to make a powerful claim for the ending of all state assistance for education, and the introduction of a completely voluntary system under which no denomination would excessively benefit.[6]

All the attempts of the Government to prove that they had not altered the <u>status quo</u> in favour of the Established Church by these measures proved unavailing. The hostility of the Dissenters against them had, indeed, increased rather than diminished by the time the general election was held the following July, 1847. This was particularly evident

in the City of London, in which constituency Russell himself was a candidate. At a meeting held on July 21st., his attempts to justify the educational policy of the Government and at the same time restore his reputation as a supporter of religious toleration by promising government aid for Baron Rothschild, who happened to be a fellow candidate, in his struggle to end Jewish civil disabilities, were greeted - so the Times tells us - by angry interruptions and a storm of mingled cheers and boos.[7] Even more vehement bitterness was shown when the nonconformist electors met together on July 28th. to decide their attitude towards Russell's candidacy. It was maintained by one speaker that even the Conservative Government under Sir Robert Peel had never proposed a measure that would have assisted the Church of England to such an extent out of public funds as the new educational minutes did. Samuel Morley, now a rising force amongst the leaders of Dissent, proved himself even more extreme: he told his audience that " the Lord John Russell of 1847 was not the man he was when he repealed the Test and Corporation Acts. He had yielded to influences that might well alarm the nonconformist body. The concessions he had made were to the aristocracy and the High Church party." The attempt by Russell's supporters to counter this flood of criticism was heavily defeated in the vote at the end of the meeting.[8]

Although in the end, Russell was returned at the head of the poll, his success was generally ascribed to the support of the Conservatives among the electorate, and he had been made well aware from his own personal experience of the strength of nonconformist discontent.[9] He received a further warning in the same sense from Sir Charles Wood, his lieutenant in Yorkshire, who told him that it was solely due to the assistance of the Conservatives that the Whigs had been able to hold Leeds and Halifax during this election, and that at Bradford, Bousfield had only managed to save his seat by promising to vote in future against increased state aid for education.[10] It seemed clear that the Dissenters had finally ceased "to act as a section of the Whig party."[11] This was all the more serious from Russell's point of view because, for the first time, they had fought the election as an organized body, and had managed to return twenty-six candidates.[12] Such a block of votes could prove of great importance in a House of Commons where, even after the election, the Government was still without a sure majority, and would depend for its survival on support from groups outside its traditional followers.[13] The result of the 1847 general election was, therefore, such as to compel Russell and the Whig Government to reappraise the value of their embryo alliance with High Churchmen which had been apparent when they had first taken office in July

1846.

The development of events during the next five years, in which Russell's Government maintained a very shaky tenure of power, would in any case have placed a considerable strain on such an alliance. It was inevitable that such a period of religious excitement would bring into sharp focus the incompatibility between the attitude of the Whigs and High Churchmen towards the Church itself, In one of its more cynical moods, the Saturday Review once wrote:

> the specific character of a Whig, by which a political naturalist may know one wherever he meets him, is that he is Conservative upon all profane matters, but a strong Liberal on ecclesiastical questions. The ecclesiastical domain is the only field upon which Liberalism can be safely indulged without endangering the position of an aristocratic party.[14]

Many Churchmen, indeed, would have agreed with the judgement of Lord Robert Cecil, that ever since the first formation of the Whig Party, "they have never swerved nor faltered in their hostility to the Church".[15]

Although it was inevitable that, as in all groups of men, there was bound to be some differences over details, it is possible to talk about a Whiggish sense of religion. This, perhaps, can best be illustrated by considering in some detail the opinions of one leading figure among them, Lord John Russell, the Prime Minister between 1846 and 1852. Russell's religious outlook was very much the product of eighteenth century rationalism, which assumed that human

progress depended on the free play of ideas between educated minds, thus making him hostile towards anything which seemed likely to produce intolerance and discrimination. In particular, Russell disliked intensely any emphasis that might be placed on the dogmatic content of religious faith, which would only result in dividing Christians among themselves. He deplored "the earthy and secretarian trappings by which man has disfigured Christianity - the multiplication of creeds, dogmas, ceremonies in the Church". These had resulted in the development of a party spirit within that Church which had divided it into antagonistic groups, as well as forming a barrier between it and the various Protestant sects. He also believed that they allowed the clergy to claim too great an authority within the community:

> he looked forward to a day when there would be no priests, or rather when every man would be his own priest, and all superstitious notions - such as was implied in the notion that only clergymen ought to perform certain offices of religion - should be cast aside by Christian men forever.[16]

Like most Whigs, Russell would have justified the existence of the Church of England solely on erastian grounds. Even if he did not believe it to be merely a department of the Government, he certainly saw it as little more than a subordinate ally of the state, whose main function was the propagation of ethics and morality amongst its citizens. All this was most distasteful to High Churchmen, who were now concerned to emphasize the essentially Catholic nature

of the Anglican Church, existing, so they believed, by divine commission as the prime channel of grace, and acknowledging in the last resort no sovereignity but that of God. It was not surprising, therefore, that they could describe Russell as nothing more than "a Church Dissenter", and at the end of his ministry, bitterly condemn its ecclesiastical record. According to one observer

> he had begun by appointing Church Dissenters to the Episcopal Sees, hung out the banner of the Sovereign in distinct antagonism to that of the hierarchy, snubbed the Bishops, swamped the Ecclesiastical Courts, blockaded the Church and stormed the Universities.[17]

For a man like Roundell Palmer, Russell was of all the leading statesmen of his time, the one in which "the power of the old Whig traditions, especially the Whig jealousy of the Church, was strongest".[18]

Shortly after the July general election in 1847, High Churchmen were once again making clear their hostility towards the Whig Government. On November 17th., the Anglo-Catholic Guardian could describe the Whigs as having re-established themselves as the heriditary enemies of the Church, in spite of their recent acts of tardy justice.[19] In its December issue, the Protestant High Church English Review expressed its regret at the recent acts of the Government, especially in the field of education, which had done much to destroy the confidence of Churchmen in it. This was all the more a pity, because, if it should lead to the

return of Sir Robert Peel, the Church itself would certainly gain nothing by the change.[20] Relations between the High Churchmen and the Government, however, were to worsen rather than improve in the near future, and by the following March, 1848, according to the Guardian, "the clergy had become of necessity an agitating body".[21] The conditions of the eighteen-thirties seemed to have returned.

One striking parallel between the two periods was the attempt by High Churchmen to safeguard their interests by the formation of pressure groups in the shape of 'church unions'. Once again, it was the Rev. William Palmer who was to play a leading part in this development.[22] As in 1833, when he had established the 'Association of Friends of the Church', he hoped that these would provide the means of ending the dissension between the various parties within it, and persuade its members to co-operate with each other for a common purpose. Palmer hoped that these unions would act in support of "a Church of England interest: in favour of the genuine old English Church, neither 'Romanized' nor 'Liberalized' nor 'Calvinized' nor 'Germanized' - but simply in the form and with the faith she had for so many years possessed."[23] He organized the first in 1848 at Bristol, a city which had for long enjoyed the reputation for enthusiastic churchmanship. From this centre they were to spread rapidly, especially through the south-west of England.[24]

Even from the start, they were to contain within themselves certain elements of weakness, which were to make them far less effective as a means of reuniting the Church than Palmer had hoped. According to even a favourably disposed observer, their members tended to dwell always on the darker side of church questions, to show a morbid hyper-sensitiveness over the issue of the church's integrity, and to give their support to the inexperienced extremists amongst their leaders, none of which did much to placate other parties within the Church.[25]

The principle which lay behind the formation of these church unions, the ending of party division within the Church of England so as to justify its claims as the Established Church of the Community, was one held most strongly by the Protestant High Churchmen like Palmer, and it was they who exercised the greatest influence within them. The Anglo-Catholics, on the other hand, were more strongly represented on the committee of the London Union on Church Matters. This particular union had developed out of the earlier Watching Committee on Church Matters, which had been formed on May 23rd., 1848, with J.R. Kenyon, its secretary, providing the driving force behind it. The purpose of this committee had been to act as a voluntary 'church cabinet', consisting of both laymen and clergy, with the specific aim of acting as a pressure group on members of Parliament. As

a result, it was perhaps natural enough that it should have been the lawyers among its members, the men who had had the greatest experience of such work, who controlled its policy. After the success of the Bristol Church Union, however, the rank and file of the London clergy resolved to claim a greater part in its management, and in February 1849, the Watching Committee was transformed into the London Union, with a much broader basis of membership. It soon became apparent, nevertheless, that the members of the original Watching Committee had managed to entrench themselves firmly into the executive committee of the new London Union, and that, much more conscious of what was practicable under the conditions of the day, they would be more moderate in their policy than the general membership approved. The result was a continuous state of tension within the Union, culminating in an inevitable schism. On June 12th., those members of the general body who favoured a more aggressive churchmanship resigned in order to form a rival association, the Metropolitan Church Union, consisting, so an unfriendly observer tells us, "of the grumblers amongst the High Churchmen".[26] This was, as will be made clear, to have a serious effect on the High Church cause in London.

The major issue during the period of Russell's Ministry which divided High Churchmen from the Whigs, and

indeed divided the High Churchmen amongst themselves, was the proper relationship between church and state. The various ecclesiastical controversies which turned upon this point were in particular to compel a reappraisal of the nature and function of the royal supremacy over the Church of England, a supremacy no longer exercised by the monarch in person whose loyalty to the Church might be assumed, as it had been in the sixteenth century when first established, but by a Government responsible to a Parliament containing among its members many who might not even belong to the Church. After 1847, there were two areas in which this became a matter of intense debate. First, it was necessary to decide the limits of this supremacy over the internal affairs of the Anglican Church. How far, for example, should the Government act on its own initiative in the appointment of the senior dignitaries of the Church? This was an issue brought into prominence by the choice of an extreme Evangelical, J.B. Sumner, to succeed Archbishop Howley at Canterbury, and the proposed elevation of R.D. Hampden, still under the censure of Oxford University for his theological opinions, to the see of Hereford. Again, it had to be decided whether departments of the Government consisting mainly of laymen had the right to interfere in church matters. In this connection the crucial issues were the claims of the two Committees of the Privy Council: the Judicial Committee to act as a court of

final appeal in questions affecting the doctrine of the Church, as in the Gorham case, the Committee on Education to have control over the management of church schools. Secondly, there were the problems caused by the relationship between the Government and the non-Anglican groups in the community, which might well seem to threaten the interests of the Established Church. Should it now be prepared, for example, to allow Jews to sit in Parliament? What would be the result if it succeeded in re-opening diplomatic relations with the Papacy? Above all, should it use its authority to prevent the possible strengthening of the Roman Catholic Church in England itself by forbidding the introduction of a diocesan hierarchy?

The policy adopted by the Whig Government to deal with each of these matters was to result in adverse criticism of Russell and his colleagues by one or another group of High Churchmen on the grounds that they had abused the prerogatives of the royal supremacy. At the same time, it brought into the open the still wide divisions existing within the Church of England itself: between High Churchmen and Evangelicals, between Anglo-Catholics and Protestant High Churchmen. In order to understand the political activity of High Churchmen in the years from 1847 to 1852, it will be necessary, therefore, to discuss their role in each of these controversies in some detail. In order to keep the course of events as

clear as possible, it would seem best to deal with them in chronological order.[27]

The question of the civil disabilities imposed on the Jews had become critical as the result of the election of Baron Rothschild for the City of London in the general election of 1847. Under the existing system, he would be unable to take his seat because the oath made by each member included the words 'on the true faith of a Christian'. In December, Lord John Russell introduced a resolution enabling him to take this oath without this required declaration. This was accepted by the House of Commons, but was rejected by the Lords, and it was not until 1858 that a compromise was reached, which allowed each House to determine the form of oath to be taken by its members. There is little doubt that the stand of the Lords on this matter reflected the opinion of a great majority of Churchmen against making this concession. Charles Wordsworth, for example, saw in it the greatest threat yet to the principles of 'the Constitution in Church and State'.[28] Such fears were expressed in the House of Commons itself by Sir Robert Inglis, who declared that, while there might have been some justification for relieving Roman Catholics of their civil disabilities in the community, this measure was "an unmixed evil".[29] The strength of this hostility towards the Jews was further illustrated by the fact that the Anglo-Catholic Beresford-Hope,

who, in general, prided himself on the extent of his tolerance, voted against the resolution.[30]

This did not deter Gladstone from making clear his support for the resolution. If he wished to retain any reputation with High Churchmen, it was nevertheless essential that he should justify as fully as possible his vote for Russell on this occasion. He did so by using two major arguments. First, he urged that "the most profound and powerful and uniform tendencies of the age, associated with the human mind, with the general course of events...with the providential government of the world" was towards the greater toleration of minorities. The Church must at all costs avoid identifying herself with a reactionary opposition to this development, or she was bound to lose that popularity in the country which was her greatest strength.

> As citizens and members of the Church we should contend manfully for her own principles and constitution, and should ask and press without fear for whatever tends to her own healthy development by her own means and resources, both material and moral, but we should deal amicably and liberally with questions either solely or mainly affecting the civil rights of other parties in the country.[31]

Secondly, Gladstone denied the charge that the admission of Jews would destroy the Christian character of Parliament, which had always been an essential principle of the traditional 'Constitution in Church and State'. It could in fact have no worse effect than that caused by allowing Unitarians

to sit as members of the House of Commons.[32] The guarantee that the Legislature would remain essentially Christian was no longer by giving orthodox believers a monopoly over its membership, but

> from the general preponderance of Christians in its composition, from their generally representing Christian constituencies, from the admitted principles of the constitution under which they are to act, and from the high and earnest love prevalent amongst them.[33]

Gladstone's speech on this question, with the long explanatory preface he provided for it in its published form, proved how far he had advanced towards accepting the idea of a secular state even since the days of the Maynooth controversy in 1845. In this, indeed, he had gone too fast for many of the Anglo- Catholics who were also reappraising their ideas about church-state relations. Even the Guardian, the representative mouthpiece of the younger generation among that group, expressed its doubts about the wisdom of his action. It believed that he was trying to maintain an untenable position between preserving the Christian character of Parliament or separating completely the Church from the State.[34] The older Anglo-Catholics were utterly dismayed by his decision to vote for the resolution. Pusey wrote to him out of the bitterness of his heart:

> I voted for you [in the 1847 election at Oxford] out of personal affection and regard for you, and the confidence I had in you as a religious man. Had I known that you would have joined in what I account

> an anti-Christian measure, I could not have helped to put you in a position which would have led to such a result. I would for your own soul's sake that you had been out of Parliament... It seems one more hint to Churchmen to have nothing to do with politics. Your election seemed the one thing which could still interest me in them.[35]

It was undoubtedly Pusey's anti-semitism, which he shared with so many of his contemporaries, that did much to determine his attitude towards this question. He told Gladstone once that

> it is very painful, as I have myself both heard and seen, to know of the devilish pleasure which it gives a Jew to utter blasphemy. They seem like persons possessed, and are so. The sort of laugh I have seen (sic) in uttering blasphemy was no other than satanic.[36]

He was thus never able to consider their claims for equal civil and religious rights as tolerantly as he did those of the Roman Catholics, a failure which he shared with "the Winchester people", Keble, Moberly and Isaac Williams.[37]

This controversy over Jewish civil disabilities was thus to divide Gladstone from those High Churchmen who, in other matters, were to look to him for political leadership. In spite of this, an examination of the division list on Russell's resolution shows that he in fact won more support than Inglis on this issue from those members of Parliament who can be identified as High Churchmen.[38]

There was to be a similar outcome to the parliamentary controversy over the proposal of the Whig Government to re-open diplomatic relations with the court of Rome at this same

time. In November 1847, the Earl of Minto, the father-in-law of Russell himself, had arrived in Rome on a private visit. Lord Palmerston, the foreign secretary, took advantage of his presence there to start unofficial negotiations with the Pope, Pius IX. He instructed Minto to offer assistance against possible future Austrian aggression on the Papal States, but in return he was to seek co-operation from the Pope in helping to repress Irish lawlessness, especially by condemning the priests who were believed to have incited it, and also to press for a withdrawal of the papal rescript denouncing the unsectarian colleges at Galway and Belfast as 'Godless institutions'. Although Minto failed to persuade Pius to do either of these two things, Palmerston was nevertheless sufficiently encouraged to introduce into the House of Lords in February 1848 a bill to authorize diplomatic relations with the Papacy. Despite the support of Lord Stanley, the Duke of Wellington and several Bishops, it was invalidated for all practical purposes by an amendment carried in committee, which provided that the papal representative must not be a priest. The House of Commons passed the amended bill by a majority of seventy-nine in the following August, but it quickly proved a dead letter when the Pope declined to send a layman as his representative.[39]

Although the matter thus soon became an academic one, it did make clear, as with the Jews, a significant difference

of opinion amongst High Churchmen over the Government's proposals. On the one hand, the Anglo-Catholic Guardian saw nothing to fear in it because the Pope was now too weak, in a temporal sense at least, to abuse whatever influence a diplomatic representative in London might provide him.[40] On the other, the Protestant High Church English Review could express its foreboding that

> assiduity, perseverance, obstinacy will prevail in the long run over weak governments, even if it may not be possible to specify the particulars in which the power of the Roman see, if once recognized and given a locus standi by the English Government may be found embarrassing and inconvenient.[41]

Once again, it was Inglis who repeated such warnings in the Commons, emphasizing that the Whigs were clearly determined to bring about a full reconciliation with Rome, which could only result in harming the interests of the Church of England.[42] According to the division lists, however, most of the Parliamentary High Churchmen, including this time Beresford-Hope, followed Gladstone in supporting the Government's proposal.[43] This difference of opinion over a possible threat from a revived Roman Catholicism was to have important consequences in shaping High Church reaction to papal aggression during 1850-1851.

Whig policy towards the Papacy and the Jews had resulted in emphasizing the differences amongst High Churchmen themselves. The controversy caused by the election of

Hampden as Bishop of Hereford in November 1847, and the appointment of J.B. Sumner as Archbishop of Canterbury the following February did much, however, to reunite them in opposition to Russell's Government, while, at the same time, it widened still further the gulf which already existed between them and the Evangelicals in the Church.

The connection between Hampden and the Whigs had been a close one ever since their former Prime Minister, Lord Melbourne, had appointed him Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford in 1836. Then both High Churchmen and Evangelicals had joined in condemning as heterodox his views on the authority of the Church's creeds, especially as these views had been expressed in his Bampton Lectures of 1832. Although they had failed to prevent his appointment at that time, they were able to secure his condemnation by the University by forcing his exclusion from the Board which nominated the select preachers in the University Church. The two attempts to remove this ban from Hampden in 1842 and 1844 had both failed. Most contemporaries considered Russell's choice of him to succeed Bishop Musgrave at Hereford, therefore, as a deliberate insult to the Church and University.[44] The extreme partisans among the High Churchmen, indeed, believed it part of a deep-laid plot to establish the complete submission of the Church to the State. If it failed to prevent the election of a man whom they considered not even Christian in his

theology, then clearly the Whigs would be able "to change the religion of the country by appointments" as they desired.[45] More moderate Anglicans like Archdeacon Hare did not go as far as this in their condemnation of the appointment. Hare also disliked intensely the unscrupulous attacks made by these extremists on Hampden's personal character, both in 1836 and during this later crisis. He was nevertheless forced to agree

> that it was a most injudicious measure on the part of the Minister...a wanton outrage to the feelings, prejudices they might be, but still strong and earnest feelings - of a large body of the clergy ...an act which would infallibly arouse vehement opposition and break up the peace of the Church at a time when we were hoping for something like a lull... . On these grounds, I would have implored the Minister, on my knees if of any avail, to recall what seemed to me an act of folly, almost amounting to madness, of which I have never been able to learn the slightest explanation or defence.[46]

Russell's reputation for acting hastily and without due forethought was certainly justified. His actions over the repeal of the Corn Laws, over the Durham Letter, over the dismissal of Palmerston in 1851, over the break-up of the coalition Government in 1855, provide cumulative evidence of a most unstatesmanlike impetuosity. In this affair of Hampden, however, it is now clear that he acted with a greater sense of responsibility than his contemporaries like Hare were prepared to believe at the time. On taking office as Prime Minister in 1846, Russell had accepted the obligation

of his party to make some recompense to Hampden for the support he had given the unpopular Whig cause at Oxford since his appointment as Regius Professor.[47] His intention was to make him the first Bishop of the newly created diocese of Manchester. In order to test the reaction of the Church to this choice, he had thought it sufficient to consult only the aging Archbishop of Canterbury, William Howley. The reaction had been encouraging. Howley repeated what he had told Melbourne in 1836, that he had been unable to discover in Hampden's books or lectures any doctrine at variance with the creed of the Church. He suggested, however, that Hampden might not possess the personal qualities necessary for the organization of a diocese in the industrial North.[48] Russell did not ignore this sensible warning. Instead of the scholarly Hampden, he proposed to the Queen one of the great reforming headmasters of the Victorian age, James Prince Lee, as the new Bishop.[49] On the other hand, after what he had learned from Howley, he felt no hesitation in selecting Hampden to fill the vacancy at Hereford when Bishop Musgrave was translated to York.

The consequent explosion of outraged feeling was thus an equal surprise to both Russell and Howley.[50] The Archbishop was unable to control the storm. Although obstinate in defence of his principles, he was timid and diffident by nature,[51] and, moreover, he was now an exhausted man on

the point of death. It was not surprising that he made no attempt to defend Russell against the vocal discontent of the Churchmen. Taking advantage of his silence, extremists like Bishop Phillpotts of Exeter could create a misleading impression of a tyrannical Prime Minister persecuting a saintly Archbishop.[52] To his credit, Russell refused to embarrass the dying Archbishop by making known his previous negotiations with him, and especially by publishing the full text of the letter in which Howley had exonerated Hampden from the charge of heresy, and which Charles Greville, after he had been shown it at the height of the controversy, believed fully justified the appointment.[53] The Prime Minister enhanced his reputation for courage by fighting this battle on his enemies ground, and thus the impact of his final victory was all the greater.

For, in spite of all the efforts of the High Church party, public opinion began to swing in favour of Hampden and the Whig Government.[54] In particular, Russell found that he had the support of the Evangelicals in this matter, and that, unlike Melbourne in 1836, he did not have to face a combined opposition between them and the High Churchmen. There were two reasons why, contrary to their traditions, the Evangelicals were now prepared to support a Whig Government. First, they believed that the Anglo-Catholics had become by far the greatest danger to the Protestant faith in England, and they

were thus prepared to be much more conciliatory than previously in their attitude toward Hampden. "Acquiescing only too thankfully in anything that was not Puseyite", they were ready to accept the election of a Bishop, who, however liberal he might be thought in his theological opinions, had at least given evidence of evangelical practices in his parochial work as Rector of Ewelme.[55]

Secondly, the confidence of the Evangelicals in Russell's good intentions had been greatly increased by his choice of a successor to Archbishop Howley, who had died in February 1848 at the height of the crisis. For the first time they had in John Bird Sumner one of their own party as head of the Church. The appointment of Sumner as Archbishop of Canterbury was, indeed, a considerable surprise to many of his contemporaries. In the popular mind, he had always been in the shadow of his more forceful younger brother, Charles, Bishop of Winchester, and he had earned for himself the reputation of extreme mildness of character.[56] Lord Aberdeen was to describe him later in even less flattering terms as a "poor, vain, silly creature, who could be bullied with impunity",[57] and the Saturday Review unkindly said of him in his obituary notice that "it cost him no effort to be undistinguished".[58] He had been Bishop of Chester since 1828, and had waited long for further promotion. It can, however, be said of him that, although his uncritical acceptance of

the more reactionary social theories of the day prevented him from offering any radical solution for the problems of the new industrial areas in that overgrown diocese, he had at least shown his personal concern for the condition of the poor by his active pastoral work amongst them.[59] It had been Russell's ecclesiastical adviser, Bishop Maltby of Durham, who had first drawn the attention of the Prime Minister to Sumner by forwarding a letter from him in which he had expressed his sympathy with the Government's position in the Hampden controversy, and this at a time when even his brother, Charles, was expressing his discontent.[60] On hearing of his nomination as the new Archbishop, however, Maltby could find nothing more to say to his credit than that he was "substantially a good man, sincere in his piety, candid and liberal in maintaining his opinions", and he expressed the hope that "his generally sound judgement will prevent him from giving offence and by degrees disengage him from his party, who will naturally cling with the greater pertinacity now that he has reached so high a station."[61] Unfortunately these hopes were not to be fulfilled. The part Sumner was to play in the attempted condemnation of Archdeacon Denison for his extreme high church views of the Real Presence in 1855, did much to confirm his reputation as a committed partisan, and he thus proved unable to act as a leader of an united Church. His appointment in 1848 did

much, however, to win Russell the support of the Evangelicals. According to the English Review:

> they are apparently satisfied at the present prospects of the Church, and possibly look to the exaltation of their own views under the influence of Government patronage, and to a depression of opinions... . They remain quiescent at all events, and perhaps they may even pass from the state of quiescence to one of actual support of Government in its conflict with the Church.[62]

The Evangelicals certainly refused to have anything to do with the campaign against Hampden being organized by the high church unions. These unions their mouthpiece, the Christian Observer, denounced bitterly as "nothing short, we are bold to say, of treason to the Church. They begin in conspiracy; they are conducted in violence; and they will end either in smoke or in ruin, not the restitution or regeneration of the Church of England."[63]

As a result, High Churchmen were isolated as never before both in the Church and the country, and they were unable to offer any effective resistance either to the confirmation of Hampden's election by the Cathedral Chapter at Hereford or to his consecration by the new Archbishop. It seemed that they had lost their ability to exercise any influence on political or ecclesiastical events. One observer, however, warned that the Government might find it dangerous to draw such a conclusion:

> we conceive it likely to encourage our mainly secular politicians of all parties in treating with unwise incredulity and unstatesmanlike

> contempt the spiritual power over which they appear to have gained so cheap and easy a victory ... but believing as we do, in spite of sceptical sneers in certain quarters, that the revived church feeling in England is both a great reality, and a great power we owe it seems to us impossible that it should not grow and prosper for a season.[64]

Despite such warnings, Russell must have felt, after his triumph in the Hampden controversy, no reason to doubt a successful outcome to any future struggle with English High Churchmen. He certainly could afford to ignore their vocal discontent over the appointment of John Graham to succeed Sumner at Chester, a man who, as a don at Cambridge, had played a leading part in the struggle to admit Dissenters to the University.[65]

The fourth critical issue which developed in ecclesiastical affairs after 1847, the policy of the Whig Government regarding the 'management clauses' in the trust deeds of church schools, produced much the same result as the first three: it worsened the relations between the Evangelicals and the High Churchmen, the one group on the whole approving, the other disapproving of the proposals made by Lord Lansdowne, who, as Lord President of the Council, was the minister responsible in this matter: it emphasized the differences amongst the High Churchmen themselves.

National education was, indeed, a subject which lent itself to violent controversy in nineteenth-century England. This was because the Victorians possessed such a high conception of its importance in the life of the community. They

believed its purpose to be, not the acquisition of a technical training, but rather the preparation of the young to play their full part as citizens. In order to do this, it was generally assumed that religious teaching must form the essential foundation of all education. The question remained, what form this teaching should take. On the one hand, orthodox Churchmen argued strongly that it should be based on the distinctive doctrines of the Established Church as embodied in the catechism of that Church. On the other, it was maintained that a truly national system of education which would be acceptable to dissenters from that Church must be unsectarian in its teaching. In the field of elementary education, this controversy had been temporarily resolved by the creation of two voluntary societies to share the responsibility for its provision: first, in 1811, the National Society for the Promotion of the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church, whose title speaks for itself; and secondly, in 1814, the British and Foreign School Society, whose schools would attempt to teach the Scriptures in the plain sense in which all Christians understood them, and exclude all matters which tended to divide Christians amongst themselves.

This system worked comparatively well until the eighteen-thirties, when it became obvious that any efficient system of national education could not be run along such

voluntary lines, but would require assistance from the state. At first, the Whig Government after 1832 proposed merely to subsidize the work of the two societies, but by 1839, Lord John Russell had convinced himself that much greater direct control should be in the hand of the state. He insisted that all schools accepting grants from the Government must also accept inspection in order to ensure that standards were maintained. Further, he hoped it would prove possible to create a national system of state-directed education outside the influence of any one denomination. In this respect, he had been greatly encouraged by the successful development in Ireland after 1835 of a form of religious instruction used in the pauper schools which had proved acceptable to all denominations, including the Roman Catholics. This had been transplanted successfully, so it seemed, into the schools which had been established by the newly reformed Liverpool Corporation.[66] Russell saw no reason why this same system should not be extended on a national scale. He took the first step in his Education Bill of 1839, which proposed in part the organization of Normal Schools, which would provide a training for the required teachers in such schools on a non-sectarian basis.

The result was a most hostile reaction on the part of Anglican Churchmen, who never again fully recovered their confidence in the good intentions of Russell and the

Whigs in educational matters. They saw these proposals, in particular, as a direct challenge to the influence of their National Society, which because of the greater financial resources of the Established Church, had played up to this time a dominant role in the field of elementary education, especially in the country districts where there was only a small minority of Dissenters. They made, therefore, a sustained attack on the Education Bill and the idea of 'indifferentiated Christianity' which underlay it, an attack that Russell, because of the weak Parliamentary position of the Whig Government, had no chance to resist effectively. He was forced to make fundamental concessions to their demands, first by abandoning the most unpopular Normal Schools, and then, by 'the Concordat of April 1840,' agreeing that the state inspectors for the National Schools should be appointed only from the men who had the approval of the Archbishop of Canterbury. It was clear, as a result, that the National Society would, in fact if not in theory, retain its independence from government control.[67]

After this surrender by the Whig Government and during the subsequent period of Conservative rule between 1842 and 1846, relations between the Established Church and the Committee of the Privy Council, which had been created in 1839 to deal with educational matters, naturally improved considerably. The fears which were revived by the return

of the Whigs to office in July 1846, were allayed, as we have seen, by the proposal to increase state assistance on the same terms which had hitherto proved so beneficial to the interests of the Church. Even Archdeacon Denison had no diffidence in applying for a grant on behalf of his new parochial school at East Brent on such terms.[68]

George Anthony Denison, Vicar of East Brent and Archdeacon of Taunton, was to play a large part in the educational controversies of the next few years. He was, indeed, one of the great eccentric figures of the nineteenth century. A member of a most impressive family group, he was the brother of a Speaker of the House of Commons, a Bishop of Salisbury, a Governor of New South Wales in Australia, and two fellows of Oxford Colleges. Denison, himself, as a fellow of Oriel, had been a contemporary of Newman. He was always unable, nevertheless, to appreciate the depth and profundity of Newman's thought, and had never been at ease in the theological discussion which took place in the common room of his college.[69] His high church principles were those of the orthodox 'high-and-dry' school, and he was always happier living in his parish at East Brent than at Oxford, acting there, so Tom Mozley tells us, "as a medieval Chancellor, Archbishop and Cardinal".[70] As such, he shared the increasing distrust of the English landed gentry for the growing power of the centralized state. In particular, the

presence of government inspectors in his parish school drove him to distraction. One he threatened to throw into the village duckpond; another he allowed his school-children to mock by singing 'Goosey Goosey Gander'.[71] In time he became convinced that the Committee of Council on Education which they represented was a body in which "all the evil of the time is, as it were, summed up and condensed... it is to me, and always has been, 'the abomination of desolation, sitting where it ought not."[72]

Denison very soon lost whatever confidence the educational minutes of 1846 had given him in the good intentions of the Whig Government. His suspicions were first revived during the debate on education which took place in the House of Commons the following April 1847, and in which Government spokesmen made some unwise remarks about the teaching of the catechism in the Church of England schools. One of the requirements of the National Society before making a grant to any such school was that this should be taught to all its pupils. In the early days of the Society, this regulation had tended to be ignored, but in the more heated ecclesiastical atmosphere of the eighteen-thirties and -forties, Churchmen had insisted that it should be more strictly enforced. Both Lord John Russell and Sir George Grey, the Home Secretary, emphasized in this debate the hardship such a stipulation was to those Dissenters who had no alternative

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but to send their children to church schools as the only ones in the districts in which they lived, and they suggested that it might well be abolished. Even so, they made it clear that no compulsion would be put on the Society by the Government to do so, and that the whole matter should be left to the good sense of the school managers.[73] Despite this, Denison's fears were aroused, and after an unsatisfactory correspondence with the Secretary of the Committee of Council on Education in an attempt to have the policy of the Government clarified on this issue, he decided to withdraw his application for a grant from the National Society under the terms of the 1846 minutes in order to provide no justification for state intervention in the running of his school at East Brent.[74] Denison was, however, unable to convince other Churchmen that this was an immediate threat to the Church. Gladstone, for example, told him that he saw no reason to be concerned about these ministerial statements. He himself was convinced instead that a much more serious danger was the proposal of the Committee of Council to impose new 'management clauses' on the schools.[75] This had escaped Denison's notice up to that moment, but once it had been drawn to his attention, he made it, rather than the controversy over the Catechism, the centre of his sustained and bitter attack on the educational policy of the Whig Government during the next five years.

There was, indeed, little disapproval among Churchmen of the principle involved in the introduction of these management clauses into the trust deeds of their schools. Most of the annual government grant for education since 1833 had been devoted to paying the cost of their construction, and obviously there was need of some guarantee against the diversion from its original purpose of a building constructed with the aid of public money. One such security was the creation of a management committee which, being self perpetuating, could ensure that the founder's original intention was maintained. A report on the National Schools which had been established previously to 1839 showed, nevertheless, that only one fifth of them possessed such committees, and that many of these were not constituted in such a way to fulfill their functions properly. The survival of the remaining schools without any such committee at all, depended on the continuing initiative of the local clergyman of the parish.[76] It was natural, therefore, that the Committee of Council, soon after its creation, should have recommended that all schools receiving state aid through the National Society ought to possess properly organized management committees. In 1844, in order to make the situation clear, Lord Wharncliffe, the then Lord President of the Council in the Conservative Government, had an interview with Archbishop Howley and the committee of the National Society about the

nature of these recommendations. It was agreed to leave the parish clergy a great deal of authority in this matter. They were to have both the right to nominate members of these management committees, and also to have sole control over the schools in those districts which lacked sufficient qualified persons to form a quorum of one. Lord Wharncliffe suggested that this agreement should remain an understanding between the Committee of Council and the National Society rather than be embodied in a formal minute, "lest discussions should be raised in Parliament which are always more injurious to the Church than to the Government".[77]

The change of Government in 1846 ended the advantages which had been gained from this informal arrangement. Lord Lansdowne, the new Whig Lord President, did not consider himself bound by the verbal agreements of his predecessor. Moreover, having extended the scale of public assistance to Church Schools, he felt entitled to interfere more decisively in the formulation of their trust deeds. He had also far less sympathy with the claims of the clergy than Wharncliffe possessed, and was prepared to restrict as much as possible their influence over the management committees. As a result, the draft of four models of management clauses, prepared by the Committee of Council in April 1846, proved to be detrimental to the interests of the clergy. It was true that they differed somewhat in nature according to the social

structure of the local school district. In the poorer areas, for example, it was the Bishop who had the responsibility of nominating the members of the first committee, or of deciding to leave the school management for the time being at least in the hands of the local clergy. All four models, however, provided ultimately for the establishment of a committee composed mainly of lay members elected by the votes of the subscribers to the school, and thus, in theory at least, being independent from ecclesiastical control. In the subsequent negotiations, the committee of the National Society pressed for further clarification, insisting especially that the qualifications required for election to these committees should ensure a bona fide membership of the Church of England, and also that the founders of church schools should have a free choice between the four models. They agreed, nevertheless, that they would in future recommend to all Church of England schools receiving a grant from the Society that they should adopt one or another of the suggested clauses. This was confirmed in July 1847 by a formal minute of the Committee of Council on Education.[78]

It was at this stage in the proceedings that Gladstone had drawn the attention of the Archdeacon to the dangerous implications of these model clauses. Denison quickly convinced himself that they were part of a plot by the Whig Government to destroy the authority of the clergymen of the

Church of England in one of their last strongholds, the country parishes. He maintained that the committee of the National Society, by coming to this understanding with the Committee of Council, had in fact surrendered the whole position of the Church.[79] He demanded that it should go back on the settlement it had reached with the Government, and now insist on the authorization of a fifth model clause, which would allow the founder of a school the right to leave its management entirely in the hands of the local clergy. In order to prevent any increase in the control claimed by the state over these schools, he sought a return to the terms of the "Concordat of 1840", by which their acceptance of public money only provided the Government with the right to inspect the standard of teaching and to insist on a guarantee that the site of the school was legally secured. If the Government considered that this was not sufficient, then the Church should refuse to accept its financial aid, and in future support its schools from its own resources, as Denison himself was now doing at East Brent. Only in this way could the Church make sure of preserving her exclusive control over both religious and moral instruction in her schools, and thus maintain England as a truly Christian society.[80]

Denison hoped that with the support of High Churchmen, he could force a complete break between the Government and

the National Society over this issue. He soon discovered, however, that they were not all prepared to accept his extreme claims for the authority of the Church over her schools. It is of significance that it was the Anglo-Catholics who adopted a much more liberal position in this matter. The Tractarian Sir Walter James, for example, emphasized the right of the lay subscribers to exercise some influence over their management.[81] The statesmanlike Guardian warned its readers of the fatal consequences of a head-on collision with the state, especially at a time when the Church did not possess the financial means to support its own system of education on a national scale.[82]

In this period of great religious excitement, such moderate advice won little acceptance. Denison's extravagent demands made him the hero of the extreme partisans of the Church. They flocked to his support at the annual meetings of the National Society, which provided him with the only opportunity to maintain a sustained attack on what he considered the misguided policy of the Society's committee which acted as its executive organ. At these meetings, nevertheless, he was not to remain unchallenged. He was to meet the equally vehement opposition of the Evangelicals, who were much more prepared to co-operate with the Whig Government in this matter. The Evangelicals acted under the leadership of the Rev. Francis Close, who was to prove himself a

most worthy opponent for the Archdeacon. A disciple of Charles Simeon at Cambridge, he had become Rector of the wealthy parish of Cheltenham at the age of twenty-six. The self-confidence arising out of this early material success was added to the energy and determination which he had inherited from the military background of his family. He proved himself a born ruler of men, and the parish was content to submit to his will:

> No neighbouring hereditary or municipal instinct of independence could thwart his determination long. In the bosoms of hundreds and thousands of households his social decrees were accepted without a thought of the probability of opposition. He must be credited with eminent qualities to have founded so supreme and inquisitorial an empire over homes and wills.[83]

If Mozley was right in describing Denison as a mediaeval Archbishop, then Close was surely 'the Pope of Cheltenham'.[84] The two men brought the same despotic characteristics they both possessed in such abundance into their controversy over the management clauses. The resulting clash of personalities engendered a spirit of violence amongst their supporters which was the despair of more moderate Churchmen like Frederick Maurice. Maurice described his attendance at the annual meeting of the National Society in 1849 as "a most grievous five hours...listening to speeches from clergymen that it almost broke one's heart to hear, and seeing demonstrations of a spirit which betokens schism and destruction." He believed that here was a greater danger

to the Church than any external aggression against it on the part of Roman Catholics or Dissenters.[85]

This bitter conflict between High Churchmen and Evangelicals which developed within the National Society during these years, was not, however, entirely the result of personal factors. Fundamental principles were also involved, for the Evangelicals had a very different conception of the Church's role in national education from that possessed by Denison and his followers. They were, in particular, much more aware of the failure of the existing system in the large industrial towns, and thus much more conscious of the need to work as closely as possible with the Committee of Council on Education in order to obtain assistance from the state in solving new problems which were unknown in the country districts. They recognized that the excessive pretensions claimed by Denison on behalf of the clergy were harmful to the reputation of the Church, and warned their colleagues that "public opinion would not allow the schools to be consigned wholly to the cassock pocket of the parish priest".[86] Above all, they had a very different conception of the purpose of the education provided by these parish schools. The authoritarian element amongst the High Churchmen believed these to be one of the main bulwarks of the existing social system. As the English Review once boasted, none of those taking part in the riots of 1842 had

been at National Schools or were parents of pupils being educated in them.[87] The Evangelicals, on the other hand, rejected any idea that these schools should be used in order to preserve the existing hierarchical order of society, especially by transforming them into charity schools for the sons of farm labourers, in which they would be taught in such a way to fit them for the same station in life. The Rev. Richard Dawes, the most eminent of the Evangelical school-masters, believed instead that the essential need was to make these schools the meeting place for children of all classes so as to abolish the social barrier between them.[88]

The National Society after 1848 proved the battle-ground on which these principles clashed. The Evangelicals had their due share of representation on the committee of the Society, of which their leader, J.B. Sumner, the new Archbishop of Canterbury, was ex-officio chairman. Sumner never possessed, however, that force of character necessary to dominate the annual meetings, thus giving the malcontents the opportunity to make clear their displeasure, and it was at these meetings that Denison came into his own. In 1848 he succeeded in carrying a motion urging a return to the principles of the 'Concordat of 1840' as the only basis for any further negotiations with the Government. After making the strength of his support amongst the rank-and-file

of the Society clear, Denison then allowed his motion to be withdrawn so as not to embarrass the committee of the Society in its discussions with the Committee of Council then in progress. When these proved abortive, he returned to the attack at the meeting the following year, and found himself with greatly increased support and apparently master of the situation.[89] It was generally accepted that the motion he proposed in terms very similar to the one of the previous year implied not only a declaration of war on the Government but also a vote of censure on the committee of the National Society for the way in which they had so far handled the situation.[90] If, as seemed very possible at one time, this motion had been carried by a large majority, it would have marked the triumph of the extreme High Churchmen, and done much to increase the hostility against them of both the Evangelicals and the Whigs. At the last moment, two moderate Churchmen, Bishop Samuel Wilberforce and Denison's own brother, Edward, Bishop of Salisbury, managed to outmanoeuvre him. Making Archdeacon Manning, at this time a man of the most immense reputation in the Church, their spokesman, they persuaded the meeting to adopt a compromise resolution. This emphasized on the one hand the need not to break with the Government; on the other, it urged that the committee should only negotiate 'freed from their original and unguarded recommendation of the model clauses".[91]

Despite this tactical defeat of the extremists, it remained clear that High Churchmen of all shades of opinion were still suspicious of the Whig Government's good intentions, and were concerned about the lack of vigour on the part of the committee of the National Society in defence of the interests of the Church.[92] On June 7th., the day after the annual meeting of the National Society, the secretaries of the various church unions who had attended it met together in order to set up their own committee to watch over the ensuing negotiations with the Committee of Council. It is significant that both the important London church unions were strongly represented on it.[93] Their forebodings seemed to have been realized when, once again, the negotiations broke down without finding a solution satisfactory to both sides. At the end of 1849, the hapless committee of the National Society withdrew completely from the controversy, refusing to give its sanction to any of the model clauses, but leaving the managers of the church schools the right to adopt them if they so wished.[94] Considering this a complete abdication of their responsibility, Denison now seized the initiative again. He organized a public meeting at Willis's Rooms in St. James's on February 7th., 1850, which attracted an audience of over twelve hundred persons.[95] An hostile witness has left a vivid description of the temper in which it was conducted:

> A large proportion of the excited body appeared to have come to the meeting with the resolution to make each man as much noise as he could: "Bravo, bravo, Denison", "Go it, go it, Denison" ... Mr. Denison was the great offender of the day, egotistical, inflammatory exaggerated. The addresses were almost uniformly characterized by great bitterness against the Commissioners, the Government and the late Secretary, Sir James Kay-Shuttleworth; by profound respect for the Primate, who had given his consent to almost all that was now complained of; and by derision of the present Primate, who has by an admirable series of letters to the Commissioners done much to bring the Society out of its present difficulties... . The real point of our differences with Denison's supporters is that at bottom their object is to take from the laity all power, and give to the clergy absolute dominion over the schools... where their object is to 'unprotestanize' their parishes by 'unprotestanizing' their schools; to innoculate the young mind with all the follies and fripperies of a new fangled Christianity; to send them forth elaborate musicians rather than simple minded believers; to create in them an early distaste for the simple and pure ceremony of the Church - then we are among those who think it well to have a lay check upon ecclesiastical folly.[96]

Denison's leadership of the opposition to the educational policy of the Whig Government did not, however, merely arouse the antagonism of the Evangelicals; it brought into the open how far he differed in his approach to this matter from many other High Churchmen themselves, and especially the Anglo-Catholics. The Guardian, for example, engaged in a long controversy with him during the last months of 1849. In particular, it warned him of the dangers which would result from a complete break with the Government, even though it agreed that the perfect solution would be for the Church

to devote its own resources to the support of voluntary schools.[97] Even more important, it was now obvious how little sympathy Gladstone possessed for the extreme claims made by Denison on behalf of Churchmen. It had after all been Gladstone who had first drawn the attention of the Archdeacon to the implications of the management clauses. But in the period since 1846 that statesmen had become much more aware of the need to reach a compromise solution with the Government over this issue. It was common knowledge, indeed, that in 1848 he had almost succeeded in negotiating an agreement between the Committee of Council and the National Society.[98] Gladstone especially disagreed with Denison about the problem of lay co-operation in the management of church schools. By this time he had come to believe that in ecclesiastical as well as civil institutions, the spirit of the age demanded some measure of self-government. The clergy were no more justified that the King in claiming the divine right of their authority.[99] He could not, therefore, support Denison in his appeal for exclusive clerical control over the Church of England schools. He suggested that the real complaint of the clergy should instead be about the failure of their parishioners to share in the responsibility of running these schools. His speech in this sense during the educational debate of 1848 met with Lord John Russell's entire approbation, and it marked

another significant stage in his advance to a more liberal position with regard to religious controversies.[100]

It was not surprising, therefore, that Gladstone did not attend the protest meeting on February 7th when, under the guidance of Denison, it was resolved to take the controversy over the management clauses out of the limited arena of the National Society by petitioning Parliament itself to undo the work of the Committee of Council on Education. It was more significant that he did not accept Denison's invitation to a council of war summoned for the 13th., in order to discuss what were the best parliamentary tactics to adopt. The members of Parliament who did attend included one liberal, William Page Wood, and one Peelite, Roundell Palmer, the only member of that group whom Denison ever claimed to trust.[101] The rest were Conservatives, including the Archdeacon's father-in-law, J.W. Henley, Lord John Manners, Spencer Walpole, W. Mills, Napier and Newdegate.[102] They were soon forced to the conclusion that it would be dangerous to press the extreme claims of the Church in an hostile House of Commons. It was decided instead to demand an investigation into the whole question of the Government's educational policy by a select committee of the House of Lords, where they might expect a more sympathetic hearing. On March 4th., the matter was brought up in that House, and this proposal received more authorita-

tive support than even its more extreme supporters had hoped. Even Archbishop Sumner surprisingly aligned himself with Bishop Blomfield in pressing the matter on the Government. On the other hand, more liberal clergymen like Bishop Thirlwall of St. Davids believed that the appointment of such a committee would only result in increasing the dissension within the Church. Lord Landsdowne was able to take advantage of these fears to win support for his attempt to shelve the whole question. He complained bitterly that the speakers at the protest meeting of February 7th., had knowingly misrepresented the policy of the Committee of Council on the management clauses:

> there was scarcely one single statement made...in reference to matters of fact which he was not able on the most unquestionable evidence - evidence laid on the table of the House - most decisively to controvert and to prove that persons unacquainted with the subject were induced to sign that petition by statements that might have been contradicted on the spot.

In particular, there was no intention on the part of the Government either to weaken the authority of the Clergy over the parish schools or to introduce into them any secular form of education.[103]

Lansdowne's firm declaration of the Government's intent did much to dampen down the educational controversy for the time being. The annual meeting of the National Society, held on May 28th, 1850, proved far less tumultuous than its immediate predecessors. Archbishop Sumner, for once firmly

in control of its proceedings, was able to win approval for the proposal of the Society's committee to leave to each school manager in future the decision whether to adopt any of the Government's model clauses.[104] High Church opinion was further placated by the readiness of the Government to accept the demands of a majority in the House of Lords on July 2nd. for a full investigation into the whole subject of church education. Lansdowne promised that there would be as little delay as possible in setting this up.[105] As a result of this concession, even Denison was now prepared to moderate his stand. He was content to insist only on the granting of his secondary point, the right of the clergy to have sole control over the school if its promoter so desired, and he no longer demanded that the National Society should make a complete break with the Government.[106]

In spite of this lessening of tension between the Whigs and the extreme High Churchmen in the controversy over the management clauses, the cumulative impact of the Government's policy on such matters as church appointments, Jewish civil disabilities, the Papacy and education since 1847 had done much to make ecclesiastical relations as strained as they had been in the eighteen-thirties. The reaction of Churchmen during this period was an extremely complex one, which did much to prevent the Church of England

from adopting a common policy over these issues. These differences of opinion were further emphasized by the long drawn-out legal proceedings in the Gorham case, which in particular was to prove once again how widely separated were the Protestant High Churchmen and the Anglo-Catholics on the problem of church-state relations. It is for this reason rather than for its direct political implications that the Gorham controversy is of importance for our study.[107]

The matter first became of public concern in November 1847, when the Rev. C.G. Gorham, Vicar of St. Just-in-Penwith, Cornwall, had been presented by the Crown to the living at Brampford-Speke. Both these benefices were in the diocese of Exeter, and its Bishop, that most orthodox of 'high-and-dry' Churchman, Henry Phillpotts, had been given reason to believe that Gorham's opinions with regard to Baptismal Regeneration were unsound, if not heretical. Accordingly, when Gorham applied for institution to his new benefice, the Bishop told him that he must first undergo an examination in the soundness of this doctrine. As a result of this examination, which was not completed until March 1848, Phillpotts came to the conclusion that, while Gorham was sincere in his claim to accept the formularies of the Church, he did so in fact only by forcing on them a Calvinistic interpretation. In particular, he held that the spiritual regeneration of infants was not given or conferred through the Sacrament of Baptism, but

by one specific Act of Grace from God. Considering that this was contrary to the wording both of the Baptismal Service and also to the Twenty-Seventh Article, Phillpotts refused to institute Gorham in his new living, and in August 1848, his right to so refuse was upheld by the Court of Arches at Canterbury.

As he was entitled, Gorham now appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as the final court of appeal in such matters of doctrine. After a long delay, in December 1849 his case was argued before the seven lay judges who formed the Court, with the two Archbishops and the Bishop of London acting as assessors. The following March, 1850, the Court finally decided by a majority vote, with one of the lay judges and Bishop Blomfield dissenting, that what appeared to be the doctrine held by Gorham was not contrary to "the declared doctrine of the Church of England as by law established", and that he ought not, therefore, have been refused institution.[108] This decision was for High Churchmen certainly one of "the most important events in the history of the English Church since 1662".[109] Gladstone even believed that its outcome might be one "which will separate for ever my path of life, public or private, and that of political parties. The issue is one going to the very root of all teaching and all life in the Church of England."[110] In particular, it forced them to reconsider the

implications of the Reformation settlement of the sixteenth century for the catholic nature of the Anglican Church.

The crucial issue was the claim of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to act as a court of final appeal in doctrinal cases. It had indeed only been given this function as recently as 1833, after the abolition of the Court of Delegates the previous year. It was generally assumed that this had been in fact done in a fit of absence of mind, the controversy which would be caused by a court composed of secular judges dealing with doctrinal questions having been overlooked by the Royal Commission which dealt with the matter.[111] Their judgement in the Gorham case was the first occasion on which they had used the authority given to them, and it would thus act as a precedent for the future. It was clearly necessary that Churchmen who disapproved of it should challenge it as effectively as possible.

It soon became clear, however, that, although Churchmen might have questioned the decision on two levels, on each of these it would prove impossible for them to reach an unanimous agreement even amongst themselves. First, it might be argued that the judgement was wrong in itself, that to uphold the right of Gorham to hold a living in the Church of England because his doctrine was not contrary to that of the Church, could only be justified by a complete

misinterpretation of the Church!s formularies. It soon became apparent, nevertheless that few Churchmen could adopt such an unqualified position towards it. There was, indeed, general agreement amongst them that Bishop Phillpotts had been completely right to condemn Gorham's opinions as heretical as these were expounded to him during his examination, and especially Gorham's denial of the belief in "one baptism for the rejection of sins". Even here, however, Pusey could differ from many High Churchmen, including Keble himself, believing that Gorham should have been left alone to give him an opportunity to learn the errors of his ways.[112] What made the situation much more complicated was the fact that the members of the Judicial Committee had based their decision not on the evidence of Gorham's own statements, but rather on their own abstracts of these, which proved to be much more vague in substance, and omitted many of what were considered to be Gorham's specific errors. As a result, there was room for a valid difference of opinion as to whether much of what Gorham was purported to have maintained had not, in fact, always been accepted as orthodox doctrine by some of the great divines of the Church. On the one hand, extreme Churchmen could still argue that even the Committee's abstract contained matter contradictory to "the clear, distinct and explicit assertions of the Faith of the Church of England."[113] On the other, J.B. Mozley, whose churchmanship

could not be denied, thought that the issue was far from being so clear-cut,[114] and by 1855 he had convinced himself that the judgement of the Judicial Committee had been the correct one under the circumstances.[115] Archdeacon Churton, himself a most orthodox Churchman, also came out in support of the judgement.[116] There was, thus, clearly considerable opportunity for disagreement between High Churchmen in the doctrinal aspect of the Gorham controversy.

Even more fundamental differences of opinion resulted from the second main charge by Churchmen against the judgement of the Judicial Committee, that in acting as a court of final appeal in doctrinal matters it was abusing the supremacy claimed by the Crown over the Anglican Church. For many, this was a much more serious issue than the judgement itself; as Charles Marriott later told J.B. Mozley, "For my part, I object more strongly to the tribunal than to the decision".[117] All Churchmen were determined to reject the authority claimed in spiritual matters by the Judicial Committee as it was then constituted with a membership of secular judges. There was, however, a wide divergence of opinion as to how this situation could be ratified. At one extreme, Protestant High Churchmen, like William Palmer, believing as they did in the great value of the Established Church, which made it essential to preserve the intimate connection between the Church of England and the state,

denied that any radical reform was in fact necessary. All that was required was to make it clear that the Committee must consider cases referred to it, not as if they were matters of law, but according to the spiritual and traditional authority which had developed within the Church itself.[118] Bishop Blomfield attempted to make certain that this would be done in future by proposing that all matters involving doctrine which came before the Committee should first be referred to the Episcopate in general, whose decision would be final. The Whig Government rejected this suggestion, however, on the grounds that it was an indirect attack on the Queen's prerogative, and that the Bishops themselves were by no means unanimous in their understanding of the doctrine of the Church.[119] At the opposite extreme to Palmer were Anglo-Catholics like Manning, Allies and Maskell, who denied the right of any constitutional body, however it might be constituted, to claim authority to judge in spiritual questions from the secular ruler. The controversy over the Gorham decision compelled these men to consider again whether the replacement of papal by royal supremacy over the Church in England at the Reformation had not destroyed the catholic and apostolic character of that Church. Their failure to resolve this difficulty was the cause of the second great wave of secessions to the Roman Catholic Church, following those who had accompanied Newman

in 1845, and including two of Gladstone's closest friends, Manning and James Hope-Scott.[120]

Gladstone himself, however, in company with many of the younger generation of Anglo-Catholics, took a middle position in this matter. They were still prepared to justify the Reformation settlement in England on the grounds that it was based on principles similar to those which had existed in the times of Constantine and Justinian, and which had made Church and State conjoint powers. Gladstone indeed maintained that his study of this controversy had given him a much greater appreciation of the English Reformation, especially with regard to the question of Supremacy, than he had possessed previously. At the same time, he could not deny that the constitutional changes which had taken place since the sixteenth century had completely changed the position of the Church. There was a great difference between the exercise of the Royal Supremacy by Elizabeth on the one hand, who ruled over a nation whose subjects, at least in theory, were all members of the Established Church, and by Victoria on the other, who had to act through a body which was in the last resort responsible to a Parliament elected in part by Dissenters from that Church. It was for this reason that no amount of tampering with the nature and composition of the Judicial Committee could be expected to restore the spirit of the Reformation. Those who believed

as Gladstone did in this matter were now convinced that the Church must be given much greater independence to direct its own affairs, especially by the revival of Convocation and church synods.[121]

The Gorham controversy thus brought into prominence three major issues about which there proved to be a wide variety of opinion amongst High Churchmen: the doctrine of the Church concerning Baptismal Regeneration, the question of Church-State relations and the threat from Roman Catholicism as shown by the number of influential conversions to that faith which followed the judgement of the Judicial Committee. It was this last factor which above all prevented these Churchmen from forming an united body in defence of the Church. This was clearly shown by the ultimate failure of all attempts to reunite the two London church unions in this period so that they might adopt a common policy.[122] Even up to July 23rd., 1850, when members of both the London and the Metropolitan Church Unions had co-operated in organizing a well-attended protest meeting against the judgement, this has still seemed a practical possibility.[123] The growing concern of the Protestant High Churchmen about the apparent revival of an aggressive Roman Catholicism was, however, to emphasize the fundamental split between them and the Anglo-Catholics on this issue. As one contemporary observer explained, it

was

> a different mode of regarding Rome and Romanism on the part of individuals on either side whose energy and attainments could not fail to acquire for them a leading place in any executive which they joined, which was the greatest hindrance to the amalgamation of these organizations.[124]

William Palmer, for example, believed that it was now essential that all High Churchmen, especially if they wanted the support of the politically important middle classes, should make absolutely clear their loyalty to the Church of England, even if this meant subscribing to a declaration against Romish error. Pusey, on the other hand, maintained that to publish any such declaration emphasizing the Protestant nature of the Church would only drive away those already wavering in their faith in it. There was little chance of any compromise between these two points of view.[125]

Relations between these two groups of High Churchmen became even more strained the following October, due to the scandal caused by Viscount Feilden's conversion to Roman Catholicism. Feilden had acted as one of the chairmen at the protest meeting of June 23rd. At that time he had been considered a Protestant High Churchmen, mainly because of the reputation he had gained when he had stood as a 'No Popery' candidate in the Cambridge University election of 1847. There seemed to be no doubt about his loyalty to the

Church of England, and it was, therefore, the greater shock when, at the end of August, amidst considerable publicity, he announced his conversion to Rome.[126] This caused considerable embarrassment, in particular, to the members of the Metropolitan Church Union which had been responsible for his choice as chairman, and Palmer, who was a leading member of that union, sought the earliest opportunity to disassociate both the Metropolitan Union and the church union movement as a whole from the acts of such converts. This occasion seemed to have arrived when a meeting of the Bristol Church Union, the parent body of the whole movement, was arranged for October 1st, in order to consider proposals for a radical reorganization of the unions. Palmer suggested that, in order to restore public confidence in them, the meeting should also adopt at the same time a declaration to be made by all their members affirming their faith in the Church of England and their condemnation of the Papal system.[127] This was to cause a bitter controversy amongst Churchmen, during which Palmer was to earn the reputation of a 'mad Irishmen' quite foreign to his normal character.[128] On the other hand, this proved to be the first major issue to separate Pusey from Keble.[129] Pusey for his part was convinced that

> the issue of the meeting will determine whether the High Church will break into two or more parties... people who have no wish to Romanize still do not

> wish to make any anti-Roman declaration, because they would be understood in a sense further than they mean; and so they would not seem honest.[130]

In reply, Keble argued that "the quiet and true people deserved a very moderate but quite real disavowal of Rome", and that it would scare away only those worth little.[131]

By the time the meeting was held on October 1st., Keble and Pusey had managed to resolve their differences, both now agreeing that the terms of Palmer's proposed declaration were far too extreme in their condemnation of Roman Catholic doctrine. It was they who, with Lord Beresford and A.J. Beresford-Hope, led the opposition to Palmer at Bristol, charging that he was attempting to impose a test on members of the Church of England which was in no way justified by its existing formularies. They succeeded in defeating Palmer's resolution by an unexpectedly large majority, with the result that his supporters withdrew from the Bristol Church Union to form a rival body of its own.[132] A fortnight later, Pusey consolidated his victory by winning a vote of confidence from the London Union, of which he was a committee member. Disheartened by this turn of events, Palmer decided to withdraw from playing an active part in contemporary ecclesiastical controversies. He retired to his country vicarage in Dorset, where he was to spend the rest of his life, forgotten in the main by his former colleagues.[133] This meant in particular that, deprived of

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his enthusiastic leadership, the church union movement collapsed into ineffectiveness, just as his earlier experiments along the same lines in the eighteen-thirties had done. Despite the efforts of the London Church Union to continue to represent High Church opinion in the capital during the eighteen-fifties, it was not until the foundation of the Church of England Protection Society in 1859 that Palmer's hopes in this respect were to be finally fulfilled.[134]

This controversy over Roman Catholicism in the late summer of 1850 was, however, to have a far wider implication than for the church union movement alone. It did much, especially, to create that atmosphere of hostility towards that Church which was to intensify and make more bitter the last and greatest religious crisis of this period, the so-called Papal Aggression. This was caused by the attempt by Pope Pius IX to reorganize and strengthen the system by which the Papacy had governed the English Roman Catholics since the Reformation. The proposal was to substitute for the existing governing body, the Vicars Apostolic, a Diocesan Hierarchy, consisting of a Metropolitan see and twelve Episcopal sees, each having assigned to it a district more or less corresponding to a county and each bearing a territorial title which might in fact duplicate one already in use in the Church of England. The papal bull which

authorized this change was issued on September 30th, 1850, and when a week later, Nicholas Wiseman arrived in England as the new Cardinal Archbishop of Westminister, he published his first pastoral letter in which he exultingly welcomed the blessing conferred on that country "by the restoration of its true Catholic hierarchical government in communion with the See of St. Peter", and the restoration of "Catholic England to its orbit in the ecclesiastical firmament, from which its light had long vanished".[135] In the temper of the time, it was not surprising that the result was an explosion of outraged Protestant feeling in the country, which was still further inflamed by the dictatorial and authoritative tone used in Wiseman's pastoral. The immediate reaction on the part of High Churchmen of all shades of opinion was equally hostile. Even the Anglo-Catholic Guardian condemned what it considered an act of aggression on the part of the Pope, who had been encouraged by the misguided policy of moderation adopted by the Whigs towards the Roman Catholic Church since 1847. At this time, indeed, the Guardian was prepared to take up a position on this issue which was very similar to that of the Protestant High Churchmen: it maintained for example that "it is our duty to declare in the eyes of the public and the State before this intrusion has received (as in time it will) the recognition and the license of the Government, that there cannot be two Churches,

although there may be many sects, on the same soil."[136] The Christian Remembrancer was equally outspoken in its denunciation of the Papal action. It maintained that it had put the clock back by two hundred years by reviving in its most extreme form the ancient hatred of the English people for the Papacy, and thus prevent for a long time ahead any possibility of reunion between the Anglican and the Roman Catholic Churches, "the great public guardians and witnesses of Christianity in the civilized world." Further, public opinion would now identify all church principles as popery, and the cause of Anglo-Catholicism would as a result lose much ground.[137]

The reaction of the Whig Government to the restoration of the Catholic hierarchy proved, however, more complex than the Guardian had expected. Instead of maintaining their traditional policy of religious toleration, it introduced in February 1851 a harsh penal measure against the assumption of ecclesiastical territorial titles already used in the Church of England by any other religious body. The severity of this response can be explained by the anger of the Whigs against the Papacy as a result of the condemnation in February 1850 of the non-denominational Queen's Colleges in Ireland, which were the essential basis of the Whig scheme for national education in that country.[138] It was, however, not only the Roman Catholics who suffered from the hostility

of the Government. In November 1850, Lord John Russell published a letter written to the Bishop of Durham in which he condemned as well as Papal Aggression those Tractarians who had remained in the Church of England and whom he accused of being crypto-Romists ready to betray her from within. Whether or not it was part of a Machiavellian scheme on the part of the Prime Minister, the impact of this letter on public opinion was certainly immense.[139] Such a charge, moreover, had obvious and serious political implications at a time when the three leading figures amongst the younger generation of the Peelites, Gladstone, Sidney Herbert and Lord Lincoln, were being identified with such opinions. How strong this identification had become can best be measured by the fact that even Sir James Graham could use the term 'Gladstonism' to describe the kind of religious principles censured by Russell in the Durham Letter.[140]

As a result, Anglo-Catholics were forced on the defensive. The Guardian, which had continued, despite some criticism from its readers, to denounce the aggression on the part of the Papacy into the first weeks of 1851, now turned its main attacks onto the Whig Government: "We can only repeat our congratulations to our readers that we of the Church of England have something better and more to rely on than the friendship of Lord John Russell."[141] A.J. Beresford-Hope was prepared to use the Morning Chronicle as a forum

to make widely known his wholehearted support for the Peelites who were offering a strenuous resistance to the passage of the Ecclesiastical Titles bill through the House of Commons.[142] He praised Gladstone and Sidney Herbert in particular for their readiness to do so despite their realization of the harm it might do to their political careers by arousing the 'No Popery' sentiment of the country against them.[143] They themselves made it clear that they did so in part because they believed this measure to be a reactionary retreat from the principles of religious toleration which had been enshrined in the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829.[144] Their primary concern, nevertheless, was not with its effect on the Roman Catholic Church, but with its implication for the Church of England.

They believed, in particular, that it represented a serious abuse by the Government of the authority it claimed to exercise in religious matters in the name of the Royal Supremacy. For Gladstone especially, the issue revolved around the fundamental question whether the restoration of the Catholic diocesan hierarchy was a matter affecting the temporal or spiritual function of that Church. He appreciated the force of Russell's argument that the Catholic Episcopate, when it had been strengthened in this way, would inevitably play a more forceful role in secular affairs. He nevertheless affirmed that the form of government adopted

by a Church was essentially a matter of spiritual concern for that Church alone. The re-establishment of the hierarchy in itself, therefore, could not be considered in any way an attack on the sovereign rights of the English crown, whatever its temporal effects might be in the future. The Roman Catholic Church must be left the same rights in this matter as all the other dissenting sects possessed, and the Government had no right to impose on it penal legislation in the form of the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill.[145]

The main charge against the Whig Government was, thus, that it had used its undoubted and acknowledged authority in temporal affairs of the Church to deal with a spiritual matter. Sidney Herbert was not surprised, however, that any man who thought about religion as Russell did could fail to make the necessary distinction: he wrote to Gladstone that "the true and sincere argument in Lord John Russell's mind was evident in his speech [of February 7., 1851]: 'All Churches are dangerous things, and the State must by all means in its power repress all and any of them as opportunity offers.'"[146] There was little reason as a result to believe in the sincerity behind Russell's contention that his bill was mainly intended to protect the interests of the Established Church. Indeed, Gladstone was convinced that the principles behind it would prove a positive danger to it. He warned the leaders of that Church that if they were

prepared to accept the protection of the Government against an imagined challenge from an aggressive Roman Catholicism, they would do more harm than good. In the first place, they were claiming once again a privileged position for that Church in the community which could only be unpopular with a large number of people, secondly, they would make it far more difficult for it to claim independence from the control of the state in future.[147] The surest defence for the Church of England would be to trust in the principle of religious liberty, not only for itself, but for all religious bodies:

> to cite and appeal to the principle of religious freedom is not a mere cant phrase, but it is a stern reality, it is a substantial truth - and I ask you again, will you go backward or forward in the career of religious freedom? Have you no faith in your free institutions.[148]

This argument of Gladstone's was enthusiastically welcomed by A.J. Beresford-Hope. In particular, he maintained his full agreement with the advocation of

> that only true, consistent and rational religious liberty which allows to all denominations liberty of self-development within the bounds of order and morality - to Dissenters and not only to Dissenters, but to the Church of England - a liberty neither abated in the one instance from a hypercritical regard to the 'interest' of the 'Establishment' nor arrogantly refused in the other on the ground of freedom and the status of the 'Establishment' not being compatible.[149]

Anglo-Catholics like Gladstone and Herbert opposed the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill because it was a denial of

their church principles. What impressed contemporary observers even more was the fact that the other two Peelite leaders, Aberdeen and Graham, were equally determined in their resistance to the measure, making it their justification for refusing to form a coalition with the Whigs at this period.[150] Both these men, as we have seen, were far more erastian in their thinking on church-state relations than their High Church colleagues, and thus were not concerned about the possible misuse of the authority of the state. Both, however, strongly opposed the bill on the grounds that it was a direct attack on the principles of religious toleration which they had always maintained.[151] It was the fact that all the Peelite leaders thus voted consistently in the small minority which divided against the bill in both the Commons and the Lords which must have done much to confirm the identification of that group with 'puseyism' in the public mind.

It did much, moreover, to strengthen the confidence of the Anglo-Catholics in the Peelites as a political group. J.B. Mozley was to provide the clearest illustration of their attitude in a letter written to his sister:

> a Peel ministry will be favourable to the fair claims of the Church, and disposed to give up the old Royal Prerogative ground. Lord Aberdeen voted for the Bishop of London's Bill (to set up a new court of final appeal in ecclesiastical cases), and Gladstone and Sidney Herbert would both be strong on the prerogative question. Gladstone, too, has great private influence over

> the Duke of Newcastle. As for Sir James Graham, he does not care a farthing for the Church or equity; but he would be obliged to make terms with Gladstone, if he was to have his service.[152]

The reaction of the other group of High Churchmen, the Protestant High Churchmen, to the crisis caused by the papal aggression was to prove more complex than that of the Anglo-Catholics. The re-establishment of the Catholic hierarchy in England inevitably revived in full force their innate fear of Roman Catholicism. Sir Robert Inglis voiced their opinions when he maintained that it marked a new stage in the eternal conflict "between light and dark, between freedom and slavery, between the development of all the powers of the intellect and the prostration of all these powers before the wills of others."[153] As a result, such men were unable to take a moderate, balanced view of the Pope's action. They could also have little sympathy with the conciliatory policy followed by the Peelite leaders. Even the Rev. W.F. Hook, the orthodox High Church Vicar of Leeds who had nevertheless been one of the staunchest of Gladstone's supporters during his election contest at Oxford, now threatened to vote against him at the next election because of his opposition to the Ecclesiastical Titles bill.[154] Gladstone replied to him with some sharpness that

> scarcely any greater injury can be done to the Church of England at this time than to seek or promote such a Bill as a measure of defence to her, so that I should be doing the work of her

> deadly foe if I supported it; a Bill which confers upon her what is worthless and offensive, and which in my mind erects new and formidable obstructions in the way of her obtaining satisfaction for her real and reasonable, her urgent and most crying wants.[155]

The Protestant High Churchmen were also alarmed that they might become linked in the public mind with the unpopular attitude of the Anglo-Catholics in this matter. One of Charles Wordsworth's correspondents complained that

> it is very perplexing to see 'High Churchmen' contending for religious liberty to the extent of ... saying as well as doing nothing to oppose Romanism. D.C.L. and his friends who have now got the theological department of the 'Morning Chronicle' will, I fear, do as much injury in private and public.[156]

On the other hand, it seemed to many Anglo-Catholics that these Churchmen were prepared because of their hostility towards Rome to co-operate with those who they had previously considered an equally grave threat to the Church. According to Beresford-Hope,

> the effect of Papal Aggression was the diversion away from the real threat to the Church by sinking all differences, however important, in the one point of hostility towards Rome and the destructive profession of a common Protestantism,[157]

and Roundell Palmer warned them that

> our Church will not be strengthened in the affections of any class of religious men by a movement in which her ministers are taking part on the same platform with Jews, Unitarians, Dissenters of every persuasion, and some examples of the laity as some I forbear to name.[158]

For a time, indeed, it appeared likely that this crisis would revive the short-lived alliance of 1846 between

the Protestant High Churchmen and the Whig Government. The apparent readiness of Russell to use the authority of the state to defend the interests of the Established Church against a resurgent Roman Catholicism had so restored the confidence of the Protestant High Churchmen in the alliance between Church and State ▬ that they could be considered once again as simple 'Establishment' men.[159] It seemed as if the principles of the old Protestant Constitution, modified and weakened as they had been by the events of the last twenty-five years, had gained a new lease of life. These Churchmen were, moreover, most impressed by the moderation of the Evangelical Archbishop Sumner, who had hitherto been regarded by them as the leader of their most partisan opponents in the Church. Sumner had, however, refused to take advantage of the popular hostility against anything that smacked of Tractarianism in order to advance the cause of his party, and especially to bring about its greatest ambition, the rewriting of the Prayer Book in a more marked Protestant sense. As a result, the Protestant High Churchmen were now prepared to consider with approval a church establishment led by a Whig Prime Minister and an Evangelical Archbishop.[160]

The dictates of political necessity were, nevertheless, to reveal, just as they had done four years previously, how unsubstantial was the basis of this alliance. The Whig

Government's defeat in February 1851 over Locke King's annual motion to extend the country franchise had emphasized once and for all the weakness of its parliamentary position.[161] This had forced Russell to resign, and when a few days later he returned to office after the failure of the Protectionists to form an alternative government, he had to accept the necessity of modifying his anti-Catholic policy in order to recover the support of the Irish Liberal members, whose defection had been a major cause of his earlier defeat. As a result it soon became apparent that the Ecclesiastical Titles Act, even in the far less penal form in which it was finally carried through Parliament, would remain a dead letter. The Protestant High Church English Review, therefore, resumed its customary denigration of the Government, its bitterness being all the more intense because of this renewed alliance between the Whigs and the Roman Catholics which it had hoped had been broken once and for all.[162]

The crisis over the Ecclesiastical Titles Act marked the climax of five years of religious controversies which had done so much to influence the political thinking of High Churchmen during this period, especially their attitude towards the Whig Government. They made no secret of the hostility they felt for Whig policy towards the Church of England, which appeared to them as a most serious threat to

the existing structure of church - state relations. In connection with the two main issues of church appointments and the management of church schools, both the Protestant High Churchmen and the Anglo-Catholics believed that the Government's abuse of its authority had done much to make the system unacceptable to men of their principles.

These two groups of High Churchmen, however, reached very different conclusions from these events. The Protestant High Churchmen still retained their confidence in the traditional conception of the Constitution in Church and State. They continued to maintain the necessity of an established church as the guardian of the moral life of the community. They accused the Whigs in particular of undermining the position of the Church of England in this respect both by encouraging the development of party-spirit within it and also by extending toleration to non-Anglican denominations within the community. Their anxiety to preserve church establishment was clearly shown by the extravagant praise they were prepared to give the Whigs themselves as its presumed defenders during the early stages of the controversy over the Ecclesiastical Titles bill. On the other hand, the Anglo-Catholics saw the acts of the Whig Government as a challenge to the Anglican Church, not as an established, but as an apostolic church. As a result, they were becoming convinced that the essential need was to make it impossible

for any future government to intervene in its affairs in this way, this desire being especially strong amongst the younger generation of these Churchmen. For them, the dangers of church establishment were far more apparent than its benefits.

The full extent of this difference of opinion on the future status of the Church of England within the community was to be emphasized in the controversy which took place in the early months of 1852 on the subject of 'religious liberty'. It was Gladstone who was responsible for the form this debate assumed. At the end of January, he published an open letter to the Rev. William Skinner, Bishop of Aberdeen and Primus of the Scottish Episcopal Church.[163] Gladstone's immediate purpose in writing it was to contribute to the controversy then taking place within that Church over the proper function of its lay members within its synods. It soon became clear, however, that his argument possessed far wider significance. In his Letter, Gladstone showed especially how far he now accepted the fact that political liberalism must be recognized as the governing mood of the day. In the first place, he was convinced by his first hand experience of conditions both in the Papal States and the Kingdom of Naples that "any system ... resting on the principle of absolutism, must be tyrannical, feeble and ineffective".[164] On the other hand, to give full licence

to the anarchical tendencies in the new principles of democratic socialism would be to threaten the very basis of the social order, as it had proved in 1848.[165] The problem was to combine a respect for legitimate authority with a reasonable amount of self-government. Gladstone believed that this could be found in what he described as "the great Providential instrument of the constitutional system", the possession of which had saved England from the worst excesses of the European Revolutionary movement.[166] Such principles were equally valid in ecclesiastical as well as secular affairs. This meant, first, that all religious bodies must be given greater freedom within the community,[167] and secondly, that they must create for themselves a regular constitutional organization, in which their lay members "must have defined and recognized functions in relation to their government".[168] It was his understanding of this last point which explains Gladstone's refusal to accept full clerical authority over the Church of England schools, which had brought him into such bitter controversy with Archdeacon Denison.

The second major theme of Gladstone's Letter to Bishop Skinner was the question of church-state relations. Gladstone emphasized the vital necessity to recognize how fundamentally the nature of the state had changed in the previous decades. It had been possible previously to believe that it possessed a religious character, and that this must

be preserved even if it meant sacrificing the "lesser good of full liberty of conscience". Recent developments, in particular the extension of religious toleration, had, however, completely altered the situation, with the result that "while the tone and amount of personal religion have been rising in general society, the religious character of the State has progressively declined." Any religious character now claimed by the State would, therefore, be "a bastard and deceptive one", and, if persisted in, would prove harmful to the Christian religion itself.[169] Moreover, it was now true that "religion can live without the aid of Parliaments". The future of the Established Church in England, as a result, would no longer depend on its connection with the state, but on its ability to construct a system of government which would allow it to exploit "the strong sentiments of personal duty and responsibility" amongst its members.[170]

High Churchmen gave a varied critical reception to the publication of Gladstone's Letter. It did much, indeed, to increase the doubts felt by Pusey, the representative figure of the Tractarian generation, over the development of that statesman's religious thinking. Pusey was in particular concerned about the implications of the greater role claimed for laymen in the government of the church, which he believed to be essentially contradictory to the practice of the primitive Apostolic Church.[171] The Guardian,

also, took this opportunity to reiterate its reservations about some of Gladstone's more recent political activity, especially his support of Jewish emancipation, which it considered had been taken without due thought for its effect on the Church. Nevertheless, at the same time, it was to act as the spokesman of the younger generation of Anglo-Catholics in giving an enthusiastic welcome to this conception of 'religious liberty' for all religious bodies in the community, including the Anglican Church.[172] A.J. Beresford-Hope was even more lyrical in his praise of Gladstone, describing him as one who had been "a cabinet minister once - a cabinet minister to be again if talent and principle wedded together are ever again to hold up their heads in state affairs."[173] From now on, this group of Churchmen proved ready to keep more or less in step with Gladstone in his intellectual advance towards Liberalism.[174]

The reaction of the Protestant High Churchmen to the Letter was, by contrast, extremely hostile. The most sustained criticism of it came from Charles Wordsworth and the pages of the English Review.[175] Their main accusation against Gladstone was that he had now abandoned the theory of church-state relations which he had so staunchly maintained in 1838 without sufficient justification. All the reasons which he now advanced for doing so, especially the changed position of the Dissenters and the Roman

Catholics in the community, and the abuse of the authority of the State through the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, could have been used to invalidate the theories he himself had expounded at the end of the eighteen-thirties, because exactly the same conditions had existed at that time.[176] Moreover, Gladstone had not merely modified but completely reversed his previous opinions, for he was now advocating that the State should be nothing more than 'a mutual insurance company' whose function was to hold the balance between the various religious bodies in the community, and thus must itself be neutral in religious matters.[177] The Churchmen whom these writers represented, on the other hand, still believed it possible to defend the principle of a Established Church on more than erastian grounds; it was, indeed, a vital necessity for the Christian character of the State itself. For this reason, they were prepared to continue to support the alliance between Church and State in England, so long as the Government did not use the authority this gave it to alter the doctrine of the Church of England.[178] Further, they maintained that those "ecclesiastical liberals" who supported Gladstone in the pages of the Guardian and the Morning Chronicle were expressing "the visionary ideas of the inexperienced, confident youth".[179] Such men did not realize that there would always be a struggle for power between the various religious

bodies in the community, and that the Anglican Church, in order to maintain its position, must still take all the advantage it could from its alliance with the State.[180]

Wordsworth was convinced, indeed, that Gladstone's conversion to the conception of 'religious liberty' was not the result of principle, but of political expediency. It was his failure to create and lead a party devoted to the defence of the interests of the Church during the controversy over Maynooth in 1845, which had left him in an isolated political position, and which had been made all the worse by the death of Peel.[181] His future political career now seemed to depend on his winning the support of the electorally powerful Dissenting interests in the country.[182] It was not surprising, therefore, that he was now adopting opinions which in the end must inevitably force him to accept "pure Voluntaryism, or in other words, the separation of Church and State".[183] Gladstone was well aware how such charges could seriously weaken his position especially amongst his clerical constituents at Oxford. He thus indignantly denied that the principle of religious freedom and the maintenance of the union between the national Church and the State were in fact incompatible.

Whether or not Wordsworth was correct in his belief that Gladstone was influenced by political rather than religious considerations at this time, there is no doubt that

the debate over religious liberty had considerable political consequences. However strongly High Churchmen might have been united in their hostility towards the Whig Government in the period after 1847, they were now to be sharply divided in their attitude towards the Peelites, of which group Gladstone was such a dominating figure. The Anglo-Catholics had been most impressed by the manner in which the leaders of the Peelites, despite their different religious backgrounds, had all made clear their support for this principle during the controversy over the Ecclesiastical Titles bill. The Protestant High Churchmen, on the other hand, urged the danger of High Churchmen becoming identified in the public mind with a cause that was so unpopular amongst the electorate. If this happened, then it would be hopeless to expect the return to Parliament of any candidate who made known his support not only for Anglo-Catholic doctrine, but also for church principles as such, and "the High Church party would be put back by ten years".[184] Although this gloomy prophecy was not to be fulfilled during the general election held in July 1852,[185] the Protestant High Churchmen continued to make known their opposition to the Peelites. It was this fact that does much to explain the contrasting reaction of these two groups of High Churchmen to the formation in December 1852 of a coalition between the Whigs and the Peelites, and thus make impossible the maintenance of any common political front.

NOTES: CHAPTER IV

[1] N. Gash, Reaction and Reconstruction in English Politics, 1832-1852. (Oxford, 1965), p. 192.

[2] Spectator, XXI (1848), p. 38.

[3] Gash, Reaction and Reconstruction, Chapter III, passim.

[4] C.S. Dessain (ed.), Letters and Diaries of J.H. Newman. In progress. (London, 1960-), XII, p. 69.

[5] Hansard, 3d ser., XVI (1846), 1002.

[6] Ibid., 1008-1110.

[7] Times, July 21., 1847, p. 7.

[8] Ibid., July 28., 1847, p.6.

[9] Gash, Reaction and Reconstruction, p. 104.

[10] Wood to Russell, August 1, 1847. Russell Papers, P.R.O. 30/22/6E/1267-8.

[11] Gash, Reaction and Reconstruction, p. 104.

[12] E. Hodder, The Life of Samuel Morley (London, 1887), pp. 104-105: A. Miall, The Life of Edward Miall (London, 1884), p. 106.

[13] Gash, Reaction and Reconstruction, p. 192.

[14] Saturday Review, XIX (1865), p. 8.

[15] Lord R. Cecil, 'The Church in its Relations to Political Parties', Quarterly Review, CXVIII (1865), p.219.

16 D. Southgate, The Passing of the Whigs, 1832-1886 (London, 1962), p. 219.

17 G.H. Moore, in Hansard, 3d ser., CXIV (1851), 240.

18 Earl of Selbourne, Memorials, Part II: Personal and Political, 1865-1895, 2 vols. (London, 1898), I, p.44.

19 Guardian, November 17, 1847, p. 683.

20 English Review, VIII (1847), p. 433.

21 Guardian, March 2, 1848, p. 193.

22 W. Palmer, 'A Plan for the Co-operation of Churchmen' (1848) in J.B. Sweet, A Memoir of Henry Hoare (London, 1860), p.60.

23 W. Palmer, A Statement of Circumstances connected with the Proposals of Resolutions...at the Bristol Church Union, October 1st, 1850. (London, 1850), p.4. See also English Review, XIII (1850), pp. 182-184.

24 W. Palmer, Narrative of Events connected with the Publication of the Tracts for the Times...(London, 1883), pp. 105-106: Sweet, Memoir of Henry Hoare, p. 62.

25 Ibid., pp. 62-64.

26 [A.J. Beresford-Hope], Letters on Church Matters by D.C.L. 11 pts in 4 vols. (London, 1852-1854), I, p.79. The rest of this paragraph is based on A.J. Beresford-Hope, The Church Cause and the Church Party, Reprinted from the Christian Remembrancer (London, 1860), pp. 10-13 and Sweet. Memoir of Henry Hoare, pp. 62, 92-101.

27 For the early stages of these controversies, see W.J. Trower, A Letter to the Rt. Hon. Lord John Russell. 2nd. ed. (London, 1848), pp. 20-22.

28 C. Wordsworth, Annals of My Life (London, 1893), p. 122.

[29] Hansard, 3d ser., XCV (1847), 1249.

[30] Ibid., 1364.

[31] W.E. Gladstone, Substance of a Speech on the Motion ... with a View to the Removal of the Remaining Jewish Disabilities...with a Preface. (London, 1848), pp.3, 22, 34.

[32] Gladstone to Pusey, December 14, 1847, Pusey Papers. Pusey House Mss. Correspondence with Gladstone (Transcripts), I, f. 283.

[33] Gladstone, Substance of a Speech, p. 8.

[34] Guardian, January 19, 1848, p. 42.

[35] Pusey to Gladstone, December 13, 1847, Pusey Papers, Pusey House Mss. Correspondence with Gladstone (Transcripts), I. ff. 279-281.

[36] Ibid., f. 276.

[37] Northcote to Gladstone, January 25, 1848. Gladstone Papers. B.M. Add. Mss 44216, f. 122.

[38] Those voting for the resolution included G. Smythe, W. Scholefield, C.B. Wall, H. Fitzroy, W.P. Wood and R. Palmer: those against included A.B. Hope, Lord A. Hervey, A. Stafford, H. Seymer.

[39] H. Paul, A History of Modern England, 8 vols. (London, 1904), I, pp. 102-103.

[40] Guardian, January 3., 1838, pp. 14-15.

[41] English Review, V (1846), p. 441.

[42] Hansard, 3d ser., CI (1838), 211-215.

[43] Supporting Gladstone were A.B. Hope, W. Scholefield, J. Simeon, T.S. Cocks, W.P. Wood.

[44] English Review, VIII (1847), p. 433: Guardian, November 17, 1847, p. 683; March 15, 1848, p. 178.

[45] Beresford-Hope, Letters on Church Matters, IV, p. 362.

[46] J.C. Hare, Letter to the Dean of Chichester on the Appointment of Dr. Hampden. 2nd. ed. (London, 1848), p.6.

[47] Russell to Wood, November 15, 1847, G.P. Gooch (ed)., Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell. 2 vols. (London, 1925), I, p. 178.

[48] Howley to Russell, August 9, 1847, Russell Papers, P.R.O. 30/22/6E/1295-6.

[49] D. Newsome, Godliness and Good Learning (London, 1960), pp. 92-147.

[50] Howley to Russell, November 26, 1847. Russell Papers. P.R.O. 30/22/6G/2023.

[51] B. Harrison, 'The Remembrancer of a Departed Guide and Ruler in the Church' in his Patient-Waiting: Sermons (London, 1889), pp. 177-232.

[52] G.C.B. Davies, Henry Phillpotts (London, 1954), pp. 205-212.

[53] C.G.F. Greville, Journal... 1837-1852. 3 vols. (London, 1885), III, pp. 117-118.

[54] H. Hampden, Some Memorials of R.D. Hampden (London 1871), pp. 252-253.

[55] North British Review, VIII (1848), p. 543: R.W. Church, The Oxford Movement (London, 1892), p. 319.

[56] Maltby to Russell, February 15, 1848. Russell Papers, P.R.O. 30/22/7A/303.

[57] Gordon to Wilberforce, January 10, 1853. Stanmore Papers, B.M. Add. Mss. 49210, f. 11.

[58] Saturday Review, XIV (1862), p. 297.

[59] G.F.A. Best, Temporal Pillars: Queen Anne's Bounty, the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, and the Church of England (Cambridge, 1964), p. 163: R.S. Dell, 'Social and Economic Theories and Pastoral Concerns of a Victorian Archbishop 'Journal of Ecclesiastical History, XVI (1965), pp. 196-205.

[60] Maltby to Russell, December 8, 1847, Russell Papers, P.R.O. 30/22/6G/2193-5.

[61] Maltby to Russell, February 15, 1848, Ibid., 30/22/7A/303.

[62] English Review, XIII (1850), p. 344.

[63] Christian Observer, new ser., CLV (1850), p. 813.

[64] North British Review, VIII (1848), pp. 547-548.

[65] Guardian, March 15, 1848, p. 178.

[66] J. Murphy, The Religious Problem in English Education (Liverpool, 1959), passim.

[67] Gash, Reaction and Reconstruction, pp. 78-79.

[68] G.A. Denison, Notes on My Life (London, 1887), p.98.

[69] Ibid., pp. 25, 37.

[70] T. Mozley, Reminiscences, chiefly of Oriel College and the Oxford Movement. 2 vols. (London, 1892), II, p. 98.

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[78] Minutes of the Committee of Council on Education, 1848-1849, (London, 1849), pp. 1-4.

[79] Denison, Church Schools and State Interference, p. 20.

[80] G.A. Denison, The Church of England the Committee of Council on Education 2nd. ed. (London, 1849), passim.

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[82] Guardian, May 30., 1849, p. 357.

[83] Memorials of Dean Close by One who Knew Him (London, 1885), p. 10.

[84] Ibid., p. 9.

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92 Guardian, February 14, 1849, p. 109.

93 Sweet, Memoir of Henry Hoare, pp. 123-125.

94 Denison, Notes on My Life, pp. 155-156.

95 Ibid., p. 172.

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[100] Hansard, 3d ser., CIX (1848), 261-263.

[101] Denison to Scott, April 5, 1852. L.E. Denison (ed.). Fifty Years at East Brent: the letters of George Anthony Denison (London, 1902), p. 32.

[102] Sweet, Memoir of Henry Hoare, p. 133.

[103] Hansard, 3d. ser., CIX (1850), 295-310.

[104] Guardian, May 28, 1850, pp. 386-390.

[105] Hansard, 3d ser., CXII (1850), 831.

[106] Guardian, July 10, 1850, p. 492.

[107] But see Palmer's suggestion that the Whig Government may have exercised some influence on the Judicial Committee to make their decision in the sense they did in order to retain the alliance of the Evangelicals. Narrative of Events, p. 245.

[108] J.C. Nias, Gorham and the Bishop of Exeter (London, 1951), passim: Davies, Henry Phillpotts, chapter VII.

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[111] F.W. Cornish, The English Church in the Nineteenth Century, 2 vols. (London, 1910), I, pp. 131-132.

[112] H.P. Liddon, Life of Edward Bouverie Pusey. 4 vols. (London, 1898), III, pp. 217-9.

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[117] J.B. Mozley to Anne Mozley, February 4, 1855. Mozley, Letters, p. 229.

[118] Palmer, Narrative of Events, pp. 244-245.

[119] Cornish, English Church in the Nineteenth Century, I, pp. 331-333.

[120] Lathbury, Mr. Gladstone, pp. 59-60.

[121] Ibid., Chapter IV: Liddon, Life of Pusey, III, p. 249: R.W. Church, 'Church and State' Christian Remembrancer, XIX (1850), pp. 472-516: M.D. Stephens 'Gladstone and the Composition of the Final Court in Ecclesiastical Causes, 1850-1873', Historical Journal, IX (1966), pp. 199-201.

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[123] Ibid., pp. 177-180.

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[127] Palmer, Statement of Circumstances, pp. 19-32: Sweet, Memoir of Henry Hoare, pp. 202-216.

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142 [Beresford-Hope]. Letters on Church Matters, I, p. 149. See Appendix for the names of the Peelites voting against the Ecclesiastical Titles Act.

143 Stanmore, Sidney Herbert, I, pp. 138-139.

144 Ibid., p. 139: Hansard, 3d ser., CXV (1851), 568.

145 Ibid., 3d ser., CXV (1851), 582, Herbert to Gladstone, February 11, 1851. Stanmore, Sidney Herbert, I, p. 138.

146 Ibid., I, p. 138. Herbert is referring to a remark made by Russell in the House of Commons that "it is of the nature of all ecclesiastical bodies to attempt to trench on temporal matters", Hansard, 3d ser., CXIV, (1851), 794.

147 Ibid., 3d ser., CXV (1851), 566. Gladstone to Wilberforce, January 22, 1852. Lathbury, Correspondence, I, pp. 88-90.

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149 [Beresford-Hope], Letters on Church Matters, I, p. 149.

150 Aberdeen to Princess Lieven, February 27, 1851, E.J. Parry (ed.), The Correspondence of Lord Aberdeen and the Princess Lieven, II, 1832-1854. (London, 1931), p.553.

151 Aberdeen to Princess Lieven, February 17, 1851. Ibid., p. 546, Hansard, 3d ser., CXVIII (1851), 1086, Graham to Howard, November 23, 1850. C.S. Parker, Life and Letters of Sir James Graham, 2nd Baron of Netherby, 1792-1861. 2 vols. (London, 1907), II, p. 113.

[152] J.B. Mozley to Anne Mozley, March 9, 1851. Mozley, Letters, p. 208.

[153] Hansard, 3d ser., CXIV, (1851), 1375.

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[156] Wordsworth, Annals of my life, p. 109.

[157] [Beresford-Hope], Letters on Church Matters, I, p. 38.

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[160] English Review, XV (1851), pp.163-177: Ibid., XVI (1851), pp. 151-171.

[161] Gash, Reaction and Reconstruction, p. 198.

[162] English Review, XVIII (1852), p. 340.

[163] Gladstone, On the Functions of Laymen in the Church, passim.

[164] Ibid., p. 17.

[165] Ibid., p.2.

[166] Ibid., pp. 1-2.

[167] Ibid., p. 13.

168 Ibid., pp. 9, 18.

169 Ibid., p. 7.

170 Ibid., pp. 8-9.

171 Liddon, Life of E.B. Pusey, III, pp. 341-354.

172 Guardian, May 19., 1852, p. 328.

173 [Beresford-Hope], Letters on Church Matters, III, p. 440.

174 B.A. Smith, Dean Church: The Anglican Response to Newman (Oxford, 1958), Chapter IV, passim.

175 C. Wordsworth, A Letter to the Rt. Hon. W.E. Gladstone, M.P. for the University of Oxford, on the Doctrine of 'Religious Liberty' as expounded in his Letter to the Bishop of Aberdeen and Primus (Oxford, 1852): his Annals of My Life, pp. 115 - 118: English Review, XVII (1852), pp. 337-378.

176 Wordsworth, Letter, p. 27: English Review, XVII, pp. 353-354.

177 Ibid., p. 352: Wordsworth, Letter, p.9.

178 English Review, p. 372.

179 Ibid., pp. 341, 347: Wordsworth, Letter, p.52.

180 Ibid., p. 38.

181 Ibid., p. 50.

182 Wordsworth, Annals of My Life, p. 118.

183 Ibid., p. 115.

184 English Review, XVIII (1852), p. 123.

185 Sidney Herbert, W.E. Gladstone, Sir G. Pechell and C.B. Wall, all of whom had voted against the Ecclesiastical Titles bill, were successful in retaining their seats at this election. It is certainly true, however, that the majority of those who voted against the bill, decided not to stand at this election: G. Smythe, A. Oswald, A.B. Hope, J. Simeon, F.R. Wegg Prosser, R. Palmer, Lord Castlereagh. On the other hand, most High Churchmen who voted for the bill were returned, often unopposed: Lord John Manners, Lord Emyln, Lord A. Hervey, H. Fitzroy, C.B. Adderley, T.S. Cocks, W.J. Evelyn, A. Stafford, W.P. Wood.
Roundell Palmer discovered that he had lost much of his support at Plymouth nominally on the ground of his Tractarian sympathies, and thus was forced to withdraw his candidature. Nevertheless it appears likely that the real reason for the defection of his mainly Conservative committee was due to his refusal to support the Derby Government. Earl of Selbourne, Memorials, Part I, II, pp. 139-145.

CHAPTER V

HIGH CHURCHMEN AND THE WHIGS

PART II: COALITION, 1852-1855

The formation in December 1852 of a Coalition between Whigs and Peelites with Sir William Molesworth as the representative of the Radicals had been the result of political necessity rather than of any agreement over political principles. It had been brought about by the defeat of Lord Derby's Conservative Government, a defeat for which the Peelites had the greatest responsibility. When Derby had taken office in the preceeding February, he appeared to have a better chance of survival than his lack of experienced ministers and his minority position in the House of Commons would warrant. The feud between Russell and Palmerston, which had been the main cause of the Whig Government's final collapse, did much now to prevent the mounting of an effective opposition. The Peelites, on the understanding that the Ministry would introduce no major legislation, were prepared to allow it time to establish its reputation amongst the electorate before calling a general election. When that election was held in July, however, the Conservatives failed to win their required majority. Their policy had,

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moreover, already proved unacceptable to the Peelites, whose disenchantment was completed by the tactics they used during the election in which they professed to be "Protestants in Scotland and Papists in Ireland, Free Traders at Liverpool and Bread Taxers at Stamford".[1] Disraeli's budget, presented to Parliament in December, proved the last straw in the eyes of the Peelites, who saw it as the rejection of financial orthodoxy for the sake of political expediency. It was Gladstone's censure of the Government on these grounds which resulted in its defeat on the 17th. The Peelites, therefore, felt it their duty to help in resolving the consequent political crisis, and, after a week of confused negotiations, they agreed to take part in a Coalition, in which Lord Aberdeen would be Prime Minister and Gladstone Chancellor of the Exchequer.

It was their practical experience of Conservative administration during 1852 which did much to shape the reaction of High Churchmen to the formation of this Coalition. There was certainly no great enthusiasm amongst them when Derby first took office in place of Russell. Both the Protestant High Churchmen and the Anglo-Catholics, indeed, believed that he would prove to be as erastian in his church policy as the former Prime Minister had been; according to the English Review, Derby was unable to conceive of the Church of England as anything more than 'An

Act-of-Parliament Church'.[2] Their recollection of his temporizing attitude during the controversy over Papal Aggression did little to increase the confidence of either group in Derby. He had maintained on the one hand that the Papal Bull was a challenge to the Royal Supremacy over ecclesiastical matters in England, on the other that the Pope had every right to superintend the spiritual affairs of English Roman Catholics.[3] As a result, the Protestant High Churchmen were to emphasize to his disadvantage the more positive response of Russell in defence of the Established Church, the Anglo-Catholics that of the Peelites in defence of 'religious liberty'.[4] For Beresford-Hope, the only advantage that the Church had derived from the replacement of Russell by Derby was a negative one:

> the difference to the Church... is that she has lost a known enemy and gained one who assuredly cannot be taxed with such an epithet, but of whom it is certain that he has never yet committed himself to the Church other than as an Establishment.[5]

Apart from Lord John Manners, "a very sound Churchman", and, to a lesser extent, Spencer Walpole, "a good although not strongly defined Churchman", the ministers in Derby's Government were no more acceptable to high church opinion. Malmesbury, the new Foreign Secretary, for example, was "a cypher in Church affairs as he had never taken any part in them": Disraeli, Chancellor of the Exchequer, had expressed church principles which were only tolerable so

long as they remained obscure. As far as the Guardian could understand them, they appeared to suggest support for a National Protestant Establishment.[6] It was, however, the appointment of Sir John Pakington as Colonial Secretary and thus responsible for the Anglican Church overseas which proved the most distasteful for High Churchmen. Pakington was a country squire of Evangelical opinions, which his bitter opposition to Roman Catholicism had transformed into a Low Churchmanship that refused to recognize any sacerdotal authority claimed for the clergy.[7] As a result, he had entered into bitter controversy with George Denison, when the Archdeacon attempted yet again to persuade the National Society at its annual meeting in May 1851 to break completely with the Committee of Council on Education over the imposition of management clauses into the trust deeds of church schools. Pakington's great dislike of priestly authority made him hostile towards any suggestion that would increase their influence over the parish schools, and he had no hesitation in proposing an amendment to Denison's resolution, congratulating the committee of the National Society on having preserved friendly relations with the Committee of Council. Due to his mis-handling of the subsequent debate, Denison was to suffer a humiliating defeat, his original motion being rejected by a two-thirds majority.[8] This had the effect, however, of reuniting for a time at least the

Anglo-Catholics with the Protestant High Churchmen in their opposition to the low church views of Pakington.[9] It was clear that no High Churchman could have complete confidence in a Government of which he was a leading member.

By the end of 1852, the Protestant High Churchmen had reappraised their attitude towards the Conservative Government, making it clear that, despite the continued presence in it of Pakington, they no longer felt the same distrust of it which they had previously shared with the Anglo-Catholics.[10] In part this was due to the fact that the Government, under the influence of Spencer Walpole, the Home Secretary[11], had adopted a far more conciliatory policy in the controversy over the management clauses. Walpole made certain that Denison was told of this decision before the meeting of the National Society in June 1852, enabling him to announce his satisfaction with the Government's intentions at that meeting, and thus bringing about a short-lived reconciliation with his great antagonist, Rev. Francis Close.[12] When the detailed proposals were finally made public after the meeting, they in fact did much to lessen Denison's enthusiasm, for while they allowed school promoters to increase the authority of the clergy over church schools, the Government refused to use its authority to ensure that this became the general practice as Denison hoped.[13] Despite this, the concession made by the Government over

this issue was sufficient to persuade the Protestant High Churchmen to support it during the July general election.

It was not, however, only the question of immediate political advantage that transformed the attitude of these High Churchmen towards Derby's Ministry. It was their fear about the way in which the English political situation was developing in 1852 that convinced them of the essential need to maintain it in office. They believed in fact that it was now the last defence standing between the Church of England and a danger as great as that it faced during the 'Great Rebellion' of the seventeenth century. If it fell, then it would inevitably be replaced by a Government dominated by Whigs and Radicals, and determined to end once and for all the privileged position of the Church within the community.[14] It was this fear that explains the bitter hostility felt by the Protestant High Churchmen for the Peelites, especially Gladstone, whom they saw as traitors to the Church, first by being chiefly responsible for the defeat of Derby, and then by making possible the formation of the Coalition Government as a result of agreeing to accept office in a Cabinet including both Whigs and Radicals. The sustained opposition of these High Churchmen to the Coalition was, therefore, the result of their belief in Derby's Conservative Party as the defender of the interests of the Established Church.

The relationship between the Anglo-Catholics and Derby's Government were to prove more complex. Like the Protestant High Churchmen, they came to believe that its existence was the only obstacle to the return to power of Lord John Russell and his dreaded Whig churchmanship. It was for this reason that the Guardian advised its readers to vote for the Derbyite candidates in the July General election.[15] Anglo-Catholics were anxious to make clear at the same time that their political support for the Conservatives in no sense implied approval of their religious principles. As Beresford-Hope emphasized:

> the inheritance of the leadership of the old church-in-danger party does not signify the recognition of the first principles of churchmanship; he must be a very sanguine man who will support the Government because it is the administration that is to cherish the Church. He may support it because it is better than Lord John Russell's -- that it is, undoubtedly. He may support it, if he thinks fit, on political grounds; but to support it on the sole and simple ground of its churchmanship no longer stands to reason.[16]

In contrast to the Guardian, Beresford-Hope advised the readers of the Morning Chronicale to vote for those candidates in the election who proved that they held sound church principles, irrespective of their party affiliations.[17]

The great cause of offence for these High Churchmen was the influence exercised within the Conservative Party by such extreme Low Churchmen as Sir Brook Bridges, J.C. Colquhoun and, above all, Sir John Pakington.[18] They had been particularly dismayed by the attitude taken by Pakington

as Colonial Secretary towards the Colonial Bishoprics bill when it received its second reading on April 28th. This was a cherished scheme of Gladstone himself, who wanted to give the Anglican Church in the colonies as full freedom to administer their own affairs as was possessed by the other denominations. He argued that the existing situation, in which these Churches came under the control of the Mother Church in England and thus in the last resort of the Government, was of no benefit to them, and indeed of considerable harm as they were as a result linked with unpopular imperial rule.[19] When, after a considerable adjournment, the debate was resumed on May 19th., Pakington made no attempt to disguise his strong opposition to the proposal. He maintained that it would, in fact if not in theory, abolish the supremacy of the Crown over these churches, a supremacy which he believed essential in any church-state relationship.[20] He spoke with such vehemence that Gladstone, for the first time in his political career, admitted to losing his temper during a parliamentary debate.[21] Pakington's speech did much to confirm his reputation for erastianism in the eyes of Anglo-Catholics. The Guardian expressed its surprise at his emphasis of 'the High prerogative', in its eyes the sign of a Whig rather than of one who called himself a Tory.[22] Beresford-Hope also denounced the principles implicit in his speech as the refusal to consider

the Church of England as anything more than a "Protestant Establishment drawing its existence...from the electoral papacy of a Parliamentary regime".[23]

This personal conflict between Pakington and Gladstone also emphasized the difficulties inherent in any attempt to form political coalition between the Derbyites and the Peelites, of whom they were leading representatives. In a letter to the Guardian, severely criticizing its advocacy of such an alliance during the July general election, F.H. Dickenson stressed in particular their very different attitude towards the greatest ecclesiastical problem of the day, the need to adjust the connexion of Church and State in a period of revolutionary change. The general tendency of the Conservatives, so Dickenson maintained, was to solve the problem by increasing still further the power of the State over the Church: that of the Peelites was to make the Church completely free. Between these two points of view, there could be no compromise which would permit political co-operation.[24] Despite this, the Guardian could still hope for such a coalition until the defeat of the Conservatives in December made it impossible.[25]

Anglo-Catholics in general, however, saw the fall of Derby's Government with equanimity. It was true, indeed, that the Anglo-Catholic residents at Oxford had done much to secure the election of Derby himself as Chancellor of the

University in succession to the Duke of Wellington the previous September. They would, nevertheless, have preferred in his place either the Duke of Newcastle or Lord Redesdale, and they were only persuaded to vote for Derby by the realization that he alone could win sufficient support to defeat candidates of extreme Low Church views, such as the Earl of Shaftesbury or Lord Harrowby.[26] They certainly had lost by December all confidence in his Administration. Beresford-Hope was to describe Disraeli's budget with scorn as "Benjamin's mess, seven times as large as any other".[27] More seriously, he characterized the Cabinet as "the offspring of reactionary panic and class ignorance", and he warned Churchmen that if the Church became too closely involved with the Conservative Party, it would have prejudiced itself in the same manner as it did during the seventeenth century when it became identified as the supporter of arbitrary prerogative.[28]

The reaction of High Churchmen to the formation of the Coalition Government was, therefore, in no way an uniform one. For the Protestant High Churchmen, it was an unmitigated disaster. During 1852 they had recovered their confidence in the Conservative Party as the protector of the true interests of the Church. Now they saw it replaced by a Ministry consisting both of their avowed enemies, the Whigs and the Radicals, and also of Churchmen like Gladstone

whose principles they had learned to distrust. Although the Anglo-Catholics in general were not prepared to condemn the Coalition so comprehensively, some had grave doubts about supporting it. The Guardian still regretted that the political combination had not been between the Derbyites and the Peelites, and could only console its readers with the reflection that it had at least prevented the establishment of an even worse Government, a purely Whig-Radical Administration which might well have proved fatal for the existence of the Church.[29] Other Anglo-Catholics, however, because the events of 1852 had confirmed their dislike of the church principles held by the Conservatives, and thus did not want to see their return to office, did their best to dispel these doubts. Beresford-Hope, in particular, suggested that there were in fact positive reasons for supporting the new Government. With Lord Aberdeen as Prime Minister in place of Lord John Russell, the balance of power in the Cabinet would be in the hands of the Peelites, and especially in those of Gladstone and Newcastle, both devoted Churchmen. This meant especially that there would be no more scandalous church appointments similar to those of the preceeding Whig Ministry.[30] Samuel Wilberforce, Bishop of Oxford, equally anxious to justify the Coalition in the eyes of High Churchmen, was to make much of this last point. He emphasized in particular how confident he was of

the wise exercise of church patronage by Lord Aberdeen, who was

> no 'presbyterian' but a churchman by conviction, who has never since his confirmation at 16 communicated save with her, and might have been seen the Sunday after his acceptance of his present post, sitting and kneeling among the poor communicants at St. James's Church, Picadilly.[31]

Wilberforce was, indeed, to play an important part during the next two years in the attempt to make the religious policy of the Coalition Government acceptable to High Church opinion. He himself had been brought up in what has been considered the most perfect model of Evangelical family life by his even more famous father, William. During the eighteen-thirties, however, under the influence of his brother, Robert, and Henry Manning, he had become a moderate High Churchman, accepting Anglo-Catholic principles in general, but rejecting their more extreme form, as in Hurrell Froude's Remains or Newman's Tract 90. As Bishop of Oxford and later of Winchester, he was to set a new standard for the English Episcopate, his achievement being such as to persuade William Palmer, who had no personal liking for him, to describe him as the greatest figure in the Church of England of his times.[32] Although his early career had been a meteoric one, becoming Bishop of Oxford at 40, he was, nevertheless, to fail in his greatest ambition of succeeding to the throne of Canterbury. This was due, in part at least,

to the reputation for deviousness he had earned for himself at the time of the Hampden controversy, when, in his attempt to satisfy both sides, he had ended by alienating all parties within the Church. The result was to confirm his popular image as 'Soapy Sam'.[33] It cannot be denied that Wilberforce's anxiety to establish a close relationship with the Coalition was to a considerable extent the result of his own personal ambition, thinking it the best method to overcome this set-back in his career. At the same time, Wilberforce also possessed more profound reasons for doing so. By 1853, he was convinced that, after the failure of the Derbyite Conservatives, Lord Aberdeen provided the last defence for the Crown and the Church against radical attack.[34] Therefore, despite the inclusion of Whig Ministers in the Cabinet, he was prepared to support the Government wholeheartedly both in and out of Parliament, and to use in its interests his influence over the venerable Bishop Blomfield of London, who, if now an ageing, was still the most authoritative figure in the Church of England.[35]

Wilberforce was aware of the need for the Coalition to overcome the suspicion of High Churchmen. Despite his eulogy of Aberdeen in the first days of the Government, he had to recognize that on certain issues, especially the need to revive an active Convocation of Canterbury, the thinking of the new Prime Minister was very different from his. This

made it all the more important that he was to find himself in close sympathy with the opinions of Aberdeen's youngest son, Arthur Gordon, the future Lord Stanmore, for, despite being only twenty-four, Gordon was to have considerable influence on his father as his private secretary. The partnership between the two men was to prove of great importance for the future religious policy of the Government.

Since the death of the second Lady Aberdeen in 1832, Gordon, her fourth son had been very close to his father.[36] As a result, he was well aware of those personal failings which were so great a handicap in that statesman's political career. A man of great moral integrity, Aberdeen suffered at the same time from a sense of inferionity which made him most undecided in action, and thus always liable to fall under the influence of his more determined contemporaries. Gordon claimed indeed that it had been mainly his encouragement and advice that persuaded his father to accept the premiership in December 1852.[37] Gordon was confident, therefore, that, so long as he retained the favour of his father, he would be able to act as a power behind the throne.[38] He was equally aware, however, that there were two factors which might well limit his effective influence in religious matters. In the first place, he had little in common with Aberdeen's erastian opinions. As a graduate at Cambridge, Gordon had taken as his teacher Dr. W.H. Mill,

one of the leading if now forgotten figures of the Anglo-Catholic revival. In 1849 he had decided to enter the Church, somewhat to the concern of his father, who deplored his leanings towards Tractarianism, and when he became Aberdeen's secretary in 1852 he had already been studying for two years in the theological college at Wells.[39] It would be impossible, therefore, to disguise his bias from his father, who could not be expected to approve of it. The second disadvantage under which he would act as the ecclesiastical adviser to the Prime Minister was his obvious lack of experience and knowledge of church affairs due to his comparative youth. If Gordon was to exercise any decisive influence over the Coalition's religious policy as he hoped, he needed the advice and support of a more experienced Churchman, and it was this he found in his alliance with Wilberforce.

The two men were to work most closely together over the problem of church appointments, which, by the eighteen-fifties, had become one of the most sensitive political issues of the day. The exercise of church patronage was now no longer a source of advantage but rather one of embarrassment for the Prime Minister. On the one hand, the loss of political power by the House of Lords as the result of the 1832 Reform Act meant that the support of the Bench of Bishops was no longer so publically valuable for the Government as it had been previously. In these circumstances, it

did not matter so much that J.B. Sumner, for example, although appointed Archbishop of Canterbury by a Whig Prime Minister, still felt it possible during his Primacy to emphasize his Conservative sympathies.[40] The administrative reforms of the eighteen-thirties had, moreover, brought about the abolition of many sinecures in the cathedral chapters, which had always provided a rich origin of rewards and favours. On the other hand, in the cnntroversial climate of opinion of the mid-nineteenth century, the appointments to bishoprics and deaneries, which were in the gift of the Prime Minister, would be watched with considerable jealously by the various parties within the Church in case they upset the existing balance of power, and a number of injudicious selections might well have serious political repercussions.[41] Lord Aberdeen was well aware, therefore, of the need for careful deliberation in this matter, and he was under the further handicap of having to satisfy his Whig colleagues, who, so it was believed, regarded church preferment as an exclusive preserve of their families.[42] Aberdeen had, moreover, decided opinions himself of the qualities required in the senior dignitaries of the Church. The result was that Wilberforce and Gordon experienced a good deal of difficulty in urging on him the claims of High Churchmen for preferment.

The main battles were fought over the appointments

to bishoprics. The death of Bishop Kaye of Lincoln on February 19th., 1853, brought the first challenge in this field. Lord John Russell was prepared at once to name a successor, but Aberdeen told him that this was a matter that he intended to decide for himself. Wilberforce and Gordon were most pleased when the Prime Minister proved just as insistent in refusing to accept any suggestion from the Court. To their dismay, however, they soon discovered that Aberdeen had meant what he had said about making up his own mind as to filling the vacancy. Subject to the approval of Bishop Blomfield, he nominated the Rev. John Jackson, Rector of St. James's, Piccadilly, where he himself worshipped when in London, and, as a member of the Broad Church school, unacceptable to High Church opinion. Aberdeen refused, however, to listen to any argument against the appointment. He rejected the claims of Dr. Jeremie, Fellow of Trinity, Gordon's College at Cambridge, as a compromise choice with the excuse that by tradition it was the turn of an Oxford graduate to be promoted to the Bench. Wilberforce, moreover, had weakened his position by pressing the claims of his own chaplain, Archdeacon Randall, and by appearing to offer the Government a bribe, by offering a more enthusiastic defence of their Canadian Clergy Reserves Bill, if it would grant him this favour. As a result, the only concession that Aberdeen was prepared to make was to maintain that Jackson's

appointment "would give him greater strength and power to promote in future men of that (i.e. High Church) party which has for the last eight years been systematically excluded from preferment."[43]

In a discussion with Lord Robert Cecil after the defeat of the Coalition Government, Wilberforce agreed that this appointment of Jackson to the See of Lincoln was the only one High Churchmen could reasonably consider as an abuse by Aberdeen of his church patronage.[44] The Prime Minister's choice of Walter Kerr Hamilton to succeed Edward Denison as Bishop of Salisbury in March 1854, was certainly much more acceptable to them. In this instance, it was in fact the disapproval of Queen Victoria that Aberdeen had to face. His first nomination for the vacancy had not been Hamilton, but the Rev. J.J. Blunt, Professor of Divinity at Cambridge. The Queen had approved of this choice, but had still felt it necessary to express some misgivings: she wrote that

> Lord Aberdeen knows how strongly the Queen's feelings are against any Puseyite tendencies as she considers them fatal to the Church of this country- she therefore hopes that the moderation of his [Blunt's] principles does not imply any leaning, may it ever be so little, to that side. The testimony of the Bishop of London is very good, with the exception of the concluding paragraph in which he says, 'his views of church questions are the same as mine', which inspires the Queen (as regards the Bishop of London) with about the same confidence as the King of Prussia does in political affairs.[45]

Blunt, however, refused the nomination, and to Victoria's

dismay, Aberdeen selected in his place Hamilton, who was by reputation much more extreme in his religious opinions. The Prime Minister was, nevertheless, prepared to defend his choice:

> He begs to assure your Majesty that in all matters connected with the appointments to the Episcopal Bench, your Majesty will never receive from him recommendations of any but such as he is satisfied possess true moderation of character and opinion. Provided these qualifications exist, Lord Aberdeen is indifferent to what Party in the Church such persons may incline. He thinks it would be unwise and unjust to exclude good men in consequence of a tendency either to High Church or Low Church; although he would at once equally reject High Church doctrines which tend towards Popery; and Low Church opinions leading to the fanaticism of Exeter Hall, and thus drawing odium and contempt on the Church of England.[46]

When Gordon showed him this memorandum of his father's, Wilberforce expressed his renewed confidence in Aberdeen's judgment: "surely she must perceive the difference between this and the miserable sort of council she has been used to from the small man (i.e. Russell)."[47] Nevertheless, Victoria remained far from happy about Aberdeen's choice, and Gordon complained to Wilberforce that "People have invented a lot of lies about Hamilton (e.g. that bets were being taken how soon he would turn Romanist) and retail them to my Father and the Queen."[48]

It was certainly some time before the new Bishop of Salisbury won much confidence outside the High Church group within the Church.

There was far less controversy over the appointment Aberdeen made to the third Bishopric which fell vacant during his term of office. Richard Bagot, Bishop of Bath and Wells, had been in declining health since the start of 1854. As a result, he had asked Wilberforce to deal on his behalf with the trouble which had started in his diocese, caused by a course of sermons given by Archdeacon Denison on the extreme Catholic doctrine of the Real Presence. Like all moderate Churchmen, Wilberforce came to believe that Denison was, in fact, seeking prosecution for heresy in order to bring the relations between Evangelicals and High Churchmen in the Church of England to a crisis, so that one or other of the groups must finally be expelled from it. When Bagot died in the May of that year, it was clearly necessary to choose a man who would be able by his strength of character and moderation of opinion both to control the Archdeacon and restore peace within the diocese. Wilberforce, well aware of the problems involved, suggested Richard Trench as the candidate most likely to achieve this. Although a man of rapidly growing reputation as a liberal theologian, Trench had nevertheless remained popular with members of both High and Low Church parties.[49] Aberdeen, however, rejected this suggestion in favour of Lord Auckland to succeed Bagot. Auckland, even though both a Whig and a low Churchman, had, like Trench, the friendship of men

outside his own faction,[50] and he was to justify the confidence placed in him by handling Denison firmly but tactfully, and thus depriving the Archdeacon of the dominating role he had hitherto played in the diocese.[51]

Apart from the appointments of Bishops, Wilberforce and Gordon were also concerned to find other suitable preferments for their High Church colleagues. George Moberley, a prominent figure in the circle around John Keble, was one they had particularly in mind, but after his failure as Headmaster of Winchester, not even the Duke of Newcastle, despite his sympathy with his religious opinions, had enough cnnfidence in his ability to find him a position in the colonial Church.[52] Gordon had also to admit that because Aberdeen had believed him to be a friend of the Rev. Mr. Stone of Spitalfields, "a clever but conceited man and the laughing stock of the London clergy", he had appointed Stone to a vacant canonry at Canterbury, in spite of Moberley's much more valid claims.[53] It was not until Gladstone became Prime Minister in 1868 that Moberley received any major perferment in the Church.

The two men were confronted at the same time by similar intrigues on the part of the Whigs, and especially of "the great man shut up in the small room", as they delighted to describe Lord John Russell. Gordon described some typically Whiggish manoeuvring to Wilberforce as

follows:

> My Father had quite made up his mind to appoint W. Hamilton to the vacant seat on the Cathedral Commission, and only today had, more suo, a long discussion with me as to whether he should write to the Bishop of Salisbury to announce it or to Hamilton himself. What then was his dismay that evening at the Cabinet dinner to hear Palmerston cooly say that having felt some difficulty in making the appointment, he had consulted the Archbishop who had assured him that he would find Mr. Montagu Villiers (!) or Lord Wriothesley Russell (!!) admirably suited for such a post (!!!). My Father was so taken aback that he did not know what to say - the brothers of both being present.[54]

Although in this particular matter, Aberdeen was to have his way, it clearly proved one of the strains under which the Coalition Government existed. There would inevitably be a great deal of difficulty in satisfying the demands of all its supporters who were so sharply divided amongst themselves in their religious opinions. High Churchmen were nevertheless prepared to admit, after the fall of the Government, that Aberdeen's church appointments had shown that, here at least, their interests need not be completely damaged by such a coalition with the Whigs.[55]

The constant intrigues over church appointments, which occupied a considerable amount of the Government's time, were thus, of great significance than might have been expected. The Coalition was, however, concerned with issues of more fundamental religious significance, especially in the

field of church-state relations. The difficulties these caused its High Church supporters were particularly serious in the controversies over the proposals to revive an active Convocation of Canterbury and to carry through the necessary reform of Oxford University. In order to understand the response of High Churchmen to the changing demands of their times, it will be useful to study both these controversies in some detail.

The convocations of the two Provinces of Canterbury and York had been no more than cyphers in church affairs ever since the middle of the seventeenth century. Under the Commonwealth and Protectorate, indeed, they had been abolished altogether. Although they had been restored as the Parliament of the Church of England at the Restoration, their ability to act effectively in its interests was finally destroyed in 1664, when Archbishop Sheldon surrendered the right of the clergy to tax themselves through their own convocations in order to prevent the threatened sharply increased revaluation of ecclesiastical benefices. The result was that, deprived of any bargaining power, the meetings of Convocation became merely formal occasions without any influence on the Government. After the Revolution of 1688, in an attempt to maintain the unity of the Church which had been created by the common hostility of its members to James II, the Government recognized the

right of Convocation to discuss and comment on their proposed reform of the Liturgy along more latitudinarian lines. The bitter opposition of High Churchmen to these proposals which nevertheless developed in the Lower House of the Convocation of Canterbury, quickly compelled the Government to regret its concession. This division between the Upper and Lower Houses was again emphasized in 1717, when only the hurried prorogation of Convocation by Parliament prevented the censure of Bishop Hoadley, a leading Whig supporter, by the latter for heresy. In 1741, the Whig Government had made a final but equally ineffectual attempt to restore the Convocations to active life as the best instruments to reform the administration of the Established Church.[56]

During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the affairs of the Church of England were consequently controlled by Parliament rather than by their own Convocations. Their meetings remained purposeless, even if their formal organization remained intact. Thus, at every new general election, two proctors were still chosen to represent the clergy, in the Province of Canterbury of each diocese, in the Province of York of each archdeaconry. These, with one proctor for each of the cathedral chapters, and the deans and archdeacons of the Province formed the Lower House. The Upper House consisted of the Archbishops and the Bishops. The two houses of the Convocation of Canterbury were

accustomed to meet on the day after the opening of Parliament, when they moved a loyal address to the Queen. After receiving the Sovereign's reply, however, no further business was done, and the Archbishop would immediately prorogue them until the first day of the next session, and so on until that Parliament was dissolved. The Convocation of York achieved even less than this, not even presenting a loyal address.

Despite the fact that the constitutional revolution of 1828-1832 had weakened the claim of Parliament to act on behalf of the Church of England there was little sustained demand during the church movement of the eighteen-thirties for the revival of an active Convocation to replace it. High Churchmen of all shades of opinion, fearful that its meeting would only aggravate the existing dissensions amongst churchmen and thus prevent the establishment of a common front against the challenge from the Whigs, preferred to put their trust in the bench of bishops, who, according to their theory of the apostolic succession, were its natural leaders. They were convinced that an active Convocation would not be suited to contemporary conditions, "being at variance with modern ideas, with the analogy of other institutions and with the real state of the Church".[57] Surprisingly in the light of future developments, it was at this time the Evangelicals, and in particular the Rev. Francis Close, who

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proved most anxious to restore Convocation to its full powers.[58] This was perhaps due to their concern over their lack of influence amongst the Bishops.

Their experience of five years of Whig Government after 1847 transformed the attitude of High Churchmen towards Convocation. What seemed to them a renewed threat against the spiritual nature of the Anglican Church now convinced them that its members should possess a far greater control over their own affairs, which could best be provided by restoring their own governing body to active life. It was understandable that the Anglo-Catholics, with their growing belief that their cause was linked with that of religious toleration and the non-interference of the state with the proceedings of religious bodies[59] should change its thinking in this way. As early as September 1847, the Guardian announced its conversion, although it was still prepared to acknowledge the strength of the opposition case.[60] It later defended itself against the charge that by supporting the revival of Convocation it was encouraging the growth of division within the Church by arguing that a wide divergence of opinion amongst its members has been an essential characteristic of that Church since the Reformation.[61] It went on to maintain that without such a body, the National Church would become a lifeless institution, with the clergy acting merely as social workers, and that, moreover, only

an active Convocation could carry through the necessary reforms of the Church, Parliament having proved itself incapable of doing so in the last two decades.[62] By 1853, the Christian Remembrancer could feel that the need for a revived Convocation was so important that it was ready to stake its theological character on it.[63]

It was, however, not only the Anglo-Catholics, but also the Protestant High Churchmen who threw their weight behind the campaign for it. These Churchmen had by 1847 become convinced that the authority of the bishops as members of the House of Lords was no longer sufficient in itself to safeguard the interests of the Church. They were, it was thought, too much committed to the Government which appointed them to allow them to consider matters affecting the Church disinterestedly, as was indeed clearly proved when a majority of them voted for the increased Maynooth grant and the repeal of the Corn Laws.[64] The English Review, the mouth-piece for these Churchmen, also now acknowledged for the first time that, under the changing conditions of the times, Parliament could no longer be accepted as having despotic authority over the Church, especially as its members included Dissenters, Roman Catholics and Jews, and its time was almost fully devoted to secular matters. As a result, it was now essential that the Church of England should have the means to deal itself with issues affecting its own doctrine and

discipline.[65]

The Protestant High Churchmen were, at the same time, anxious to emphasize that their support of an active Convocation was in no way contrary to their continued belief in church establishment. They emphasized that, even in doctrinal matters, Parliament would remain the ultimate authority, since any changes proposed by the two Houses of Convocation would have to receive its ratification.[66] It was vehemently denied that there was any intention to bring about a separation of church from state, but merely an attempt to revive the old principles of the Protestant Constitution, which had been destroyed by the principles of civil and religious liberty as these had been maintained in Parliament.[67] The Protestant High Churchmen further emphasized that they now believed that the revival of an active Convocation would help to heal the dissension within the Church, as it was now being demanded by members of all schools of thought, who would thus be prepared to co-operate with each other in its working. In any case, the vitality of the secular Parliament had always depended on the party struggle within its walls: why should not this prove equally beneficial in the Parliament of the Church?[68] Finally, realizing the continued unpopularity of the Tractarians in England, these Churchmen took considerable pains to disassociate themselves from the Anglo-Catholic

support for the same cause. They emphasized that it had never been one of the Tractarian 'planks' in the eighteen-thirties, and they sought to convince the general public that the demand for a revived Convocation was "an honest Protestant cry".[69]

The High Church campaign in support of Convocation in the years after 1847, was, thus, weakened by the customary hostility between the two major sections of that group of Churchmen. They had also to meet the determined opposition of the Evangelicals, and especially of Archbishop Sumner, who succeeded Howley at Canterbury in February 1848. In the last year of his Primacy, Howley had given an indication of his willingness to allow greater freedom to the members of the Convocation of Canterbury by permitting a wide-ranging discussion of relevant issues at the meeting held at the opening of the new Parliament in November 1847. J.B. Sumner, on the other hand, reverted to the traditional practice of proroguing Convocation immediately on receiving the answer to the loyal address. For many High Churchmen, this was clear proof that, under his leadership, the Evangelicals were prepared to sacrifice the true interests of the Church in order that they might reap the benefits of their alliance with the Whig Government. Sumner, in particular, forgetful of the traditions of his own party, was willing to accept the full implications of the Royal Supremacy over the Church: he

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was, in fact, "a Protestant Prelate striving at Papal irresponsibility and Papal powers of interference with the worship of every Church in the land."[70]

High Churchmen faced, therefore, considerable obstacles in their efforts to make Convocation into a living reality. Their cause was not advanced when the English Review, greatly impressed by the Whig Government's reaction to the threat of Papal Aggression in December, 1850, again reversed its stand. It maintained that the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill proved that the interests of the Church of England were, in spite of everything, safe in the hands of the Whigs, and thus it believed that the danger of reawakening the jealousy of a more conciliatory Government far outweighed the benefits that would accrue from the existence of an independent governing body for the Church. Further, it was prepared once again to consider the Bishops as the proper representatives of the Church. It praised Bishop Blomfield for his attack on the extreme ritualists, who were doing so much harm to its public image. It was especially impressed by the moderation of Archbishop Sumner, who had not taken the advantage he might have done from the popular hostility against the Anglo-Catholics to impose low church principles on the Church by a fundamental revision of the Prayer Book, the possibility of which was a nightmare for High Churchmen at this time. From the recent donduct of

affairs, it seemed to the English Review that there was no reason to fear the combination of a Whig Prime Minister and an Evangelical Archbishop of Canterbury.[71]

Political developments soon put an end to this enthusiasm for the Whig Government on the part of the Protestant High Churchmen. When it became clear that the Ecclesiastical Titles Act would remain a dead letter, the English Review once more began to press for a Convocation that could act independent of its control.[72] Its position was strengthened when, at the time of the general election of July 1852, the election of proctors to the Convocation of Canterbury, which accompanied it, proved for the first time in three centuries to be more than a mere formality. High Churchmen had determined to make this a real test of their support in the country, and, taking advantage of the fact that the attention of their Low Church colleagues was concentrated on making the Maynooth grant a major issue in the national elections,[73] had succeeded in returning at least half the members of the Lower House from those who were favourable to an active Convocation, and including the great majority of the representatives for the parish clergy.[74]

The result was that both Houses of the Canterbury Convocation insisted on playing a more active role, when they assembled at the opening of Parliament in November 1852.

The Lower House debated the loyal address for three days, instead of the customary one, passed an amendment demanding the right to introduce church reforms and finally appointed committees which could continue to sit in the interval when Convocation itself was prorogued, and thus deal with urgent ecclesiastical problems as they arose. The Upper House, under the leadership of Samuel Wilberforce, carried a similar amendment, and Wilberforce himself made a powerful speech, denying the right of Archbishop Sumner to prorogue Convocation without first gaining the consent of the bishops. Taking advantage of the at least neutral attitude of the Derby Government in this controversy,[75] Sumner managed at this time to maintain his prerogative in this matter, but it was clear that he would be under mounting pressure to allow much greater freedom of action in future meetings of Convocation. The Christian Remembrancer could, indeed, welcome the formation of the Coalition Government in December 1852 on the grounds that it was bound to support an active Convocation. Gladstone, in particular, was committed to it by his writings, and the journal felt that

> we trust his wisdom and discretion to know what is practicable for the Government to do, and what is the best manner by which the abstract cause can be advanced, and also we feel sure that his firmness of character and the strength of his convictions will not allow any injustice to be done towards the Church by any Cabinet of which he is a member.[76]

During the life of the Coalition, however, Gladstone's

attention was to be mainly devoted to the problems of Oxford University reform. It was Samuel Wilberforce who played the leading role in the struggle for a revived Convocation during this period, as he had, indeed, done in the preceeding five years. Wilberforce had always been convinced that this would prove the best method of restoring the unity of the Church. He had no fear that its debates would give a dangerous publicity to those questions which divided Churchmen, notably the problem of church discipline and the place of ritualism in its worship. Wilberforce considered the English clergy sufficiently responsible and moderate to be able to reach an acceptable compromise solution if these matters were discussed in the open. He was most anxious, therefore, to secure the new Government's consent for the revival of Convocation, or at least to grant the same freedom of discussion as had been allowed in the previous November. He was prepared, in order to achieve this, to use all the influence Arthur Gordon possessed over his father, especially as Gordon had led him to believe that Lord Aberdeen was in fact sympathetically disposed in this matter.[77]

When Aberdeen took office in December 1852, however, Wilberforce's hopes suffered a considerable set-back. Gordon had to acknowledge that he had misled his friend about his father's presumed willingness to revive Convocation. The Prime Minister had in fact reached the opposite conclusion to that of the Bishop. He believed that an

active Convocation would prove to be another factor helping to split the Church of England into two incompatible sections. He could not share Wilberforce's optimism about the moderation of the clergy, especially after his experience of the hysteria they had shown during the re-election of Gladstone for Oxford University. Moreover, Aberdeen was convinced of the unpopularity of the proposal, both at the Court and in the country. He was also well aware of the hostility of his Whig colleagues to it, which had been made clear to him in a conversation with Lord John Russell, by discussions in the Cabinet and by the leading part played in the opposition to it by the Rev. Montague Villiers, the brother of Lord Clarendon, a leading Whig magnate who was to become Foreign Secretary in February 1853. Aberdeen realized that, as a result, it would be most unwise to make the revival of Convocation a cabinet question, as this might split the Government, or to raise the subject in Parliament, where it was bound to create considerable opposition.[78] The most that Aberdeen was prepared to concede to Wilberforce was the opportunity for both Houses of the Canterbury Convocation to debate church affairs for a whole day, sitting "until midnight, if he liked", but after this he must accept without question its customary prorogation by the Archbishop of Canterbury. So that there should be no misunderstanding even about this slight concession, the Government would

make it clear in Parliament that this did not imply any intention of restoring synodical action, and that it still reserved the power to prorogue Convocation to itself, even if Sumner refused to fulfill his responsibility in this matter.[79]

Wilberforce realized that he would have to accept this limited concession of a free debate for one day only, which, at least, would provide an opportunity to discuss the report of the committee on church discipline which had been set up in November 1852. He promised the Prime Minister through his son that he would do his best to control the High Church extremists, like Bishop Philpotts and Archdeacon Denison, who were demanding much more freedom for Convocation. He suggested that in return Lord Aberdeen could make his position easier by similarly restraining Montague Villiers and Dean Elliott, the leaders of the Evangelical opposition, and by not threatening to use the authority of the Government to enforce the prorogation, which would only inflame the extremists. Wilberforce also took advantage of this opportunity to impress on Gordon how indispensible he was in these delicate negotiations, because Sumner was too weak, and Blomfield too old, to impose the necessary authority on the Church.[80]

Wilberforce's contempt for Sumner, indeed, led him to ignore the Archbishop almost completely in these consultations, which was to result in some considerable difficulty

and misunderstanding. Sumner, not knowing that a compromise had been arranged, made his own agreement with Palmerston, then the Home Secretary, that Convocation should present its address to the Queen early on February 16th., the day of its meeting, thus preventing any lengthy discussion, which according to custom could only take place before this was done. Gordon was dismayed when his father, forgetful of the implications of this arrangement, accepted it. The concession of free debate for at least a limited period, which this would have prevented, was finally restored by the decision to continue the meeting after the presentation of the address, but this imbroglio emphasized clearly the dangers of Wilberforce's delight in working behind the scenes.[81]

In allowing a full day's debate, Aberdeen felt that he had done all that was possible in the existing circumstances to meet the High Church demand for an active Convocation. He sought at least to postpone further controversy by proposing that most useful of delaying institutions, a royal commission, to examine the whole problem. Wilberforce and Gordon, however, welcomed this with enthusiasm, as they felt it would give them opportunity to advance their cause. They spent much time in discussing its best composition in order to ensure that, while it would produce a favourable report, it would not at the same time alienate popular sympathy by being obviously packed with High Church extremists.

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Wilberforce was, indeed, much disconcerted by his friend's suggestion that he should exclude himself for that very reason.[82] On the other hand, many of Aberdeen's Whig colleagues thought that the proposal of such a commission would be considered a surrender to Tractarian pressure, and would bring his Ministry into popular disfavour.[83] By April 1853, Gordon had to confess that his father, influenced by the determined hostility of Russell in particular, was wavering in his resolution again. He was asking what such a body could usefully achieve, for

> the revival of Convocation is not a question which can be delegated to a commission, and the report of such a semi-Puseyite body will carry no weight in the House of Commons.[84]

Gordon urged Wilberforce that, in order to persuade the Prime Minister to establish the commission, he should put into writing his reasons for wanting it.[85] Wilberforce wrote in reply that he saw its main purpose as being to reassure the more extreme supporters of an active Convocation that its revival was still under consideration. The most useful practical contribution the Commission could make would be to study the necessary reform of the Convocation's constitution and method of working so that it would be able to act efficiently as soon as it was restored.[86]

From this time to the end of the session, however, the question of Convocation fell into abeyance, primarily because

Wilberforce, its most influential advocate, had decided to concentrate his efforts for the time being on his measures for the reform of the Church in the colonies. The only initiative taken was that by Blomfield, who, on the insistence of the Bishop of Salisbury, proposed to lay before the House of Lords the report of the committee of Convocation on church discipline. His intention was to keep the matter in the public's eye by so doing, but Aberdeen warned him that it would be most misguided to provoke a debate which would only result in embarrassing the Government by emphasizing the differences of opinion amongst its members, and thus stiffen the opposition to the proposal. Consequently, Blomfield allowed the matter to drop.[87]

The controversy over the position of the Church of England in the colonies, which came into prominence at this time, was indeed closely connected with that over the revival of Convocation. High Churchmen had a special interest in this matter, because the presence of a flourishing Anglican Church throughout the British Empire would provide the most effective answer to the two criticisms generally made of the catholic claims of the Church of England: first, that as a purely national church, it did not possess the necessary qualification of universality, and secondly, as an established church, it was under the control of the secular state. In their attempts to give the colonial Church

independent authority over its own affairs, High Churchmen were to come into the same conflict as they met in the struggle over Convocation with the erastianism which was so firmly entrenched in the Coalition Cabinet, mainly amongst its Whig members but also, if to a lesser extent, in Lord Aberdeen himself. For that reason, it seemed to them of the utmost importance that it was the High Church Duke of Newcastle who held the joint secretaryship for War and the Colonies, and was thus responsible in this field.

The difficulties faced by High Churchmen were clearly illustrated by the furore caused by the problem of the Canadian Clergy Reserves. These were lands which, by the Constitutional Act of 1791, had been set aside for the support of the Protestant clergy. Spokesmen for the Church of England in Canada had nevertheless claimed exclusive rights for their Church over them, and, although their extreme position had been modified by the 1840 Act, it still caused considerable jealousy between them and the other Protestant denominations. The proposal under consideration by the Government in 1853 that control of these Reserves should be transferred from the Imperial Parliament to the local Canadian Legislature was, therefore, regarded with anxiety by Churchmen both in Canada and England as a possible threat to the material welfare of the Church in that country. The more statesmanlike amongst them were

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equally well aware, however, that to retain imperial control in this period of developing self-government would also do much harm to the Church by identifying it with external domination.

In a letter written to Gordon on February 15th, 1853, Wilberforce suggested one possible solution:

> my view is (1) that the question of the clergy reserves is one which may properly, and therefore ought to be left to the colonial legislature to settle - and that in so doing there is the best chance of maintaining the claim of the Church to endowment out of them. (2) I am disposed to doubt whether there is not for me a claim of justice in the plea that if at this instant they were handed over to a colonial ministry pledged to their secularization this must follow, and therefore (3) I should much like to consider whether they might not be handed over to the colonial legislature on a certain day which should give time to prevent any accidental majority finally fixing the question of secularization.[88]

Such a balanced appraisal was not acceptable, however, to the generality of High Church opinion, Gordon, quoting from a letter written by one of his Cambridge friends, warned Wilberforce that any apparent concession might well result in destroying the confidence of High Churchmen in the Government.[89] Wilberforce, nevertheless, remained convinced of the danger from any last ditch stand, and he was, thus, placed in an embarrassing position when Archdeacon Bethune, who had come from Canada to plead the cause of the Church there, asked him to present his petition in the Lords against the transfer of control to the local government.

Wilberforce sought Lord Aberdeen's advice whether it was against Parliamentary tradition to present a petition contrary to the policy one was supporting personally.[90]

Gordon replied that it would be best to avoid any course open to misconstruction. He told Wilberforce that both his father and the Duke of Newcastle were most anxious that he should be prepared to speak unequivocally in favour of their liberal policy with regard to the clergy reserves in order to make clear that the Bishop of Exeter's bitter attacks on it were not representative of the opinions of all the High Church bishops.[91] Wilberforce, in fact, proved himself ready to give strong support to the Government, not only in the House of Lords, but also outside Parliament. The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts had summoned a meeting to organize a High Church petition against the Government's bill, and it was hoped that Bishop Blomfield would add the full weight of his authority to the protest. Instead, Wilberforce used his considerable powers of persuasion on the Bishop so that, when he took the chair at the meeting, he gave an unexpected support to the Government's proposals.[92]

The Government succeeded in carrying its Clergy Reserves bill through both Houses of Parliament by reasonable majorities. They had, nevertheless, to face a most determined opposition from both Conservatives and High Churchmen in

Parliament, and Aberdeen was, therefore, grateful for the advocacy of Wilberforce, which did much to preserve the reputation of the Coalition amongst High Churchmen. The Prime Minister was, however, to give him much assistance in return in the two matters he had most at heart in connection with the colonial Church. Like most High Churchmen, Wilberforce believed that the Church of England overseas would benefit by strengthening the power of the episcopacy within it, and he urged on the Government the need to pass legislation to increase the number of her bishops, and also to authorize them to summon synods in order to provide for the discipline of the Church independent of the authority of the State. He emphasized strongly that the relevant Colonial Churches Bill and the Missionary Bishoprics Bill should receive high priority in the Government programme, especially since Gladstone had pressed similar legislation in the previous session on the unsympathetic Sir John Pakington, the Colonial Secretary in Derby's Ministry. He warned Aberdeen of the danger of alienating High Church support if this policy was not adopted now that Gladstone was in office. He was even prepared to accept the postponement of action over Convocation if only these measures were given the undivided attention of the Government.[93]

Gordon had, however, to tell Wilberforce that the Cabinet was far from unanimous about the need for these two bills. Even the Duke of Newcastle, conscious of its

effect on public opinion in the colonies, thought that the proposed Colonial Churches Bill would give too great independence to the Bishops, and insisted on a proviso that acts affecting the Anglican Church passed by the local legislature should overrule regulations made by its own synods. Aberdeen as well, had little favour for the idea of "see-less" bishops which would result from the Missionary Bishops Bill, and he refused to make either of these two Bills government measures without considerable amendments.[94] This opposition by members of the Cabinet was strengthened by the pressure put on the Government by the Evangelicals, who strongly disliked the proposals. Partly because they involved increasing episcopal authority, partly because they ignored the vested interests of the powerful Evangelical Church Missionary Society in the colonies.[95]

As a result, even though he received the support of Archbishop Sumner, Wilberforce was unable to get the bills through the House of Commons. He was later to describe the reasons for his failure in a letter to Arthur Gordon, which is worth quoting in full as it clearly illustrates the confusion which existed within the political groups over religious matters at this time:

> We got both our Bills then well through our House. Then came the question, who was to father them in the Lower House. Would the Government? The Archbishop left it very much to me to arrange, (I tried first to get the Government to take them)

he being at Addington, but acquiescent in all. He wrote to Pakington, and got him to promise support. He empowered me when it was thought that Government should not actually adopt the Bill to ask Walpole to take the Ch. Bill and to arrange for the Miss. Bishops Bill. Walpole agreed if the Government would support the Bill at the Cabinet of the 30th., and it was arranged. It was resolved that the Solicitor General should amend, and that the Government would support fully the Bill so amended, Walpole moving it. Walpole saw Sidney Herbert (I think) on the 30th., and it was arranged that there was no hurry for 2 or 3 days. Meanwhile some one, we have never made out who, but we suppose Brotherton, had moved the Bill for a first hearing and named earliest day for the second reading. Under this treatment, the Miss. Bill came up long before it had been regularly committed to anyone (I being engaged at the moment in negotiating the matter), was attacked by A. Kinnaird in the interests of the Ch. Miss. Society, and was entirely demolished under entirely wrong pretences... . The Col. Ch. Bill was in a like manner brought forward unexpectedly on the Tuesday, 2nd. Sidney Herbert seeing that Walpole was not in the House drove about to find him but could not. He and Pakington were both accidentally absent from town. A. Kinnaird, Lord Seymour, Vernon Smith, B. Spooner were furious against the Bill. Lord J. Russell stated that the Solicitor General had prepared amendments, and proposed putting off the discussion for a week. He behaved very well. Gladstone and Roundell Palmer spoke excellently. But the House was in its fag end, and Gladstone agreed, with a view to putting the matter into the best posture for next year, to postpone the question till next session. The Bishop of Salisbury writes me in despair of the Bills as if all were 'wasted labour'. This I do not at all feel. It is a great thing that the Archbp. as Bs. should have agreed to and passed through the Lords any such measure and a great step forward for next year. Meanwhile the Record rages against me, specially at having 'hoodwinked' the Lord Chancellor and the Archbishop' as to the nature of these Bills in articles which the mild Primate terms 'execrable'.[96]

Unfortunately for Wilberforce's hopes, before these

Bills could be passed through the Commons in the following session, there had been some significant changes in the Cabinet, made necessary by the outbreak of the Crimean War. The most important of these from the high church point of view was the separation of the office of Secretary of State for War from that of Secretary for the Colonies, which had previously been united. In May 1854, unfortunately for his future reputation, the Duke of Newcastle decided to retain the former officer which, under the circumstances of the time, carried the greater responsibilites. In his place as Colonial Secretary, Lord Aberdeen appointed Sir George Grey, being persuaded to do so by Lord John Russell, who thought this necessary in order to strengthen the position of the Whigs in the Cabinet.[97] For High Churchmen, however, the choice of Grey was a severe blow, since, being a man of strong erastian opinions, he had little sympathy for their dreams of an independent and self-governing Church of England in the colonies. Grey, in fact, quickly made clear to Wilberforce that he would not give government support to the Colonial Church and Missionary Bishopric Bill if these were reintroduced into the House of Commons.[98] He further antagonized these Churchmen by refusing to provide assistance from his department to help solve the financial difficulties of the Bishop of New Zealand, G.S. Selwyn, who was considered as the finest exemplar of their tradition in the colonies.[99]

It was not surprising that the Guardian exclaimed in disgust that Grey's policy towards the colonial Church was even worse than his Low Church Conservative predecessor, Sir John Pakington.[100]

Their failure, mainly due to Whig intransigence, to win government support for their policy of greater freedom for the Church of England in the colonies did little to encourage High Churchmen when they resumed their campaign for a revived Convocation as the first step to loosening state control over the Mother Church in England itself. Moreover, even the slight concession of a full day's debate, which they had won at the meeting held in February 1853, appeared to have been lost once again when, in August 1853, Archbishop Sumner, taking advantage of the fact that the attention of its two most influential protagonists, Bishop Wilberforce and Arthur Gordon was concentrated on other matters, availed himself of the opportunity to prorogue the meeting in the traditional fashion without any discussion taking place. Dismayed by this development, Gordon discussed with Wilberforce the best method to retrieve the situation. He emphasized that the Bishop must, in any future conversation with his father, stiffen the resolution of the Prime Minister by assuming there was no doubt about debates being permitted at subsequent meetings of the Canterbury Convocation.[101]

Lord Aberdeen, however, was now under equally determined pressure from his Whig colleagues, who were most hostile towards the proposal, and their opposition was intensified by the understanding they managed to reach for a time with the Archbishop of Canterbury. Under their prompting, Sumner suggested to the Prime Minister that meetings of Convocation should remain merely formal as they had been since the eighteenth century, and that, in order to neutralize the growing pressure which was being put on him by bishops like Wilberforce, the timing of its prorogation should henceforth be recognized as the responsibility of the Government and not of himself. Much to the surprise of his son, Aberdeen's response to this reactionary advice was more liberal than any one had expected. He urged Sumner, in particular, to consider whether the scandals and abuses of the preceeding century were, in fact, valid precedents to be accepted.[102] In his customary fashion, poor Sumner immediately gave way before this evidence of a strong conviction on the part of the Prime Minister. He told Blomfield "in his own easy way, and as if it had his full concurrence, that Convocation would sit for discussions, etc., and that committees would be appointed to keep the Synod alive during the prorogation, which the Archbishop would perform himself".[103] Wilberforce reported to Arthur Gordon that this change of front by the Archbishop had

completely disgusted his erstwhile allies, who had relied on his effective support of their opposition. Dean Elliott, for example, "abused the Archbishop soundly - saying that he would not stand by them or some such expression; that he cared for nothing and was just like a Mufti, and would make an excellent Turk."[104] Lord Shaftesbury, another determined opponent of an active Convocation, also tried to weaken Aberdeen's resolution by warning him of the danger of his Government of this unpopular policy, but, according to Gordon, he made little impression on the Prime Minister.[105]

A year later, on January 18th, 1855, Sumner astounded Aberdeen by asking him on his own initiative for even greater freedom for the Canterbury Convocation. He now proposed that the meeting to be held on the following February 6th., should be allowed to continue for two or even three days, in order to allow a more worthwhile discussion of current church problems. He justified his change of mind about an extended session on the grounds that he had been convinced that Convocation was the only institution which could handle satisfactorily much of the business of the Church. There was still, nevertheless, suspicion of the good intentions of the Archbishop, and it was even considered that Sumner's proposal might be part of a deep-laid plot to bring about the fall of the Coalition by forcing a decision on this issue, and thus worsening the relations between

Churchmen and Whigs in the Cabinet.[106] Indeed, Aberdeen insisted that Sumner should commit himself to this new proposal by putting his request into writing. Although Sumner's readiness to do so dispelled all suspicion of a conspiracy on his part,[107], his letter to the Prime Minister proved less emphatic in its terminology than had been expected, describing a prolonged session of Convocation as being "desirable rather than otherwise".[108] Four days later, however, Bishops Wilberforce and Blomfield persuaded him to rephrase his opinions in more positive terms.[109] This support from the Evangelical Archbishop of Canterbury sufficed to end all opposition to a prolonged session of Convocation, which was duly held without controversy that February. Although it was not until the eighteen-sixties that Convocation became an effective instrument of Church policy, Wilberforce was completely justified in jubilantly claiming this as victory for the cause he had been so closely involved with.[110]

The controversy over Convocation provided a clear illustration how far even moderate High Churchmen like Wilberforce had advanced towards accepting the need for the Church to exercise far greater authority over her own affairs, even if this meant weakening her connections with the State. Not all of them, however, could welcome their success in 1855 as enthusiastically as Wilberforce did. Gladstone, for example, was always much more conscious of its serious

political implications, especially in bedevilling the sensitive and far from secure relationship between the two major groups in the Coalition, the Whigs with their strong erastian sense, and the Peelites, many of whom were regarded as no better than Puseyites. When Arthur Gordon heard from his father of Sumner's surprising request for an extended meeting of Convocation, he had hurried to tell Gladstone what he considered extremely good news. He found however, that it struck Gladstone "dumb with astonishment", and that that statesman was more concerned to consider its effect on the contemporary political rather than ecclesiastical situation. Gladstone was, indeed, caught on the horns of a dilemma. As the recognized champion of the Church of England in the Cabinet, he could not afford to be seen discouraging Aberdeen from taking any steps towards a revived Convocation. On the other hand, he realized that Russell, already clearly dissatisfied with the Coalition, might use this an excuse to break it up. Gladstone's nervousness and his exaggerated language during this conversation convinced Gordon that he considered this a most serious crisis for the Government.[111] And it was certainly true that before the Convocation of Canterbury met in its extended session on February 6th., the Coalition had collapsed. The immediate cause of its disintegration, however, was not, as Gladstone had thought possible, its support for a revived Convocation

for the grounds on which Lord John Russell had resigned on January 23rd. when his inability to defend its administrative record during the Crimean War.

Gladstone's dismay over the destructive potentialities implicit in the struggle for an active Convocation must have been enhanced by the fact that, during the 1854 parliamentary session, he himself had enjoyed considerable success in consolidating a High Church - Liberal alliance behind a common cause, the reform of Oxford University. There was now, indeed, general agreement for the need to carry through some radical reorganization of the constitution of the University in order to meet the changing demands of the day. There was, at the same time, considerable divergence of opinion about the exact nature of the reforms which were required, and, above all, whether these reforms should be put into effect by the University itself, or imposed on it by some external authority. For a long time, Gladstone had been convinced, like most High Churchmen, that the first alternative was the only acceptable one, for an imposed solution would inevitably mean some measure of state interference. It was feared that, at least in the event of a Whig Government being in office, the result would prove derogatory to the essential Christian nature of the

University, especially by severing its intimate connection with the Church of England. In July 1850, therefore, Gladstone had acted as chief spokesman in the House of Commons for those who opposed the proposal of Lord John Russell to set up a royal commission of inquiry into conditions at Oxford. He did so on the grounds that it would be "contrary to the principle of local freedom of independence in local institutions," which was basic to the English way of life.[112] The Liberals who supported the motion, for their part, argued that, in asking for reform to be left to the University, Gladstone had grossly underestimated the strength of the reactionary elements there, in particular amongst the Heads. They successfully urged Russell not to yield, and the Government carried its proposal by a majority of 22.[113]

Opinion amongst High Churchmen, however, remained completely hostile. It was felt that the report of a commission appointed by such a Government must inevitably be a partisan one. This suspicion appeared to be confirmed when Russell failed to obtain the co-operation of the Hebdomadal Board, the governing body of the University, in the nomination of the commissioners. As a result, the men he selected were of pronounced liberal sympathies, with Samuel Hinds, Bishop of Norwich and a close friend of the latitudinarian Archbishop Whately, as Chairman, and A.P. Stanley as Secretary, with Goldwin Smith as his assistant. When the

report of the commission appeared in May 1852, however, it proved a far more profound and constructive document than had been expected. It dealt most thoroughly with the need for constitutional reforms to increase the influence of the working members of the University at the expense of the Hebdomadal Board, for the provision of accommodation for poorer students who could not afford the high cost of living in the colleges, for a thorough recasting of the examination system, for a better method of selecting professors and, above all, for the abolition of closed fellowships, which the commissioners regarded as the essential preliminary for improving the general standard of teaching in the colleges as a whole. Even the Guardian acknowledged after its publication that the report was a notable achievement and its recommendations had to be taken seriously.[114]

The statesmanlike conclusions reached by the commissioners about many of the issues involved in university reform convinced many High Churchmen that outside interference might not prove so disastrous as they had once feared. The formation of the Coalition Government, in which they were strongly represented also did much to persuade them to accept the possibility of state intervention. This was strengthened by the fact that Lord John Russell, perhaps due to the fact that he had no intimate knowledge of conditions

at Oxford,[115] quickly made clear that he was content to leave the whole matter in Gladstone's hands.[116] As a result, it was they who had now the easiest access to the decision-making authority. Further, both they and the Liberals were finally convinced of the need for external compulsion after the publication of the Hebdomadal Board's own proposals in December 1853. In these, the Heads made clear their determination not to surrender ultimate control over University affairs, although they acknowledged the necessity of working more closely with the residents than hitherto. There was no hope, therefore, of achieving any consensus of opinion as to the reorganization of the constitutional structure of the University amongst the interested parties themselves, and some form of intervention by the State now seemed unavoidable.[117]

It was for these reasons that one possible major stumbling block to co-operation between High Churchmen and Liberals in the advancement of university reform was removed. It was to prove more difficult for the two groups to reconcile their differing attitudes to the other controversial issue, the relative merits of the professorial and tutorial system of teaching. On the one hand, the Liberals believed that the great achievements in the field of scholarship of the German and Scottish universities had been the result of the work of their professors, who had been given the time and the means to carry on their own research as well as to perform efficiently their teaching duties. This combination of

research and teaching was much more difficult for the Oxford tutors, who were even burdened further by administrative duties within their colleges, and who, if they wished to marry, were forced to leave Oxford altogether, thus seriously reducing her intellectual capital. If Oxford was to maintain her reputation as a centre of learning, then, as one of the leading Liberal publicists, H.G. Liddell, wrote it would be necessary to have one class that would be "at once permanent and intelligent. The Heads of Houses are permanent but not intelligent. Tutors may be intelligent but are certainly not permanent."[118] Anglo-Catholics believed, however, that such arguments ignored the most important duty that university teachers could fulfill, their pastoral work amongst the students. This could only be done by the college tutors, who had closer links with the undergraduates than any professor could hope to possess. Pusey, in particular, was so convinced that the spread of unbelief in Germany was due to the lack of the tutorial system in the universities there that, to the surprise of his contemporaries, he was prepared to support the Heads in their resistance to any radical change in order to maintain the status quo at Oxford. His juniors, who were able to exercise considerable influence through their dominance of the recently revived Tutors' Association, were by no means so extreme in their opposition to the professorial system,

and saw no reason to prevent them from taking a greater part in the teaching at the University. They were, nevertheless, still determined that college tuition should remain the basis of that teaching. As a result, there was serious disagreement between the two groups of reformers as to the delimitation of the power to be exercised by the professors and the tutors respectively in the remodelled system of university government. In the end, it was the Liberals who gave way over this issue. In place of the recommendation of the royal commission that the legislating authority for the University should be in future a revived Congregation dominated by the professors, they were now prepared to accept the tutors' suggestion of a reformed Hebdomadal Board which would consist of three sections, the first representing the Heads, the second the tutors and the third both the professors and the public examiners, thus effectively reducing the influence of the professors in university affairs.[119]

The ground was now prepared for Gladstone to construct a scheme which would be satisfactory to the opinion of the reforming majority at Oxford, even if this certainly did not include the Heads. The working out of its details involved him in an immense and wide-ranging correspondence from all the interested parties at the University. In dealing with these controversial issues, his achievements were most impressive, and they did much to enhance his reputation

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amongst the resident members who formed his main support in the university constituency. It was he who took charge of the difficult passage of the Bill through the House of Commons. Although he was forced to make important concessions during the lengthy discussions in committee, mainly in order to introduce changes that would result in weakening the influence of the younger Tractarians in the University's Convocation,[120] he succeeded in producing a measure which retained the essential principles. The Oxford University Reform Act refashioned the University's constitution by substituting a new governing body on the elective principle for the Old Hebdomadal Board, it opened the close Fellowships, it struck a balance between the professorial and tutorial systems, it broke the monopoly of the colleges by allowing the foundation of private halls, and, most important of all, it put these fundamental reforms into effect in a way that won the approval of moderate opinion at Oxford, both Anglo-Catholic and Liberal.[121]

Gladstone's success in uniting these two groups in support of his proposals, nevertheless, was not complete. A number of influential Anglo-Catholics in particular were unable to endorse his policy. Roundell Palmer, for example, while agreeing that some reform was essential, believed himself prohibited by the oath he had taken on becoming a fellow of his college from taking any part in changing its

statutes by legislation, and thus continued to hope in the unlikely possibility that the colleges would reform themselves.[121a] Because of his even stronger dislike of state interference in the affairs of the University, Pusey offered more hostile opposition to the proposed measure, even although, as the Guardian noted, the principles behind it were undeniably Tractarian in origin.[122] In doing so, he had with him the other two surviving members of the older generation of leaders, Keble and Charles Marriott. It was this fact that prevented a man like Frederic Rogers from throwing his influential authority behind the bill which on the whole he approved.[123]

The suspicion of Pusey and his friends was greatly increased when, in spite of his promises to preserve "the essential connection between the University and the Church of England", Gladstone was compelled to accept in the bill as it was finally passed certain provisions that would for the first time allow Dissenters, not only to attend the University, but also to receive a Bachelor of Art's degree from it. This had originally been a matter which the Government had agreed should be excluded from the scope of the present measure because they realized the amount of controversy it would cause. Their hand was forced, however, when an amendment to relieve Dissenters from the obligation to subscribe to the Articles of the Church before graduation

was carried against them by a majority of ninety-one. Although Gladstone had voted against it, he considered that it would now be judicious to concede this point without a further struggle. As he told his supporters at Oxford, Dissenters would still be excluded from any teaching or administrative duties at the University, both of which required a higher qualification then the B.A. He argued, moreover, that, although it was by no means a perfect settlement, it appeared to be "one of those incomplete arrangements, which seem to suit the practical habits of this country, and which, by taking the edge off a matter of complaint, are often found virtually to dispose of it for a length of time."[124] Such arguments did little to dispel the fears of those like Pusey and Keble, who remembered the bitter controversies of the eighteen-thirties which had centred around this very point, and for a time they lost their confidence in Gladstone's judgement. Keble, in particular, was especially severe on him; according to Frederic Rogers, he now spoke of "Mr. Gladstone" instead of his customary "W.E.G.".[125]

The hopes of those who opposed this concession to the Dissenters were concentrated on the Conservative strength in the House of Lords, in the expectations that Lord Derby would force a defeat on the Government over this issue. For a number of reasons, however, partly because he had always

supported the admission of dissenters to Oxford in principle, although he disagreed with the manner in which the concession was to be introduced, partly because, according to some, he wanted to get off to the races, Derby refused to make any determined challenge against the proposal and quickly gave up the struggle.[126] Gladstone was, thus, allowed to escape from what might have proved a difficult and embarrassing situation for him.

The controversies over Convocation, on the one hand, and Oxford University reform, on the other, provide between them a clear illustration of the dilemma forced upon the Anglo-Catholics as a result of the coalition between the Peelites and the Whigs, whom many still considered as their inveterate enemies. Many felt that it would be possible to support the Government only if it proved that the interests of the Church were its primary concern, and that it was prepared to support with its full authority such matters as the revival of an active Convocation. Some, especially amongst the younger generation, however, agreed with Gladstone that it was essential to make the coalition a bridge between the Whigs and High Churchmen, not only for reasons of political necessity, but also as part of the process by which the latter could reach some sort of accommodation with the liberal temper of the age. The differences

between these two points of view were shown early in the life of the Government in an exchange of letters between Bishop Wilberforce and Gladstone. Wilberforce had asked Gladstone to use his influence to persuade the Committee of Council on Education to make some concession over the management clause, which still remained a most sensitive issue for most Churchmen. He argued that so trifling a surrender of principle on the part of the Whigs would be a small price to pay for the enthusiastic support of moderate Churchmen that would inevitably result.[127] Gladstone replied that to do so would bring about a serious weakening of the coalition, because Lord John Russell and Lord Landsdowne could not, after the position they had adopted in office, accept such a reversal of policy without an humiliating loss of face.[128] He was much more happy when it proved possible for him to co-operate with the Whigs over Oxford University reform without, in the main, sacrificing his principles.

The hopes of Gladstone that a permanent modus vivendi might be established with the Whigs, however, never appeared likely to be fulfilled. Anglo-Catholics steadily lost whatever confidence they had ever possessed in the Coalition, and which the Protestant High Churchmen had certainly never shared. The pages of the Guardian marked the stages in their disillusionment. In its summary review of the 1853

session of Parliament, it was already unable to consider the work of the Government with unqualified satisfaction, although it emphasized its great admiration for the financial abilities of Gladstone as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Even this did not make up, in its opinion, for his readiness to compromise, as it seemed, over the Canadian Clergy Reserves and the Colonial Church bills.[129] Like so many of its contemporaries, however, it was prepared to support Government policy in the Middle Eastern crisis, which was to result in the outbreak of war with Russia in March 1854. It believed that the Crimean War was undeniably a just war because, first, England and her ally, France, were not responsible for the break-down of the diplomatic negotiations which preceded it, and secondly, it was fought in defence of the European moral order, which was being challenged by a Russia determined on the conquest of Turkey. The Guardian was also convinced that the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire fared better under the indifferent toleration of the Turks than they would under the despotic tyranny of the Russians.[130] In spite of its forceful exposition of the Government's case, the Guardian , nevertheless, had to recognize that, in doing so, it went contrary to the opinions of many of its readers. It was in particular accused of ignoring the very clear evidence of the severe oppression of the Greek Christians, and of failing to realize that "the fall of Turkey would be

a death blow to Mohammadanism, and open a wide door for the true faith, with civilization in its train."[131]

The decision by the Coalition to declare war against Russia was, indeed, a severe shock to those High Churchmen who regarded her as the defender of the Eastern Orthodox Church, which possessed so great an appeal for them. They must have shared the anguish George Denison experienced.

> on that never forgotten day when he saw the Cross and the Crescent on the same flag in the streets of London. British (i.e. material) interests are the only rule of British policy; it shows the decline in her position. Russia alone saved her honour in spite of the bravery of the English troops.[132]

Thirty-two years later, it was to be such convictions as these which gained for Gladstone the whole-hearted support of High Churchmen in his campaign against Disraeli's adventures in the Middle East.[133] In 1854, however, he was considered as a strong supporter of the Government's war-like policy.[134] One hostile critic maintained, indeed, that the part he played at this time was based completely on political expediency rather than principle; although "cordially detesting the Russian war from beginning to end", he was determined to retain office until he had succeeded by his University Reform bill in destroying the influence of the Heads of the Oxford Colleges, whom, since the days of the Tractarian Movement, he had regarded with bitterness.[135]

The editorial support given the Government by the Guardian at the outbreak of the Crimean War did not survive

the difficulties and disappointments of its early stages. Its attitude became even more hostile as a result of its reconstruction in June 1854, with Lord John Russell claiming a more influential position within it as Lord President of the Council and Sir George Grey becoming Colonial Secretary.[136] The Guardian now concentrated its most vehement criticism against Russell, whom it considered as the puppet of Radicals like Bright, or the malcontent Whigs like Vernon Smith or Clanricarde, who had been excluded from office by the claims of the more experienced Peelites.[137] Above all, it blamed Russell for the fact that the Government had to accept the infamous clause in the Oxford University Reform Act admitting Dissenters to the University. In this instance, Heywood, the private member who moved the amendment, had been acting as the mouthpiece of the Russell section of the Cabinet:

> It is to Lord John, to his faint and feeble semi-opposition, his speaking one way and voting the other, his betrayal of the wish to force such provisions upon his colleagues, that the University is principally indebted for these mischeivious enactments.[138]

It was not surprising, therefore, that the Guardian welcomed the fall of the Coalition in January 1855. It acknowledged that the Church had indeed benefited from many of its measures, in particular, the Oxford University Reform Act and the greater latitude given to the Convocation of Canterbury, and that the exercise of ecclesiastical patronage

in the hands of Lord Aberdeen had been good and free from any party bias. It maintained, nevertheless, that it could never regard with any confidence a Ministry which contained Lord John Russell, who, it was convinced, would always remain a determined opponent of church interests. It also emphasized its belief that such a coalition was inevitably bound to collapse because of the need its members would have, under the existing political conditions, of sacrificing its internal coherence in order to attract support from the extreme wings of their respective groups.[139] For Anglo-Catholics, as for Protestant High Churchmen, the legacy of bitterness left by five years of Whig Government between 1847 and 1852 was still too strong to allow that working alliance between Whigs and High Churchmen which Gladstone, for one, had believed possible. It remains to be seen how their more liberal approach to the religious problems of the day would fare in the succeeding period: a period in which the political world was to be dominated by Lord Palmerston.

NOTES: CHAPTER V

[1] Cardwell to Palmer, November 6, 1856. Earl of Selbourne, Memorials, Part I: Family and Personal, 1761-1865. 2 vols. (London, 1895), II, p. 306.

[2] English Review, XVIII (1852), p. 149.

[3] W.D. Jones, Lord Derby and Victorian Conservatism (London, 1956), p. 146.

[4] English Review, XV (1851), p. 172: [A.J. Beresford-Hope], Letters on Church Matters, by D.C.L. 11 pts. in 4 vols. (London, 1852-1855), II, pp. 156-160.

[5] Ibid., III, p. 457.

[6] Guardian, March 3., 1852, p. 144.

[7] London Illustrated News, XX (1852), p. 321: Guardian, May 21, 1852, p. 345.

[8] The best account of this meeting of the National Society is given in the Guardian, June 5., 1852, pp. 406-410.

[9] [Beresford-Hope], Letters on Church Matters, II, p. 260: Guardian, June 12th., 1851, p. 422.

[10] English Review, XVIII (1852), pp. 117-118.

[11] [Beresford-Hope], Letters on Church Matters, IV, p. 500.

[12] G.A. Denison, Notes on My Life (London, 1887), p. 178

[13] Hansard, 3d ser., CXXII, 474.

[14] English Review, XVIII (1852), p. 118.

[15] Guardian, July 7, 1852, p. 456.

[16] [Beresford-Hope], Letters on Church Matters, IV, pp. 553-554.

[17] Ibid., IV, pp. 501-502.

[18] Guardian, July 7., 1852, p. 456.

[19] Hansard, 3d ser., CXX, 1263-1278.

[20] Ibid., CXXI, 743-761.

[21] See the report in the Guardian, March 26, 1850, p. 345.

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[23] [Beresford-Hope], Letters on Church Matters, IV, p. 500.

[24] Guardian, July 21., 1852, p. 504.

[25] Ibid., December 22, 1852, p. 852.

[26] See especially the Guardian, September 22, 1852, p. 633.

[27] H.W. & I. Law, The Book of the Beresford-Hopes (London, 1925), p. 151.

[28] [Beresford-Hope], Letters on Church Matters, IV, p. 559.

[29] Guardian, December 29, 1852, p. 873 and January 19, 1853, p. 40. See also the letter from Edwin Palmer to Roundell Palmer, in Earl of Selbourne, Memorials, Part I, I, pp. 144-145.

30 [Beresford-Hope], Letters on Church Matters, IV, pp. 559-562.

31 Wilberforce to Powell, January 18., 1853. Wilberforce Papers. Bodleian Library Mss. Letter-Book II, p.6.

32 W. Palmer, A Narrative of Events connected with the Publication of the Tracts for the Times, with an Introduction and a Supplement extending to the Present Time (London, 1881), p. 256.

33 D. Newsome, 'How Soapy was Sam? A Study of Samuel Wilberforce', History Today XIII (1963), pp. 624-632. See also the letter from Wilberforce to Lord Ashley dated December 3rd., 1850, in which the Bishop makes clear that his High Church doctrines are those of the seventeenth century divines like Andrewes, and that he sees no reason why they should be incompatible with the evangelical beliefs in which he was brought up. Wilberforce Papers. Bodleian Library Mss. Letter-Book I, pp. 269-271.

34 Wilberforce to Gordon, December 29, 1852. Stanmore Papers, B.M. Add. Mss. 49210, f.9.

35 Gordon to Wilberforce, February 21, 1853, Ibid., f. 65.

36 Lord Stanmore, The Earl of Aberdeen (London, 1893), p. 108.

37 Ibid., p. 134: Gordon to Wilberforce, September 28, 1854. Stanmore Papers. B.M. Add. Mss., 49211, f. 99.

38 Gordon to Wilberforce, December 5, 1854, Ibid., f. 158.

39 J.K. Chapman, The Career of Arthur Hamilton Gordon, First Lord Stanmore, 1829-1912 (Toronto, 1964), p. 10.

40 R.P. Dod, Parliamentary Companion, q.v.

[41] D.W.R. Bahlman, "The Queen, Mr. Gladstone and Church Patronage", Victorian Studies, III (1960), pp. 349-351.

[42] See for example the frequent derogatory references to this presumed Whig trait in the Wilberforce-Gordon correspondence in the Stanmore Papers.

[43] Wilberforce to Gordon, March 11th, 1854, Ibid., B.M. Add. Mss., 49211, f. 14.

[44] Ibid., f. 12.

[45] Victoria to Aberdeen, March 11th, 1854, (transcript), Ibid., f. 7.

[46] Aberdeen to Victoria, undated (transcript). Ibid., f. 15.

[47] Wilberforce to Gordon, March 24, 1854, Ibid., f.16.

[48] Gordon to Wilberforce, March 28, 1854, Ibid., f.20.

[49] Wilberforce to Gordon, May 9th, 1854, Ibid., f.50.

[50] Rogers to Church, undated, 1849. G.E. Marindin (ed.), Letters of Frederic, Lord Blachford (London, 1896), p. 137.

[51] See the correspondence between Wilberforce and Gordon, December 18 - 24, 1854, Stanmore Papers, B.M. Add. Mss. 49211, ff. 120-134.

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[53] Wilberforce to Gordon, December 3, 1854, Ibid., B.M. Add. Mss., 49211, f. 152: Gordon to Wilberforce, December 5, 1854, Ibid., f. 158.

[54] Gordon to Wilberforce, May 5, 1853, Ibid., B.M. Add. Mss. 49210, f. 138.

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62 Ibid., August 18, 1852, p. 553.

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66 Ibid., XI (1849), p. 402.

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72 Ibid., XVII (1852), p. 340.

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CHAPTER VI

HIGH CHURCHMEN, LORD PALMERSTON AND THE CONSERVATIVE REACTION, 1855-1865

The break-up of the Coalition Government as a result of its humiliating failures in the early stages of the Crimean War and the subsequent failure of Derby to form a Conservative Administration had left Lord Palmerston with the reputation of being the one man who could now save the country. He was fortunate in that, when he became Prime Minister in January 1855, the tide was turning in favour of the allies. Victories in the Baltic and the Crimea itself meant that by March 1856 it proved possible to conclude a peace treaty entirely satisfactory for English interests. The popularity Palmerston won as a result enabled him to remain the dominating figure in political affairs until his death in 1865, apart from his temporary eclipse from power between February 1858 and June 1859.

The attitude of High Churchmen towards Palmerston was a complex one. His religious opinions were certainly not of a kind to inspire much confidence in them. His Churchmanship was very similar to his Whig contemporaries. Like them, he possessed an extreme dislike for clerical

pretensions, and he once amused and rather shocked the religiously minded House of Commons of the eighteen-fifties by expressing sentiments which recalled those made by Lord Melbourne twenty years previously:

> the clergy have so far contented themselves with being the guides, the instructors and the friends of the laity... if they should think that this enables them to assume that authoritarian interference in the affairs of private life which is too frequently assumed by the clergymen of other countries, I am afraid that they will do the greatest possible injury to the Church.[1]

Palmerston, moreover, clearly had very little interest in the religious controversies of his day, which were to occupy so much of the time and energy of a statesman like Gladstone. According to the Saturday Review, he had not been brought up to know anything about parsons[2] and his attention was so concentrated on the minutia of contemporary politics that he did not have the time to devote to such matters.[3] The most that could be said for his religious beliefs, indeed, was that they proved that "he is no bigot, that he is superior to narrow views on doctrine, that he thinks religion a good thing for those who understand it, that he is above prejudice, superstition and formalism."[4] Even a sympathetic observer as his own son-in-law, Lord Shaftesbury, could treat his religion as something of a joke:

> he does not know, in theology, Moses from Sydney Smith. The Vicar of Romsey, where he goes to church, is the only clergyman he ever spoke to: and as for the wants, the feelings, the views, the hopes and fears of the country, and particularly the religious part of it, they are as strange to him as the interior of Japan.[5]

During his first administration between 1855 and 1858, High Churchmen came to believe that Palmerston's deficiency in churchmanship was a matter of especially grave concern in his handling of church patronage. They saw little reason to doubt that it was the influence of considerations other than religious ones which persuaded the Prime Minister to confine his appointments to members of the Evangelical Party within the Church of England. In the first place, he had convinced himself that it was the popular preachers of that school who had won the favour of the now politically important middle class electorate.[6] Here it seemed to many that he had been deceived by "the noise, arrogance and presumptious claims of Exeter Hall", the London Headquarters of the Evangelicals, so that he thought it represented the public religious opinion of England.[7] Secondly, Palmerston soon made it clear that he was prepared to listen to the advice of Shaftesbury, one of the leading figures of that Party, on the exercise of his patronage, rather to his son-in-law's own surprise.[8] Palmerston's undisguised partiality for Evangelical Churchmen was all the more important since, in these three years, he had an exceptional number of vacancies amongst the bishoprics and deaneries of the Church of England to fill.[9] Even the Times, at this period one of the Prime Minister's strongest supporters, was dismayed at the result:

> we cannot deny the provocation to controversy given by the appointment of strong adherents of the Evangelical party... the basis of his administration is broad and comprehensive: so also should be his policy in all its applications... the danger is when he delegates his powers to men of narrower sympathies and less extended vision.[10]

The character of these appointments was certainly such as to dispel whatever confidence High Churchmen might have possessed in Lord Palmerston. The Anglo-Catholic Guardian was, indeed, prepared to welcome some of them, in particular Tait as Bishop of London, and Alford and Trench as Deans of Canterbury and Westminister respectively, for these were men of undoubted intellectual stature.[11] But it dismissed the new Bishop of Gloucester, Edward Baring, as a great party fanatic, a fact which it believed did much to nullify his other considerable qualities, and it had nothing but contempt for Bickersteth at Ripon and Villiers at Carlisle, both being second-rate men of no commanding eminence even amongst the extreme Evangelicals. It was prepared to admit that it had even been "led to think (strange that it should ever come to that!) that Lord John Russell would not be worse."[12] It was the same appointments which transformed the attitude of the Saturday Review towards Palmerston's Ministry. Despite being established by Beresford-Hope in 1855 as the mouth-piece of Anglo-Catholic opinion[13] the Review had nevertheless started by being a strong supporter of Palmerston due to

its admiration of his leadership at the end of the Crimean War. It now became as determined an opponent as the Guardian was. The Review was especially concerned about the low intellectual standards of the men appointed. In its opinion, the new Evangelical bishops

> did not have the largeness of sympathy and comprehensiveness of mind necessary in an age when revived religion had broken forth in various and sometimes eccentric forms. They are not on the level of the age in part of knowledge.[14]

It was prepared to argue that these ill-considered appointments had resulted in serious political consequence, and that in making them Palmerston had misjudged the opinions of the middle class electorate. It maintained in particular that the surprising loss of popularity by Palmerston after his sweeping victory in the 1857 election, which led to his parliamentary defeat over the Conspiracy to Murder bill in February 1858 was to a great extent caused by public dissatisfaction with them:

> there are very few thoughtful persons who did not feel that the late Premier's administration of ecclesiastical patronage was a proof of his personal unfitness for the highest office. Drs. Bickersteth and Villiers really cost Lord Palmerston his premiership.[15]

To balance the bitter antagonism caused by such church appointments amongst High Churchmen and the moderate Liberals, however, it is necessary to emphasize how much they did to ensure the support of Evangelicals and ultra-Protestants for Lord Palmerston's Government. The favour

shown them in the field of church patronage was the reason, in fact, which explained what was one of the more surprising phenomena of the politics of the eighteen-fifties, the sustained support of the Evangelicals, first for the Whigs and then for Palmerston's curious blend of Liberal-Conservatism, both of which, by tradition, they might have been expected to oppose. Contemporary observers were equally astounded by this development. They argued that it was especially difficult to find any rational justification for the alliance of these Churchmen with Palmerston's Government, for its policy of maintaining state-assistance to Maynooth, for example, or of refusing to impose by legislation a stricter form of Sunday Observance on the nation, was directly contrary to their most strongly held convictions. And it was ironically noted that their extreme mouth-piece, the Record, could only continue to attack the sin of Lord Derby's love of horse-racing by conveniently forgetting the stables owned by the Prime Minister.[16] It could not be denied, however, that such an alliance did exist, nor that it had considerable political value. This was made particularly clear during the controversy caused by the Arrow incident during March 1857. As a result of the Government's support for the bombardment of Canton in an attempt to force that port open to English trade, it had been defeated on a vote of censure in the House of Commons. Palmerston had then dissolved

Parliament and called a general election.

The Guardian left its readers in no doubt about its opinion of such gun-boat diplomacy. It denounced it as a flagrant example of a powerful civilized nation attempting to impose its will on a comparatively weak one. Unlike its attitude towards the Crimean War, it could see nothing 'just' in this attack on China, either in a Christian or a secular sense. It maintained that no parliamentary vote had given it greater pleasure than that which defeated the Government.[17] On the other hand, the Government was to receive the wholehearted support of Evangelicals in both Houses of Parliament on this matter. The Saturday Review emphasized that their support was contrary to the whole tradition of paternal benevolence hitherto shown by these Churchmen to other races, as shown, for example, by their missionary work and their campaign against the slave trade. It argued bitterly that they were supporting the Government irrespective of the merits of the case:

> The part taken by the Evangelical prelates and by the immense majority of their partisans in regard to the affray at Canton is the first great departure from the line of practical conduct which they have hitherto followed... the tradition derived from Wilberforce and his compeers was surrendered for a mere mess of Episcopal pottage.[18]

How far the attitude of the Evangelicals was affected by their recollection of the use made by Palmerston of his church patronage was, indeed, clearly shown by one of their

spokesmen, N.Kendall, the member for East Cornwall, during the Chinese censure debate:

> There is a party, and a very strong political party in the country, with very High Church notions. Now I believe that if there is a body of men that are likely to pull their church about their ears, it is these extreme High Churchmen. And I know, if there is one single thing more than another for which the whole community is grateful to the noble Lord at the head of the Government, it is for his episcopal appointments. I am afraid, however, that there is a very strong party in this House - strong from intellect, strong from position - who disapproves of those appointments... . If the noble Lord was removed from office, our Protestant institutions would suffer; for I am afraid that if the resolution...were carried, a party would get into power who would not evince the same Protestant feeling as the noble Lord. Sir, I have as strong a Conservative feeling as anyone in this House; but with all that Conservative feeling, if we are to have among the elements of a new Administration, men who have these extreme High Church opinions, I must say that I would rather sacrifice my Conservative feelings than see such a Government in office.[19]

The Guardian once calculated that there was about 44 such Conservatives who would be prepared to vote for Palmerston because of such reasons.[20] Certainly, in the vote at the end of the censure debate, 21 Conservatives went into the Ministerial lobby, thus preventing an even more decisive defeat for the Government.[21]

The same political alignment of Churchmen may been seen in the course of the general election which followed close on the defeat of Palmerston. The Prime Minister proved able to take full advantage of his great popularity amongst, to use Gladstone's description,

> that peculiar stamp of Churchman and of a larger body of Dissenters ... (who) though perhaps limited in the nation at large, are, when taken together, important within those zones of the community from which the reformed constituency is drawn.[22]

The result was, as Lord Robert Cecil told the House of Commons, that

> it was a matter of notoriety that the noble Lord obtained an enormous majority in the general election, because he was supposed to entertain opinions favourable to a certain religious party.[23]

Many of those who supported him attempted to make full use of this fact on their own behalf. Edward Ellice, for example, who was standing avowedly in the interest of Palmerston at Coventry, gave as one of his reasons for doing so his indebtedness

> for the appointment of earnest, zealous and efficient men in the highest places of the Church, under whose auspices we may hope for reforms and amendments in the Establishment as for the encouragement and protection of religious liberty.[24]

It was the success of such tactics that forced Disraeli to complain about the use of religious differences for political purposes because of its harmful effect on the Church.[25]

For their part, High Churchmen suffered from being identified with what to many was considered an unpatriotic opposition. This was particularly marked in the case of the Anglo-Catholics, and Sir Stafford Northcote could talk about "a hurricane of Anti-Puseyism", which ruined his chance of election for North Devon at this time.[26] Although

the final result of the general election was not, in fact, to diminish the strength of the High Church group as such in the House of Commons, since the ten defeated members were replaced by nine successful candidates, the analysis of these changes made by the Guardian showed that these new members were more moderate in their opinions than their predecessors had been. The balance of power within the group was no longer in the hands of the extreme Anglo-Catholics.[27]

This change in the nature of its parliamentary representation did nothing, however, to alleviate the antagonism of High Churchmen of all shades of opinion towards Palmerston's Government. The Prime Minister, for his part, appeared to go out of his way to enrage their feelings. This was most apparent in his evident determination in the second session of 1857 to make full use of his greatly increased majority in order to force through Parliament a measure of divorce law reform which attacked their most cherished convictions. At one stage in the debate, Palmerston told his opponents who were complaining of the little time allowed the House of Commons after its arrival from the House of Lords in the last week of July, that he was quite prepared to keep the House sitting until September if they insisted on a full discussion of all its details.[28] This was understood as a threat to force the bill through

against all opposition; and Gladstone, reviewing the events of the session for the Quarterly Review, maintained that such behavior on the part of the Prime Minister was that of a dictator, and must result in the destruction of the authority of Parliament.[29] It was Gladstone himself who, after bitterly opposing the introduction and second reading of the bill, fought it clause by clause through its committee stage during the first weeks of August, and was only forced finally to abandon the struggle by the news of the death of his sister.

This controversy over the Divorce bill is worth examining in detail because it illustrates the reasons why both Anglo-Catholics and the Protestant High Churchmen were once again united by their opposition to the Government and why even so they still proved such an ineffectual force in Parliament in these years. They were unable to deny the need for some measure of reform. Even those who most strongly condemned the Government's proposals had to admit that the existing procedure for obtaining a divorce was certainly a most illogical one. The ecclesiastical courts, who had the responsibility in this matter, were empowered to grant a full annulment of marriage only to those couples who were either physically incapable of consummating it, or else came within those degrees of consanguinity prohibited by canon law which were still embodied in the Church of England Prayer Book.

For acts of gross cruelty or of adultery, on the other hand, the courts were able to grant, not such a divorce a vinculo matrimonii, but rather one a mensa et thoro, which had the effect of releasing the parties 'from the burdens and obligations of matrimony'. Nevertheless, the custom had developed that any person who had been able to obtain such a divorce a mensa et thoro, and had also succeeded in an action for damages for criminal conversation in a civil court, could petition Parliament to pass a private act for permission to enter into a new marriage. In the original form of these acts, it had always been insisted that a provision should be introduced, forbidding the marriage of the guilty parties, but it had now become customary to strike out such clauses when the bill was discussed in committee. It was calculated that since the first of these acts was passed in 1550, between two hundred and two hundred and fifty had been carried, five during the 1857 session alone. There had, moreover, been no recorded opposition to their passage through the House of Lords by any of the Bishops since 1703.[30]

Public opinion was, therefore, agreed on the whole for the need for some radical change in a system which benefitted only those who could afford the heavy expense of passing an act through Parliament. A writer in the Edinburgh Review estimated that the cost of such a private

act would be at least a thousand or twelve hundred pounds, and noted the widespread demand for a measure based on "justice, good policy and humanity" in order to correct a system by which "four or five wealthy individuals every year were able to obtain relief from domestic grievances by purchasing, as it were, an Act of Parliament".[31] The matter had, indeed, been prominently before the public since 1853, when a commission had produced a report recommending that adultery should be made a cause for the complete annulment of a marriage. Gladstone was later to call this report an "ill-omened document", in which the authors "have not only not sounded the depths of this great question, but they can scarcely be said to have even attempted an investigation of its social, much less its religious aspects."[32] At that time, however, the Coalition Government, of which Gladstone was a member, produced a bill which would have put into effect the recommendations of the committee, a fact that was to be brought up against Gladstone when he was leading the opposition to Palmerston's similar measure. The pressure on the time of Parliament caused by the Crimean War, however, forced the abandonment of this early attempt to settle the matter. No further action was taken until the 1856 parliamentary session, in which Palmerston, as the new Prime Minister, made his first attempt to carry a measure of reform through Parliament, only to be defeated

in the House of Lords over an important amendment introduced by Bishop Wilberforce, which would have prevented the remarriage of the guilty parties.

The leading part played by Wilberforce in bringing about the rejection of the Government's proposals emphasized the growing dismay felt by High Churchmen for them, which was to inspire their sustained and bitter opposition the following year. Although they did not deny the need to reform the existing system, these Churchmen believed that the process should be made more difficult rather than easier, and that its consequences should bear heavier on all the parties involved. This was due in part to the fear of the social effect of divorce, the break-up of family life, the inevitable deterioration in the moral character of the citizen.[33] Even more important from their point of view were the religious implications behind this controversy. It confirmed, in particular, their conviction in the close alliance between Palmerston and the Evangelicals in the Church of England. The Evangelicals were prepared to support the proposed reform by arguing that it was justified by the Protestant doctrine that marriage was not a sacrament, and that divorce on just grounds was sanctioned by Scripture.[34] Such arguments were completely unacceptable to High Churchmen who maintained "old Popish doctrine of the indissolubility of marriage", and the in their turn sought eagerly for

relevant biblical texts to justify their opinions.[35]

High Church criticism of the proposed divorce bill was expressed most eloquently and fervantly during the lengthy debates in both Houses of Parliament. As a result, Palmerston saw the need to compromise over certain points at issue, in particular giving clergymen the right of refusing to officiate at the remarriage of guilty parties if they had conscientious objections to doing so. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister always retained control over the struggle for the main principles at stake. It seemed clear that his contention that divorce was now an accepted fact in English life, and thus, on grounds of equity, must be made available to all classes within the community, was supported by a large majority of both parties in Parliament. The readiness of a considerable number of Conservatives to vote in favour of a measure to which Evangelical opinion was now so committed does much to illustrate the strength of that opinion within the Party.

As a result, therefore, High Churchmen had to realize that, in spite of the advantage of Gladstone's skilful and determined leadership, they were unable to offer any effective opposition to the passage of a measure which they believed essentially harmful to the spiritual nature of the Church of England, and the religious welfare of the community. To a great extent, this was due to the fact that, on this matter at least, Palmerston could appeal to the

dominant Protestant sympathies of the House of Commons. In part, however, it was due to the failure of High Church members of Parliament to subject themselves to the discipline necessary for successful parliamentary action. Palmerston had, in fact, only to prolong the debate until August for Gladstone to see the majority of his supporters, who were in the main country members, enticed away from the Commons by the more engrossing pursuits of their estates.[36] The almost complete victory of the Prime Minister in this controversy over divorce law reform did much to end once and for all the hopes held by some extreme High Churchmen that they could form an effective pressure group of their own in Parliament independent of all party connection. It made it imperative that they should now decide their relations to the two major political groups if they wished to be able to exercise any decisive influence in the future.

As a result of their anger both at the contents of Palmerston's Divorce Act and also at what they considered his dictatorial methods of overriding their opposition to it, High Churchmen were naturally pleased by the defeat of his Government on the second reading of the Conspiracy to Murder bill on February 19th., 1858. Many people considered this measure, which imposed stronger restrictions on political refugees in England after the failure of an

attempted assassination of Napoleon III which the French claimed had been plotted in London, as an humiliation to national pride. There was general satisfaction, therefore, when the Government, accepting their defeat as a vote of censure, resigned the following day. It was replaced by a Conservative Ministry under the leadership of Derby and Disraeli, which was, as in 1852, in a minority in the House of Commons. Its fifteen months of office, however, proved far from inglorious, and in the general election held in May 1859 the Conservatives succeeded in gaining about thirty seats. This was, nevertheless, not sufficient to provide them with a majority, and they had to give way to a new Liberal Government, once again under the premiership of Lord Palmerston.

High Churchmen naturally saw with dismay the return to office of a Prime Minister whose policy in religious matters they had so bitterly opposed in his previous Administration. This appeared to them all the more serious because they believed it to coincide with the arrival of a new crisis for the Church of England. This was caused by the religious revival, essentially protestant in nature, which had originated in the United States and had swept through the British Isles during 1858.[37] One result had been to create an aggressive spirit amongst the Dissenting sects, whose self-confidence was bolstered by their

increasing membership. They were now prepared to challenge both in Parliament and in the country every manifestation of the privileged position of the Church of England, which remained so distasteful to them. Many High Churchmen believed that this agitation was part of a conspiracy engineered by the Liberation Society, consisting of the extreme 'political Dissenters', for the purpose of making an end, once and for all, of the Establishment itself. They justified their suspicions by quoting the hostile statements made by Samuel Morley and Dr. Foster in their attack on the Church before a select committee of the House of Lords in 1859.[38] This had convinced the Guardian that the Dissenters now wanted not equality but ascendancy in religious matters, that they were in fact fighting to destroy the Established Church rather than merely seeking relief from specific burdens.[39]

High Churchmen were concerned, therefore, to defend the Church of England against a determined external attack, but they did not believe that this was the only, or even the gravest danger threatening the Church at this time. They were aware that the Protestant revival had exercised great influence over the minds of many Anglicans themselves, and that, as a result, there was growing hostility within the Church against any evidence of high church practices. This was shown most clearly by the violent riots provoked by

the attempts of the Rev. Bryan King to introduce catholic forms of service into his Church of St. George's in the East. However they might disagree with King's action, High Churchmen could not but be concerned by the failure of both the new Home Secretary in Palmerston's Ministry, Sir George Grey, and the Bishop of London, Tait, to protect him against the 'Protestant' mob. Tait, in particular, seemed content to leave the responsibility in the hands of the churchwardens, men who had already proved that they disapproved of the ritualistic practices of their Rector as much as the rioters did.[40] This did much to destroy the confidence hitherto felt by High Churchmen in the Bishop. His had been almost the only appointment made by Palmerston that had won their approval, because they felt that he was a man of great intellectual distinction who was anxious to remain separate from all the church parties. Now they were to remember the more objectionable events in his career, in particular the leading part he had played in the condemnation of Tract 90 in 1841, and that he had been chosen to succeed Dr. Arnold as headmaster of Rugby the following year. It appeared, indeed, that Tait had inherited Arnold's ambition of making the Church of England a truly national one, and was seeking to do this by strengthening the Protestant element within it so as to persuade the Dissenting sects to rejoin it.[41]

In 1859, High Churchmen had thus convinced themselves that there was a widespread campaign both within and without the Church aimed against their principles of churchmanship. With their memories of the partiality he had previously shown towards the Evangelicals, it was not surprising in these circumstances that they viewed the prospect of a long tenure of power by Palmerston with considerable trepidation. Nor were their fears much allayed by the decision of such acknowledged and devoted Churchmen as Sidney Herbert, the Duke of Newcastle and Gladstone to take office in the new Government. It seemed to many of them that these politicians had done so much more for reasons of political expediency than in order to protect the interests of the Church. They reserved their judgement on the prediction of the Guardian that the three men would be able to exercise the same beneficial influence on church policy as they had as members of Lord Aberdeen's Coalition in 1853 and 1854.[42]

In this time of developing crisis as they saw it, High Churchmen once again returned to their belief in the necessity for combining amongst themselves to defend their principles. Now they were to enjoy a much greater success than had the promoters of the earlier efforts to do so during the eighteen-thirties and after 1850. The last major survivor of the older associations, the London Church

Union, had indeed maintained a precarious existence despite the split amongst its members caused by the Papal Aggression crisis of 1851, but its failure to act effectively in the first stage of the dispute over ritualism had finally destroyed whatever confidence High Churchmen still possessed in it. As a result, a group of these Churchmen, including the redoubtable Archdeacon Denison, founded in May 1859 the Church of England Protection Society. This quickly established its reputation by its spirited defence of the two High Church martyrs, the Rev. A. Poole and the Rev. Bryan King, against their condemnation by Bishop Tait. The Hon. Colin Lindsay, President of the Manchester Church Union, was so impressed by the initiative shown by the new Society that he proposed that it should make itself responsible for co-ordinating in future the work of the surviving Unions throughout the country. Lindsay suggested that this could be best done by allowing their chairmen and secretaries to become ex-officio members of the Society's committee of management. Furthermore, the Society itself should organize branch associations in every diocese so as to ensure that it became the centre of a countrywide movement. Its primary objects should be to defend and maintain unimpaired the doctrine and discipline of the Church, and to afford counsel and protection to all its members who were suffering unjust persecution because of their beliefs. These proposals were

adopted at the first annual meeting of the Society held on May 2nd 1860, when it was also decided to change its name to the English Church Union and to nominate Lindsay as President. The E.C.U. was henceforth to provide a most effective organization for High Churchmen, thus at long last fulfilling the hopes of the Rev. William Palmer who had first suggested such a scheme only to see it collapse due to the dissension amongst High Churchmen themselves caused by the Papal Aggression crisis.[43]

It seemed, therefore, that in 1860 High Churchmen were in a much stronger position to establish a common front towards the religious and political problems of the day than ever before. Once again, this appearance of unity was to prove a delusion. This was especially so as a result of the attitude they developed to the Government of Lord Palmerston.

There was indeed a marked change in their appreciation of the Prime Minister himself which made it very different from the bitter hostility they had previously shown towards him. In his handling of secular matters at least, many of them began to recognize the great qualities he possessed beneath his bluff, genial exterior. By 1862, the Guardian acknowledged that his statesmanship was a kind of instinct, that he alone could understand what the country wanted and what it needed.[44] Even the Church and State

Review, in many ways the most prominent representative in this period of the authoritarian side of High Churchmanship, could express patriotic pride in the identification of Palmerston with the cause of national freedom abroad.[45] This journal was to find his social principles even more congenial. In domestic affairs, the Prime Minister was to prove himself essentially conservative in his attitude towards such matters as parliamentary reform and the extension of the franchise.[46] As the Saturday Review expressed it, he had shown that it was possible to remain a Liberal without having any propensity for revolution.[47] He was, in fact,

> the special representative not only of those who value law, order and the maintenance of constitutional authority but also of those who dread organic change.[48]

Besides establishing himself as a symbol of social order and stability, Palmerston gave High Churchmen in the years of his second Ministry another important reason for reversing their judgement of him. This was the manner in which he dealt with the question of church patronage, which had previously been a particularly grievous source of concern to them. It was because of their anxiety about this matter that they watched the character of his appointments with such great interest. It was true that the first of these did little to mollify their discontent. The choice of Samuel Waldegrave as Bishop of Carlisle was especially distasteful to them, as he managed to combine in himself their

two pet aversions by being both a Whig and an Evangelical. It appeared to confirm that the Prime Minister was still under the influence of his son-in-law, Lord Shaftesbury, in this matter. The Guardian was most severe in its condemnation of such appointments because they would inevitably lower the standard of the episcopal bench; it maintained that

> whoever wishes to save the English Church from passing wholly into the hands of a narrow, unlearned and intolerant sect is entitled...to give the Government a thick and thin opposition.[49]

Even so, a correspondent to the paper could suggest that this judgement showed a failure on the part of the Guardian to understand the fundamental change in the contemporary religious situation. No longer, as in the eighteen-fifties, did the main threat to the Church come from the Evangelicals, but rather from the theological liberalism which was gaining strength amongst its members, a danger which had been made so clear in 1860 by the publication of the controversial Essays and Reviews. As a result, it was far better to have even men like Waldegrave as bishops of the Church than Jowett or Rowland Williams or Maurice, the leading representatives of this school.[50]

However this might be, the public remained convinced that the Prime Minister would continue to exercise his patronage in favour of the Evangelicals within the Church, and when J.B. Sumner died on September 6th, 1862, it was confidently assumed that the new Archbishop of Canterbury

would again be chosen from that party. Bishop Wilberforce, indeed, was so certain of this that he urged Gladstone to use whatever influence he might possess in the Cabinet to press the claims of the late Archbishop's brother, Charles, Bishop of Winchester. Although Charles Sumner was an acknowledged leading figure among the Evangelicals, he had made clear his determination to maintain the existing status quo in the Church, and his appointment would thus provoke little anger in the other church parties.[51] Much to his surprise, Gladstone replied that he had already strongly recommended to Palmerston that the Archbishop of York, Charles Longley, should succeed Sumner. Wilberforce agreed that this would be indeed an excellent choice, Longley being a man "of peace and holiness, with a steady adherence to church principles".[52] When the appointment was confirmed on October 11th., the Saturday Review also welcomed it enthusiastically, for it believed that Longley possessed many important qualifications for the position, being "a scholar without pendantry, a High Churchman without bigotry, active without fussiness, sober yet not apatehtic." The Review was convinced that the choice of Longley marked a most significant change in Palmerston's attitude in these matters. He had now escaped from the influence of both the Record newspaper and of Lord Shaftesbury, and he was prepared now to rely on his own judgement. It might be

expected that further appointments would no longer be restricted to clergymen of small learning, whose only qualifications were that they came from good families.[53]

For his part, Bishop Wilberforce believed that the selection of Longley proved that Gladstone was in fact exercising more influence over church patronage than most people and hitherto realized.[54] He was naturally most anxious to persuade Gladstone to urge his own claims to succeed Longley at York. To his dismay, Gladstone told him that he was unable to give his unqualified support to this suggestion. He was concerned especially about the way in which Wilberforce had become identified with an uncompromising defence of the interests of the Church. Gladstone believed that the great religious problem of the time was the settlement of the outstanding difficulties in church-state relations, and that the Government, as a result, might fairly favour as leaders of the Church those men who had proved they were prepared to deal with this in a statesmanlike manner. He would find it most difficult to convince Palmerston that Wilberforce possessed these necessary qualifications, nor did he feel completely justified in making the attempt.[55] Despite Wilberforce's spirited defence of himself against this criticism, recalling in particular the assistance he had given the Coalition Government over the Canadian Clergy Reserves and the Oxford University Reform Acts, which had

lost him considerable popularity amongst extreme High Churchmen.[56] Gladstone remained unconvinced that he would ever be ready to damage his reputation by advocating a policy of moderate concessions. Because of Gladstone's silence, Palmerston had no diffidence in selecting William Thomson, an Evangelical and the youngest bishop on the bench, to follow Longley as Archbishop of York. The only consolation that Wilberforce received was that the Saturday Review saw this as a confirmation of its belief that the Church of England would never appreciate the qualities of leadership that the Bishop had proved himself to possess.[57]

Whatever might have been Wilberforce's personal disappointment, however, High Churchmen from now on began to regard the appointments made by Palmerston with much more satisfaction. In 1865, the Guardian printed the lengthy list of these, with the comment that at least none of the later ones had caused any scandal.[58] It was the most revered of the leading Anglo-Catholics, Pusey, who provided the most striking example of the transformation of their opinion in this matter. In May 1865, he told the readers of the Guardian how much the Prime Minister had deserved their gratitude by his exercise of church patronage,[59] and when in the following October Palmerston was finally removed from office by death, Pusey could write to Gladstone, most surprisingly if considered in the light

of his previous views, that

> Churchmen of all sorts much regret Lord Palmerston, because we had confidence that his ecclesiastical appointments would be religious men and believers. We wish we could trust Lord Russell, but our only hope, under God, is in your influence.[60]

In the course of his Administration between 1859 and 1865, High Churchmen lost much of their hostility towards Palmerston as an individual. Most of them remained unconvinced, nevertheless, that they should support the Government of which he was Prime Minister, They had strong reservations especially about the manner in which it had handled the two major religious crises of these years, the controversy over the publication of Essays and Reviews in 1860 and the sustained challenge made by the Dissenters against the privileged position of the Established Church. In both cases, High Churchmen believed that the Government had acted against the best interests of the Church of England.

Essays and Reviews consisted of seven long essays by seven different authors, all except one being clergymen of the Church of England, and all men of growing reputation within it, especially Frederick Temple, the future Archbishop of Canterbury. Although the contributors denied that they had collaborated in planning the contents of the volume, it was clear that they shared a common purpose in the attempt to reconcile the truths of the Christian religion with the scientific discoveries and philosophical developments of

the day. In doing so, they appeared prepared to subject religious doctrine and dogma to the test of rational inquiry, a process that was to more orthodox Churchmen completely irreligious and even atheistic in nature. As a result, in February 1861, the Archbishop of Canterbury was persuaded to issue a letter censuring the book, albeit in studiously vague terms, and proceedings were started against the two beneficed contributors, Rowland Williams and Henry Wilson, in their own dioceses. Benjamin Jowett, subject as a member of Oxford University to academic and not to clerical discipline, was penalized for the part he had played by the refusal of the University authorities to provide an adequate stipend for his work as Professor of Greek, a refusal they maintained until 1865. The case against Williams and Wilson was taken through successively higher church courts, in each of which their condemnation for heresy was sustained, but finally, in February 1864, the charge was dismissed by the highest court of appeal, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Convocation then took it upon itself to make completely clear the position of the Church by denouncing the collection of essays for containing teaching contrary to its teaching, but such a condemnation could have little practical effect on the authors if they wished to disregard it.[61]

The impact made by the publication of Essays and Reviews on high church opinion was as great as that of the

Gorham affair ten years earlier. The same issue was at stake, the need to define how far the authority of the Church could limit freedom of thought amongst its members over matters of doctrine and dogma. The threat came now, however, not from the Evangelicals but from the so-called Broad Churchmen. The fear of the growing influence of these Churchmen, which had been aroused by the action of Bishop Tait during the St. George's in the East riots, appeared confirmed, even although Tait himself was to join his fellow bishops in condemning the collection. The older generation of Anglo-Catholics remembered once again the events of the eighteen-thirties, when they had so bitterly denounced the Liberal theology of Hampden and Arnold. Pusey, in particular, believed that it was vital to reunite High Churchmen of all shades of opinion with the Evangelicals in order to save the Church.[62] Even the Guardian, which had previously supported so strongly the alliance between the Anglo-Catholic and Liberal Oxford dons, including Jowett himself, in the struggle to reform that University, joined in the attack on the Essayists. It was most anxious to make clear that in doing so it was not helping to revive the spirit of persecution and authoritarianism within the Church. It felt nevertheless that the opinions expressed in the book were such as could not be condoned, just as Henry Wilson, now under censure, had thought it necessary to join his fellow

Oxford Tutors in condemning Tract 90 in 1841.[63]

The controversy over Essays and Reviews, by reviving their doubts over the theological liberalism of the period, did much to force the Anglo-Catholics to reappraise their relationship with the Liberals. They were also to share the suspicion felt by High Churchmen in general that Palmerston's Government, which depended on liberal support in the House of Commons, could never act in the best interests of the Church in this matter. They were especially alarmed, as they had been in 1850, by the failure of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to uphold the judgements of the ecclesiastical courts. It was felt by many that this essentially secular institution must have been in some manner under the influence of the Government when it reached a decision so contrary to the wishes of the Church.

High Churchmen were even more angered by the pliable attitude adopted by the Government in the face of the aggressive campaign mounted by the Dissenters against the remaining privileges enjoyed by the Established Church. They believed that this was proof of the "absolute command" now exercised by the political Dissenters over the Cabinet and the Liberal Party, and which was the result of their great influence within the borough electorate.[64] Their fears appeared justified when, after Palmerston had taken office in 1859, both he and Lord John Russell announced for the

first time their support for the abolition of church rates. And although by 1861, because of his appreciation of the growing opposition to the proposal, Palmerston was no longer prepared to make it a government measure, it still remained true that the great majority of Liberals in the House of Commons voted in favour of the now annual attempt to abolish the rates. In 1863, Sir George Grey, the Home Secretary, spoke strongly in support of a bill which would have allowed Dissenters to be buried in parish churchyards with their own religious services and not those of the Church of England read over their remains. The same year, with the approval of the Government, the House of Commons adopted a measure abolishing the obligation imposed on Dissenters elected to municipal offices to make a declaration that they would never use their authority to injure or weaken the Established Church in any way. High Churchmen could never accept the contention of the Government that it was now essential to remove these specific grievances which, however minor they might appear to Anglicans, caused immense bitterness among the Dissenters. Instead they were convinced that the Government was weakly surrendering to a determined attempt to reduce the national Church to the status of a sect.[65] Their belief in the ability of the Dissenters to exercise political blackmail in this way over the Government seemed confirmed by the failure of J.D. Coleridge, standing in the Liberal interests, to retain a safe

seat at Exeter in a bye-election in August 1864. The defeat of Coleridge, a man of Anglo-Catholic opinions, was undeniably due to the abstention of one hundred and thirty Dissenters, who refused to vote because he would not pledge his support for the total abolition of church rates, thus allowing the Conservative candidate to win by a majority of twenty-six.[66]

Most High Churchmen would now see little hope that Palmerston's Government, so dependent on the electoral support of the Nonconformists, could be anything but the enemy of the Church of England. It was the Protestant High Church Church and State Review which expressed this conclusion most forcibly when it deplored

> the readiness of the chiefs of the once great Whig party, so full of anxious care for the Church of England in 1688, to sacrifice alike their principles and predelictions for the sake of gaining the support of a revolutionary faction by the help of whose votes they might perpetuate themselves in power.[67]

One correspondent of the Guardian did indeed still find it possible to maintain that a Liberal could still be a good Churchman, giving as his justification the examples of W.P. Wood and Robert Phillimore. This argument was rejected by that paper on the grounds that the two were completely incompatible, since "modern Liberalism is uncatholic and narrow minded, forever taking rights and privileges from the Church without giving anything in compensation."[68] Lord

Amberley, although in no sense an orthodox member of the Church, was to express the general opinion when he wrote:

> it is useless for Liberal Churchmen to profess their warm attachment to (the) interests (of the Church). It is quite evident that the Party as a whole are not animated by that zeal for the good of the Church, which, however unwisely it may be shown, is certainly a genuine possession of the orthodox Conservatives.[69]

Despite the fact that their admiration and approval of Palmerston himself steadily increased during the six years of his second term of office, High Churchmen of all shades of opinion were therefore to become more and more hostile towards the Government of which he was Prime Minister. Their belief that its policy was far too 'liberal' to be in the best interests of the Church of England formed part of what has been called the conservative reaction of this period.[70] The fear of the growing influence of latitudinarian religion on the one hand, and aggressive Dissent on the other had persuaded many High Churchmen of the need to take a more reactionary stand in defence of their principles. It remains to be seen how far this change in their attitude proved of benefit to the Conservative Party itself. Was Lord Robert Cecil correct when he stated as a self-evident truth that "every Churchman must be a good Conservative, and every Conservative a good Churchman"?[71]

When he came to describe the condition of the Church

of England in 1865, Cecil himself had little doubt that the religious controversies of the mid-century could, at least in part, be explained in political terms:

> the struggl of the last fifteen years between the Church and her enemies has within the walls of the House of Commons taken simply the form of a struggle between Conservatives and Liberals. Everything that could injure the Church has been supported by the Liberals, and each attack has only be.foiled by the compact front presented by the Conservatives.[72]

But although most of his fellow High Churchmen would have agreed with his condemnation of the Liberal Party, by no means all would have shared his confidence in the Conservatives.

After the fall of the Derby Ministry in December 1852, indeed, the Conservative Party had done little to win the confidence of the Anglo-Catholics while succeeding at the same time in alienating the goodwill of the Protestant High Churchmen. The Anglo-Catholics found especially repellant the two varieties of religious opinion which, in some form or another, were held by the majority of Lord Derby's followers. In the first place, many of them were still possessed by an excessive fear of Roman Catholicism, which expressed itself in an extreme Low Churchmanship. For some, like Lord Shaftesbury, this was a matter of principle, but for the majority it took the form of an atavistic 'No Popery' sentiment that was based on prejudice rather than reason.[73] Roundell Palmer noted this phenomenon with

considerably dismay; as he told Arthur Gordon,

> it is evident that Spoonerism and Puritanism, the spirit of the Standard and Morning Herald, and of the National Club have affected a permanent lodging in the Conservative body from which there is no hope of ejecting them.

It was this that had made it impossible for him to rejoin that Party after the fall of the Coalition in 1855.[74] For their part, these Conservative 'Puritans' could never forget their hatred of the Tractarians and the Puseyites, whom they saw as acting as a fifth column on behalf of the Papacy within the Church of England itself. It was on Gladstone, the political leader of the second generation of the Anglo-Catholics, that their enemity was chiefly concentrated. This was to prove the major obstacle that prevented Lord Derby from bringing that statesman back into the Conservative fold as he hoped. Edward Cardwell once calculated that over one hundred of Derby's followers would withdraw their support if he attempted a political combination with Gladstone.[75]

The second dominant form of churchmanship held by many Conservatives during this period was a strongly erastian conception of the place of the Church itself in the community. Beresford-Hope, indeed, believed that they were unable to see in the Anglican Church anything more than

> a mere 'Protestant Establishment', 'the Law Church' as the Dissenters are pleased to call it - deriving its existence from statute, and looking up to its ultimate source of jurisdiction and of doctrine also to the supremacy of the 'Supreme Head'.

It was this that made it impossible for them to have any conception of the Church of England as a true branch of the Catholic Church, which was able to demand the allegiance of its members on the grounds of its Apostolic nature.[76] For the Guardian, the maintenance of such principles brought back memories of the Tory erastianism which had been so closely identified with the names of Lord Liverpool and Lord Eldon in the eighteen-twenties, and which had proved so disastrous for the Church at that time.[77]

These religious principles of anti-Popery on the one hand and erastianism on the other proved to be two of the most powerful elements in the thinking of the Conservative Party of the mid-nineteenth century. They did much to shape that special character which was to make it obnoxious to Anglo-Catholic opinion as a whole, even although not preventing some of these High Churchmen, such as Sir William Heathcote or Lord Robert Cecil, from continuing to describe themselves as Conservatives.[78]

The Protestant High Churchmen, because of their still strong belief in the virtues of the traditional Constitution in Church and State, found these principles far less repellant. They had, indeed, been able to form an effective alliance with those who held them during the controversy over the increased grant to Maynooth in 1845. What these Churchmen disliked most about the Conservative Party during

the eighteen-fifties was rather the steadily growing influence of Disraeli within it. For, like many of their contemporaries, they were constantly being bewildered and enraged by the religious opinions expressed by that statesman. In particular, they found most objectionable the fact that Disraeli, although baptised into the Church of England, never disguised his admiration and pride in the great achievments of his Jewish ancestors. He always remained convinced that the Jews were literally a chosen people who had been entrusted with the task of securing the moral salvation of mankind. The hope of the gentile races, therefore, depended on their success in establishing institutions which could enshrine the eternal truths which were known intuitively by the Jews.[79] Disraeli believed that the Anglican Church might prove such an institution:

> resting on the Church of Jerusalem, modified by the divine school of Galilee, it would have founded that rock of truth which Providence, by the instrumentality of the Semetic race, has promised to St. Peter.[80]

Disraeli had no diffidence in making these opinions, most unpalatable to English Churchmen of all shades of opinion, widely known by expounding them in his popular biography of Lord George Bentinck. As a result, the Protestant High Churchmen were especially apprehensive that Disraeli, if returned to office, would use his authority to settle once and for all the controversial issue of Jewish disabilities,

and in doing so, seriously weaken the connection between the State and the Established Church.

Despite the defeat of Lord John Russell's proposed bill in 1848, the campaign for Jewish emancipation had been pressed with considerable determination in the following years. In 1853 Russell, now Foreign Secretary in Lord Aberdeen's Coalition Government, attempted to carry a new Disabilities Bill through Parliament, but the attempt to do so provided a clear illustration of his difficult relationship with the Peelite High Churchmen at this time. Although he won the support of the Prime Minister himself, hitherto a strong opponent, for the measure, one of the junior ministers, Lord A. Hervey, continued to vote against it, and it took all of Aberdeen's tact to placate Russell.[81] The Bill, in fact, secured a majority in the Commons, but was once again rejected by the Lords. The following year Russell changed his tactics, attempting to achieve his purpose by proposing a new parliamentary oath that would no longer include the words 'on the true faith of a Christian', the barrier which prevented Jews from taking their seats in the Commons. But as it was also proposed to remove the special oath for Roman Catholics which had been laid down by the Catholic Emancipation Act, the bill met strong resistance from the Conservatives, and was rejected by a narrow margin by the Commons.

In 1857, Palmerston made a similar attempt to rephrase the oath in such a manner that would have incidentally allowed

Jews to take it without making this the declared purpose of the change, thus hoping to avoid controversy over the principle involved. Because he was now careful not to link this reform with further concessions for Roman Catholics, and because he was prepared to accept safeguards which would have prevented Jews from exercising ecclesiastical patronage attached to any government office to which they might be appointed, Palmerston succeeded in carrying his measure through the Commons. The great majority of the Conservative Party still nevertheless continued their determined resistance to the proposal, and they were greatly pleased by the leading part played by Lord Derby in the rejection of the Government's bill by the House of Lords. At the same time, Disraeli showed no reluctance to prove how far out of sympathy with the opinion of his Party he was on this matter by voting in support of Palmerston.

Because of the large majority in favour of the proposed bill in the House of Commons, its rejection by the Lords could not now be taken as the final settlement of the matter. Consequently, although Palmerston was unable to allocate any further government time to it, Lord John Russell acting as a private member introduced a new bill which would have retained the existing oath, but have given the Commons the right if it so desired to omit the crucial words 'on the true faith of a Christian' from the oath when it was

tendered to a Jewish member. This bill passed quickly through the formal stages in the Commons, receiving little opposition. In the committee stage, it was nevertheless discussed at some length, but a final attempt to have the relief clause omitted was defeated by a vote of 297 to 144. It reached the Lords early in April after Derby had replaced Palmerston as Prime Minister. Derby was prepared to allow the bill to pass its second reading in that House, because it included a necessary reform of the parliamentary oath itself by removing the many archaic sentiments still included, thus making it less obnoxious to, and more binding on the conscience of those subscribing to it. At the same time, he reserved the right to oppose in committee the particular clause dealing with the problem of the Jews, and on April 23rd, this clause was duly rejected by 119 to 80.

The House of Commons was placed in a much stronger position than previously by Derby's agreement to pass the bill and merely strike out the offending clause. It was now possible for its members to state formally their reasons for disagreeing with the Lord's amendment. It was decided to set up a committee to prepare their case, and Thomas Duncombe proposed that Rothschild, although not yet sworn in as a member of Parliament, should be invited to join it. This proposal was carried on May 11th, the vote showing clearly the division between the members of the Conservative

Administration over this issue. Of the members of the Cabinet in the Commons, Disraeli, Pakington and Derby's son, Edward Stanley, voted for the majority: Henley, Manners, Sir Johathan Peel and Spencer Walpole for the minority. Of the junior ministers, only Sir Frederick Kelly was amongst the majority, Sir Hugh Cairns, C.B. Adderley, Sir E. Hayes, J.B. Mowbray and J. Whiteside voting against the proposal.[82]

This evidence of a split amongst the leaders of the Conservative Party weakened Derby's position when the Lords prepared to consider the report of the Common's committee at the end of May. He was all the more ready, therefore, to accept the compromise suggested by Lord Lucan that either House might be given power to modify the form of oath to be taken by its newly elected members by a special resolution to meet individual cases. While maintaining that he had in no way changed his opinion, Derby conceded that this might prove "a very obvious and very plausible solution of the difficulty", though he would have to be given time in order to consider it.[83] The Liberal leader in the Lords, the Earl of Granville, persuaded his supporters not to force an immediate decision on to Derby, as he realized that the Prime Minister might now be prepared to compromise in this matter.

On July 1st., Derby announced his unwilling support for Lord Lucan's proposal. He acknowledged the force of the argument that there had been no violent public reaction against

this proposed solution, and he conceded that it was essential to bring both Houses of Parliament into accord as soon as possible. Nevertheless, he was concerned to make clear that he still did not consider it expedient to admit Jews to Parliament, and later in the same evening, he expressed his great regret at having to desert those who had previously supported him in the opposition to it.[84] The second reading on the bill introduced by Lord Lucan was carried through the Lords by a majority of 143 to 97. By the end of July it had become law. Its passage through the Commons was not, however, merely a formal one; a determined opposition of between fifty and sixty Conservatives resisted both its first and second reading, and this included the four Cabinet Ministers, despite their Prime Minister's support for it in the Upper House. Their sentiments were most bitterly expressed by S. Warren. He maintained that there now seemed no principles that the leaders of his Party considered worth defending, not even the connection between Church and State, and he went on:

> I have a great admiration for Lord Derby, but the Conservative Party is greatly shocked by the step which has now been taken... . It may even lead, for aught I know, to new political combinations and effect not only temporary but permanent changes in the relations of parties.[85]

That it should have been a Conservative Government which took the final step that permitted Jews to sit in the House of Commons also did much to complete the disillusionment

of the Protestant High Churchmen with that Party. The fact that it adopted a policy so contrary to their most strongly held principles apparently confirmed the worst fears of these Churchmen about the growing influence of Disraeli within that Government. As a result, they had like the Anglo-Catholics, albeit for different reasons, lost their confidence in the Conservatives as the defenders of the Church of England. One of the most partisan Conservative High Churchmen of the next decade, Frederick Lygon, when he looked back at the events of this period, was forced to admit that during it the Church had in fact been completely estranged from the Tories, to the manifest disadvantage of both.[96] It would seem, therefore, that that Party was in a poor position to derive any benefit for itself from the growing discontent felt by High Churchmen for Palmerston's Government in the years after 1859.

Disraeli was, nevertheless, too experienced a politician not to appreciate the political advantage he might gain from this development. He was especially impressed by the transformation in public opinion brought about by the long drawn-out struggle over the church rates, which was undoubtedly for most High Churchmen "the great domestic question of the day".[87] They believed that the campaign being now fought so fiercely by the Dissenters for their abolition was clear evidence of their new spirit of aggression

against the Established Churches. In its early stages, however, there seemed little possibility of preventing its success. The Dissenters appeared, indeed, to have won the decisive victory in 1853, when, after a lengthy legal battle, the House of Lords, as the highest court of appeal, finally judged in favour of the non-conformist majority amongst the parishioners of Baintree in Essex that the Churchwardens did not have the right to levy a rate with the consent of the minority only. In the next four years, 1525 parishes had taken advantage of this judgement by refusing to levy a rate.

This development had apparently created a situation in which the system of church rates could finally be abolished. Early in February 1858, Sir John Trelawny introduced a bill into the House of Commons to abolish them, and on February 17th., two days before the downfall of Palmerston's first Ministry, its second reading was carried by a majority of 10. As expected, the bill was heavily defeated in the Lords, but Disraeli believed that on this issue the temper both in the Commons and the country as a whole was such as to prevent the Conservative minority Government, which had now assumed office, from making this an excuse to shelve the measure. He thought it necessary to promise Sir John that the Government would itself be responsible for a new bill during the next session

> in the hope and belief that it would be acceptable as a satisfactory solution of a long controverted subject.[88]

On February 21st, 1859, Spencer Walpole, the High Church Home Secretary, introduced the promised measure of relief. This bill did not provide for the complete abolition of the rates, but offered Dissenters the right to refuse payment on conscientious grounds if they were prepared to surrender in return the right to vote at the vestry meetings. Although Disraeli reported optimistically to the Queen on the bill's favourable reception by the House of Commons,[89] it soon became clear that it had little chance of success. Liberals complained that the public declaration of their objections to paying the rates would place Dissenters in an invidious relationship with their neighbours, and, moreover, that the proposed measure would do nothing to relieve those members of the Church of England who were just as strongly opposed to the whole system in principle. Their main complaint, however, was against the Government's proposal to replace the rates, which at least had to be voted year by year, by a rent charge on the owners of land, which, if they once accepted it, became permanently binding on them. Such a charge might also be imposed on those parishes which had already refused to pay church rates, thus re-opening a controversy which appeared to have been settled in that district. As a consequence of their complete disapproval of the bill, the Liberals in the House of Commons forced its defeat by 254 votes to 171.[90]

The attempt of the Conservative Government to solve the vexed problem of church rates in February 1859 had thus resulted in consolidating the Liberal opposition in the House of Commons, a most dangerous development in light of the forthcoming election. At the same time, it did nothing to conciliate High Church opinion. The more extreme amongst these Churchmen felt, indeed, that by offering this compromise the Government had done much to concede the justice of the Dissenters' case.[91] Their confidence in the Conservatives as the defenders of the interests of the Church of England was even further reduced as a result of further setback which they suffered in this controversy later the same year. During the general election the Conservatives had succeeded in increasing their representation in the House of Commons, although not sufficiently to maintain themselves in office. When, however, in the early days of the new Administration of Lord Palmerston, Sir John Trelawny reintroduced his bill for the complete abolition of church rates, it was carried on its second reading by an increased majority of 63. As a result, many now believed that the Conservatives were not prepared to offer any determined resistance to the proposal. As Gladstone wrote to Robert Phillimore:

> the greatest blow that the rate has received has been the discovery that an addition of fifty or sixty to the relative strength of Lord Derby's party in Parliament has added nothing to the members in favour of the rate.[92]

It seemed as if their abolition would be merely a question of time.

Trelawny was, however, unable to follow through his success on this occasion because lack of time in the short remainder of this parliamentary session prevented him from carrying his bill through its remaining stages. When he attempted to complete his victory the following year, he was to find that the situation had fundamentally changed. The great number of public meetings held in the intervening months had made very clear the growing strength of opposition in the country to this attack on the Established Church. They had done much in particular to persuade the Conservative members of Parliament that if they continued to abstain from voting on this issue, they would suffer more by enraging their own supporters than benefit by conciliating the Dissenting vote.[93] The result was that the majority on the third reading of Trelawny's bill in May 1860 dropped to 9, which was considered as a moral victory for those opposed to abolition, and the overwhelming defeat of the bill on June 19th. in the House of Lords was received with equanimity.[94] During the next year, the defenders of the rates went from strength to strength. The vote on the third reading was exactly equal, 274 voting for and against the measure. As was the custom, the Speaker of the Commons broke the tie by voting against it.[95] An even more decided

victory was gained in 1862, when for the first time the attack on the church rates was defeated in the House of Commons, albeit the majority was still the bare minimum of one vote. In 1863 this majority rose to 10, and, as a result, the abolitionists decided to give up the struggle, at least on the national level. The controversy over church rates was, nevertheless, to remain a source of local disputes and bitterness, which was to bedevil provincial politics in the succeeding years, until in 1868 Gladstone brought in a Bill to abolish them, which was passed with a large majority in the House of Commons.

It was this completely unexpected reversal of fortune in a struggle which at one time the Church of England had, so it seemed, irretrievably lost that convinced many of the reality behind 'the conservative reaction' which was so marked during the early part of the eighteen-sixties. Both the Guardian and the Saturday Review considered the tie on the third reading of Trelawny's bill in 1861 as evidence confirming how strongly opinion had turned against that ultra-Liberalism which only a short time before had appeared destined to be the political creed of the future.[96] The Review was also keenly alive to the political implications of this change. It noted in particular a radical transformation in the character of local politics:

> [Ecclesiastical questions] used to be the strong point of the Liberals and the weak point of the

> Conservatives. The nonconformists were wont to boast that they were the only questions by help of which the middle classes could be induced to take an interest in politics. At elections it was a regular part of the proceedings that the Liberals should boast of his ecclesiastical views and the Conservatives should try to explain his away... . All this is strangely changed now. The Parliamentary leader of the Conservatives is eager to proclaim that his ecclesiastical colours are nailed to the mast. The Liberal candidate for the City of London wins in spite of repudiating church rates and the Liberation Society.[97]

By 1864, the Review was convinced that "for the first time in many years, a well-organized Church Party might exercise some considerable influence on the hustings."[98]

As an experienced politician, Disraeli did not need to learn from journalists the political advantages that he and his Party might derive from this transformed situation. The Guardian was to comment on the skill and ease with which he adjusted himself to the remarkable change in public opinion, a change which emphasized the 'commanding and majestic position' and 'deeply rooted, subtle and intangible influence' still possessed by the Church in English society.[99] By August 1860, Disraeli was already well aware of the value of the church rate controversy in consolidating the Conservative Party behind his leadership.[100] At the same time, he saw this as an opportunity to re-establish the traditional alliance between that Party and High Churchmen. His resourcefulness in doing so was especially apparent, according to one observer, at a meeting of the Diocese of Oxford

clergy which was held at High Wycombe on October 30th., 1862:

> we may say, we trust without any fear of giving offence, that the Bishop of Oxford [Samuel Wilberforce], Mr. Disraeli and Mr. Walpole, who were the chief speakers at High Wycombe, represent, if not different parties in the Church, parties at least who have often regarded the Church of England from different points of view and have differed as to the best methods of promoting her temporal interests. The Churchmen represented by the Bishop of Oxford have not always been unanimous in their sympathy with that party of which Mr. Disraeli is leader. Between Mr. Disraeli and Mr. Walpole conscientious differences of opinion have been acknowledged. Now, however, all these differences have been merged into a common resolution to fall back upon the ancient alliance between the Church and the Conservatives, which has been the surest support of both, and through them of the Constitution.[101]

Disraeli's success, indeed, convinced many that a new factor had been introduced into English politics. Gladstone proved especially concerned about the possibility that this would deprive the Liberal Government, of which he was a member, of important electoral support from the clergy. He complained to Wilberforce that he had fallen victim to Disraeli's propaganda, warning him that

> it is, I think, hazardous for the Church to tie herself over closely to a party, and I am sorry to see that some of your speeches at your Bucks meeting were not free from that tendency,

to which the Bishop soothingly replied:

> there was studiously on Disraeli's part the tone of tying the Church to one political party. There was in my speech...as studious a quiet disclaimer of it.[102]

In the event, Gladstone's fears that Disraeli would be able to win the support of an united High Church Party for

the Conservatives were not realized. The obstacle that Disraeli could never overcome in his attempt to establish a common political front with these Churchmen was the fact that they were still divided amongst themselves, as they had been since the eighteen-thirties, over the question of church establishment. It was Disraeli's misfortune that the church rate controversy was one that sharply emphasized these differences. High Churchmen of all shades of opinion were by 1860 convinced of the need to defeat the campaign for the total abolition of the rates, for they believed this part of a conspiracy to reduce the Anglican Church to the status of a sect. They were unable to agree, nevertheless, about their attitude to church rates themselves. With its belief in the essential necessity of church establishment, the Protestant High Church Church and State Review strongly urged a policy of 'no surrender' on this issue, since any compromise at all would undermine the very foundation of the Church of England; "if we would save the citadel, we must defend the outworks."[103] Beresford-Hope, on the other hand, was convinced that such a policy would itself prove disastrous for the Church, however much satisfaction it might give for the moment to the extremists. In the first place, it ignored the consequences of the House of Lords's judgement of 1853 which, so long as the status quo was maintained, would make it impossible to levy any form of rate in a parish where even a bare

the Conservatives were not realized. The obstacle that Disraeli could never overcome in his attempt to establish a common political front with these Churchmen was the fact that they were still divided amongst themselves, as they had been since the eighteen-thirties, over the question of church establishment. It was Disraeli's misfortune that the church rate controversy was one that sharply emphasized these differences. High Churchmen of all shades of opinion were by 1860 convinced of the need to defeat the campaign for the total abolition of the rates, for they believed this part of a conspiracy to reduce the Anglican Church to the status of a sect. They were unable to agree, nevertheless, about their attitude to church rates themselves. With its belief in the essential necessity of church establishment, the Protestant High Church Church and State Review strongly urged a policy of 'no surrender' on this issue, since any compromise at all would undermine the very foundation of the Church of England; "if we would save the citadel, we must defend the outworks."[103] Beresford-Hope, on the other hand, was convinced that such a policy would itself prove disastrous for the Church, however much satisfaction it might give for the moment to the extremists. In the first place, it ignored the consequences of the House of Lords's judgement of 1853 which, so long as the status quo was maintained, would make it impossible to levy any form of rate in a parish where even a bare

majority voted against it. More importantly, Beresford-Hope believed that any attempt to compel non-members of the Church to pay towards its upkeep, and thus in effect turn it into "a joint-stock corporation of competing religious"[104] would go far to destroy its distinctive character. He insisted, indeed that a fundamental principle was at stake here, for

> to establish the perpetual liability of Dissenters to pay on the score that a national church implies the church of everybody [is] in defiance of the whole current of legislation since 1688 [and] must to be consistent land us in principles which are wholly inconsistent with belief in the Church as a divine institution, independent of the civil polity within which it is situated.[105]

Beresford-Hope himself considered that the only possible solution was what he described as the 'exemption policy'. Under this, all those who objected to the payment of rates on conscientious grounds, whether Dissenters or not, would be excused from doing so, but only on the understanding that they would henceforth be excluded from the church vestry meetings, which would thus be composed only of bona fide churchmen.[106] This was as well the suggestion contained in the majority report of the House of Lords's select committee on church rates which was issued in 1860.[107] It had, however, the major failing of all suggested compromises in being totally unacceptable to the extremists on both sides. The Church and State Review proved exceptionally scathing in its comments on the lack of resolution shown by

those who propounded it, and it was clearly never practical politics to try and put it into force. A third solution, equally unacceptable, was that the rate, still imposed compulsorily on all parishioners, should be used only for the upkeep of the church fabric, which might well be thought of as a national possession, and never for the expenses of the church services. This failed to be satisfactory because of the obvious difficulty in separating these two items of expenditure.[108] It was mainly due to these differences of opinion, differences which indicated the lack of a common understanding of the place of the Church within the community, which was to prevent High Churchmen from preventing the final abolition of church rates in 1868.

Disraeli was to find, therefore, that his decision in 1860 to adopt a 'no surrender' policy with regard to church rates, while it might win the enthusiastic approbation of the Protestant High Churchmen, caused serious disquiet amongst the Anglo-Catholics.[109] The Guardian, in particular, expressed grave doubts about Disraeli's political judgement in this matter, fearing that such outright opposition might end in disaster for the Church.[110] Even after the victory of 1862, it warned Disraeli that the situation was still most precarious, and that all might yet be lost if the struggle was allowed to continue until the resolution of the church rate supporters was exhausted. It urged that this

was in fact the time when a compromise solution on the most advantageous terms might be effected.[111] The Guardian's warning was ignored, however, both by Disraeli and the more extreme High Churchmen who refused to accept any suggestion of a compromise.

Disraeli was left in no doubt, therefore, that he might expect his support to come from the Protestant High Churchmen rather than the Anglo-Catholics. As a result, it was not surprising that, when he expounded his newly-found church principles in a series of five major speeches between 1860 and 1864, they were to be in sympathy with those of the former group of High Churchmen.[112] According to the Guardian, Disraeli set out to prove himself "a prudent and enlightened Churchman of the traditional Church and State kind".[113] He emphasized in particular the necessity of an Established Church, which was essential in order to 'consecrate society and sanctify the state".[114] Disraeli believed that the Church of England would always be able to perform this function because it had become an integral part of the life of the local community by reason of its well established parochial organization, and there was, therefore, no danger that it would succumb to the greatest danger threatening any established church, that of becoming merely a department of state.

At the same time, Disraeli acknowledged that there

were factors which weakened the claims of the Church to be a truly national one. On the one hand, there was a lack of union amongst its members caused by the bitter religious controversies of the past few years.[115] On the other, a large proportion of the population, Nonconformists, Catholics and the infidel inhabitants of the industrial towns, remained outside it.[116] Disraeli optimistically maintained, nevertheless, that the undoubted tendency of the age was towards reunion, both within the Church itself, and between the Church and the other religious bodies in the community.[117] He was prepared in order to encourage this development to commit any future Conservative Government to a policy of church extension on a far larger scale than ever before.[118] In this way, he hoped that the Church would be placed in an even stronger position to perform its rightful duties.[119]

Disraeli reserved his most severe criticism for the Anglo-Catholic Churchmen. He denounced them especially for demanding disestablishment in the name of 'religious liberty'. He maintained that to separate Church and State in England would inevitably reduce the Anglican Church to the same ineffectual position held by the Episcopal Church in Scotland.[120] It has to be recognized, however, that the vigour of his attack on these Churchmen was not entirely due to his dislike of their principles, but was also the result of his rancour at the activity of some of their

political representatives. He was well aware of the hostility towards him in particular of men like Roundell Palmer and Beresford-Hope, who formed

> a coterie who hate us and have flattered themselves they had a monopoly of church championship. Most of them are now out of Parliament... but they are unceasingly at work. They can do the Church no good, for they are utterly incapable of managing England, being a financial and fastidious crew, who are more anxious about what they call the Church than the Church of England.[121]

High Churchmen made a varying response to Disraeli's speeches. The Protestant High Churchmen were naturally delighted by his powerful defence of church establishment. Their mouthpiece, the Church and State Review, believed that this would make possible the resumption of the traditional alliance between the Church and the Conservative Party. It argued that this alliance had in fact only been broken in the first place because of the exceptional political circumstances of the eighteen-fifties. It was in particular the existence of the Peelite group which had been responsible for it. Because of the reputation of Gladstone, Sidney Herbert and the Duke of Newcastle amongst High Churchmen, the Peelites had succeeded in retaining the confidence of many of these Churchmen despite their dubious political manoeuvering with the Whigs. As a result, it was not to be expected that the Conservatives, when they took office as a minority Administration, should risk arousing the implacable opposition of Dissent by becoming the declared champions of the Church:

> if the Church wishes the Conservative Party to undertake her defence, she must not bestow her confidence on the enemies of that Party. Mr. Disraeli has always maintained that no great question can be satisfactorily settled in an English Parliament except by the machinery of Party. And he detected at once the uselessness of opposing the Dissenters except as the accredited and authoritative Church Party in the House of Commons.[122]

After 1859, the situation was transformed. The decision of the three leading Peelites to join Palmerston's Government did much to resolve the political confusion, and it also ended whatever claim they might still possess on the loyalty of High Churchmen by making it clear that they were now concerned in furthering their own careers rather than in defending the interests of the Church.[123] The reaction in the country to the bill for the abolition of church rates had proved that these Churchmen were now determined to resist any future aggression by the Dissenters. The Church and State Review, thus, saw nothing surprising in the fact that Disraeli should assume the leadership of the church cause, and by 1862 it was already prepared to claim that he had done more for the Church of England than Sir Robert Peel had ever achieved in long years in office.[124]

The anxiety shown by the Review to restore the alliance between the Church and the Conservative Party reflected its understanding of the contemporary political system. It told its readers

> that as we live under a Parliamentary Government, the temporal position of the Church of England can only be secured against attack, not by the zeal of individuals, but by the steady resistance of a disciplined political party.[125]

It was also convinced that Disraeli possessed the necessary qualitites to ensure success in the House of Commons:

> his pluck is invincible... . He is always ready for a fight. He never shrank from the biggest or boldest bruiser. He gave back scorn for scorn. He never allowed his Party to be insulted without punishment for the offender.

In the hands of such a man, the interests of the Church would never be lost by default.[126]

The Church and State Review had, nevertheless, some considerable reservations about the future political prospects of the Church. However great its admiration for Disraeli might now be, it feared that the Conservative Party itself might prove unable to give him the support he would need. In the first place, they lacked party discipline, and thus had been unable to maintain the constant pressure on the Government that was so essential in order to provide an effective oppsoition. Despite their great success in the defence of church rates in 1863, they had failed dismally the following year, for example, to prevent the second reading of a bill proposing to abolish religious tests at Oxford, a matter they had equally at heart. The Review explained this disaster by the fact that the vote was taken the day before the running of the Derby, an event which always thinned the

Conservative ranks in the Commons irrespective of that grave matter might be under consideration. It pointed out as well the serious handicap suffered by a Party which included so many country gentlemen, as these were always eager to anticipate and extend their holidays.[127] Secondly, because the Conservatives were in a minority, Disraeli himself might be forced on some matters to sacrifice the principles which he so strongly maintained for reasons of political expediency. This had happened in particular as a result of the bargaining which had been necessary in order to ensure the defeat of Trelawny's church rate bill in 1863. In order to make this possible, both Derby and Disraeli had realized the importance of persuading the Irish Catholic members to abstain from voting in support of it. In return, the Conservative leaders promised not to oppose the proposed Prison Ministers' bill, which would provide at the expense of the Government the appointment of a Roman Catholic priest to every prison. Many High Churchmen considered this another serious attack on the rights and privileges of the Established Church, and were therefore most concerned when the abstention of several Conservatives allowed it to be carried through Parliament.[128] Unaware of the issues involved, they lost much of their confidence in the leadership of Disraeli. Most important of all, it was clear that a significant number of Conservatives including Lord Derby

himself preferred to keep Palmerston in office, believing that his presence as Prime Minister was a far better obstacle than another minority Conservative Ministry would be to the demands for more radical legislation from the left wing of the Liberal Party.[129] The Church and State Review had complete sympathy with the frustration felt by Disraeli at his continuing inability, despite his success in the struggle over church rates, to bring the full strength of the Conservative Party against Palmerston in the Commons, and thus ensure the defeat of his Government. It realized that a sustained and effective opposition depended very much on the belief that it would be rewarded with office in the not too distant future. The Review, therefore, denounced the informal arrangement to maintain Palmerston in power as

> an ignoble compromise, to say nothing of the practical hardship it inflicts on the members of the Party who desire the legitimate and honourable awards of party fidelity... . It is not a light thing that a great Party should have nothing to bestow upon its adherents, or that a majority of the House of Commons should be excluded from the administration of affairs.[130]

While the Church and State Review urged on its readers the necessity to revive their allegiance to the Conservative Party, it did so fully realizing that this act would not completely solve their political difficulties. It maintained, nevertheless, that under the conditions of the day High Churchmen must seek the protection of that Party. It hoped in particular that they would be prepared to take

full advantage of the parliamentary skill of Disraeli, after that statesman had made widely known his adherence to their church principles. That the Review could now reach such a conclusion was the measure of Disraeli's success in winning the support of the Protestant High Churchmen.

Disraeli was to find the Anglo-Catholics, on the other hand, in no way impressed by his campaign on behalf of the Church in the early eighteen-sixties. Many of these Churchmen could never accept the sincerity behind his avowal of church principles. After all, as one reader wrote to the Guardian, what Church did he attend?[131] Moreover, the whole of Disraeli's past career had proved how ready he had always been to sacrifice his principles in order to stay in office.[132] The Saturday Review was certainly not alone in believing that he was merely attempting to use the Church as "a political ladder to Downing Street".[133] Even giving as much credit as possible for sincerity, considerable doubt still remained whether Disraeli really understood the full implications of what he was saying. There was a strong impression that, because the subject was new to him, he was substituting "words for things and fine talk for sober facts".[134] If this was so, then there was little chance that he would ever attempt to carry out the programme outlined in his speeches once the holding of office had shown him the realities of the situation. As the Saturday Review once commented:

> when the defence of the Church of England reposes in the hands of the author of Tancred it would be a very stiff man who would not laugh and a very silly man who would do more than laugh.[135]

It was not only the presence of Disraeli as one of its leaders that destroyed the confidence of the Anglo-Catholics in the Conservative Party of the eighteen-sixties. They disapproved equally strongly of the character of the Party itself. They believed that it was still dominated by the powerful "puritanical and Erastian element" which had been the main cause of their dislike during the previous decade.[136] Their puritanism had made most Conservatives into bitter opponents of High Church principles: their erastianism had made them into believers in the divine right of establishments.[137] On both counts there could be no sympathy between them and the Anglo-Catholics. Pusey expressed the general feeling of the latter when he wrote to Keble:

> I am sick of Conservatism. Under D'Israeli they only bring in worse bills in power than those they oppose out of it.[138]

It was because of their distrust of Disraeli and their dislike of Conservative churchmanship that the Anglo-Catholics could never accept the belief of the Protestant High Churchmen that this was the time to revive their support for the Conservative Party. They went, indeed, further by arguing that to do so might prove disastrous

for the Church. To identify it once again withthe forces of Tory reaction might well revive that popular hostility which had made possible the burning of the Bishop's Palace at Bristol during the riots of 1832.[139] The Guardian was convinced that the almost revolutionary transformation in the public attitude towards the Established Church since that date had been entirely due to the fact that "for the first time since the Reformation (it) had been unconnected with any political party". It ought to make every effort to retain this independence in the future, even if this meant the sacrifice of the undoubted advantages to be derived under the English system of Government from the support of a great parliamentary organization.[140]

There was a third most important factor that prevented the Anglo-Catholics from reacting in the same way as the Protestant High Churchmen did in these years of danger for the Anglican Church. This was the presence of Gladstone in Palmerston's Cabinet. It was impossible for Anglo-Catholics to remain uninfluenced by Gladstone's political carrer at this time because, of all leading politicians, he appeared most in sympathy with their principles.[141] Their fortunes were to be even more closely linked with his by the fact that between 1847 and 1865 he was to be the member of Parliament for Oxford University. As such, he was deeply involved in the many controversies that took place in the

University during this period, and in which the Anglo-Catholics were to play a dominating role. In order to understand the political thinking of these Churchmen in 1865, therefore, it is necessary to describe at length their relationship with Gladstone.

NOTES: CHAPTER VI

[1] Hansard, 3d ser., CXLVII, 442.

[2] Saturday Review, IX (1860), p. 305.

[3] Ibid., X (1860), p. 659.

[4] Ibid., III (1857), pp. 237-238.

[5] E. Hodder, Life of Lord Shaftesbury. 3 vols. (London, 1887), II, p. 505.

[6] Saturday Review, II (1856), p. 713.

[7] Ibid., XII (1861), p. 166.

[8] Hodder, Shaftesbury, II, pp. 606-612: G.F.A. Best, Lord Shaftesbury, (London, 1964), p. 64.

[9] For Palmerston's church appointments, see Hodder, Shaftesbury, III, Chapter 28.

[10] Times, April 8th, 1857, p. 8.

[11] But compare the concern of Queen Victoria over Alford's appointment as she believed him an extreme Low Churchman. A. Benson & Viscount Benson, Letters of Queen Victoria, 1837-1861. 3 vols. (London, 1908), III, p. 227.

[12] Guardian, March 11, 1857, pp. 193.

[13] For the history of the Saturday Review, see the Conclusion.

[14] Saturday Review, XI (1861), p. 286.

[15] Ibid., V (1858), p. 366.

16 Ibid., III (1857), p. 238 & V (1858), pp. 106-107.

17 Guardian, January 7, 1857, p. 8: February 4, 1857, p. 84: March 4., 1857, p. 172.

18 Saturday Review, III (1857), pp. 345-346.

19 Hansard, 3d ser., CXLIV, 1745.

20 Guardian, March 4, 1857, p. 104.

21 H. Paul, History of Modern England. 5 vols. (London, 1904), II, p. 75.

22 [W.E. Gladstone], 'The New Parliament and its Work', Quarterly Review, CI (1857), p. 550.

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CHAPTER VII

GLADSTONE AND THE REPRESENTATION OF OXFORD UNIVERSITY 1847 - 1865

Gladstone's decision to contest the vacant seat at Oxford University in 1847, which was to have such a great significance for High Churchmen, was the result of a crisis in his own political career.[1] Gladstone had first entered Parliament in 1833 as member for the borough of Newark, which was under the effective control of the Duke of Newcastle, father of Lord Lincoln, the close friend he had made at Christ Church, Oxford. The Duke was prepared to extend his patronage to Gladstone, however, for other reasons than the claim of friendship. In particular, he was in complete sympathy with the religious principles that Gladstone held in these years.[2] The Duke was a strong believer in the traditional principles of the Protestant Constitution in Church and State, and the fact that he allowed Gladstone to retain his seat for the next three elections was proof enough that he approved of the ideas that statesman was to expound in his first book on the State in its Relations with the Church, and that he usually voted with the small group

of Tory High Churchmen in the Commons, who were associated with Sir Robert Inglis.

During the eighteen-forties, as we have seen, Gladstone was to change his views on the principle of Church establishment. Like most of his contemporaries, the Duke failed to realize how far he had lost his confidence in the close link between the Church of England and the State. As a result, the Duke was shocked and dismayed when, despite his resignation from the Board of Trade, he was nevertheless prepared to support the increased grant to Maynooth in 1845, thus proving that he saw no danger in the Government extending its recognition to other religious bodies besides the Established Church. The relations between the two men reached a crisis the following December when Gladstone rejoined the Government by accepting the Colonial Office, made vacant by the resignation of Lord Stanley over the proposed repeal of the Corn Laws. Gladstone's support for repeal was a further cause of offence to the Duke who was convinced Protectionist. It was not surprising that he refused to continue his patronage of Gladstone at Newark, where he was forced to seek re-election after taking office. Gladstone felt bound on the grounds of honour not to stand against the Duke's nominee, although he was asked to do so by some of his previous supporters, and he had to look elsewhere for a new seat.

In spite of the assistance of the Conservative Party's election manager, Philip Bonham, this proved more difficult than might have been expected. Indeed, by the time that Peel's Government fell in June 1846, Gladstone had actually held Cabinet office without a seat in Parliament for six months. Finally, in May 1847 on the eve of a general election, Bucknell Estcourt, one of the two sitting members for Oxford University, announced his forthcoming retirement, and thus made it possible for him to contest this unique constituency of the mid-century political system.

It had been, indeed, as far back as January 1846 that Stafford Northcote, who had been his private secretary at the Board of Trade, had canvassed this possibility.[3] Northcote, a member of a Devon county family, had been brought up by his mother as an Evangelical,[4] but the religious controversies of the eighteen-thirties had given him a more profound appreciation of high church principles than he had possessed before.[5] He became convinced that the great problem of the day was to settle the proper relationship between Church and State, and he was almost prepared at one time to accept Thomas Arnold's contention that the only solution was to restore in whatever way possible the complete identity between the two.[6] He thus believed that the great variety of religious opinion - "Puseyism and Evangelicalism, Popery and Dissent" - which existed in the country must

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prove a great source of discord. He was especially concerned about the inability of Sir Robert Peel to counter the ill-effect of this by acting on "fixed church principles"[7]. For Gladstone however, he had nothing but admiration:

> he is the one whom I respect beyond measure: he stands almost alone as the representative of principles with which I cordially agree; and as a man of business and one who, humanly speaking, is sure to rise, he is preeminent.[8]

Northcote hoped that Gladstone would become the centre of a new political combination:

> I look upon him as the representative of the party, scarcely developed as yet though secretly forming and strengthening, which will stand by all that is dear and sacred in my estimation in the struggle which I believe will come ere very long between good and evil, order and disorder, the Church and the World, and I see a very small band collecting around him and ready to fight manfully under his leading.[9]

In spite of the mystification caused by Gladstone's apparent volte-face over Maynooth, Northcote was thus prepared to play a leading part in securing his election for Oxford University whose members because of its intimate links with the Church of England and because it included so many clergymen amongst its constituents, were considered in a special sense the parliamentary representatives for that Church.

Others of those Churchmen who had previously looked to Gladstone for leadership in the struggle to preserve the intimate connection between Church and State were much more concerned than Northcote about the recent indications, of

which his Maynooth vote was the last and greatest, that he was changing his opinions on this crucial issue. It was Charles Wordsworth, once as close to Gladstone as Northcote, who now expressed their fears most forcibly, maintaining that

> in these days the very worst member we could choose would be a man holding good principles but without faith in them; and such Gladstone described himself to me last year... . The more I think of it the more I feel it to be our bounden duty not to support Gladstone without some mutual understanding. He is at present a Janus in politics; an authority of one school and a statesman of another... . He will be the most dangerous representative Oxford ever had.[10]

When, therefore, some influential Anglo-Catholics met together in London to discuss the position after the resignation of Estcourt, their first reaction was to reject Gladstone as an unsuitable candidate; he was "too strong from a party point of view for success".[11] They sent a message to their counterparts at Oxford in this sense, suggesting that Sir William Heathcote would be a far better compromise choice as he would be able to unite all shades of church opinion in his support. As it happened, however, on the very same day, H.J. Coleridge came up to London from Oxford with the news that the full weight of that party amongst the university residents would be given to Gladstone if he stood. On hearing this report, Frederic Rogers asked Stafford Northcote to try and persuade Gladstone to accept the nomination, which, to the general surprise, he

immediately did. On May 12th., the Guardian, announced its full support for Gladstone on the grounds of his eminence as a statesman, his independent mind, his earnest and serious character and his marked attachment to the interests of the Church.[12]

The general opinion remained, nevertheless, that Gladstone had little chance of success. His coming forward at all appeared nothing but "a sort of Tractarian puerility",[13] and the membership of the two committees, one in London the other in Oxford, which were formed to support him, did not inspire any great confidence. In London, it consisted of a strange alliance of

> London Puseyites, who atone for their religion by their rank, mixing with Tyler, Hume Spry, Saunders of the Charterhouse, Hallam (the Whig historian), etc.

while at Oxford itself, his supporters at the start were "barefaced Puseyites, whom nobody in Oxford but themselves will join".[14] Moreover, Gladstone had far more doubts about the wisdom of standing than his interview with Northcote might suggest. On May 14th., he wrote to Manning that, despite the fact that a hundred residents had already announced their support for him, his success was by no means assured. In particular, there was the inconvenient fact that the other sitting member, Sir Robert Inglis, was also a Christ Church man, as it was against the University tradition to have both members from the same college. Even more

important however, was "the question whether I am stiff enough in State and Church politics to be justified in assuming the position".[15] It indeed appeared far more likely that the victor in this struggle would be one of the other two candidates, Edward Cardwell and C.G. Round.

Cardwell was a man of considerable academic reputation, having been a scholar and fellow of Balliol and a double first. Moreover he had been a colleague of Gladstone in the last Conservative Government and, like him, very close to Peel. Peel, in fact, in the belief that Gladstone was disbarred from standing because he was, like Inglis, a Christ Church man, had committed himself to Cardwell's support. This was an important factor for those who hoped for Peel's patronage after,[16] as was generally expected, he was returned to office as Prime Minister in the near future. Cardwell was also a nephew of Principal Cardwell of St. Alban Hall, and as such had the support of the majority of the Heads. At the start of the campaign he had received more promises of votes from the Liberal dons than Gladstone did. In spite of all these considerations, it soon became clear that he had little chance of success. The Guardian attacked him as the creature of the Hebdomadal Board, who were attempting to force him on the University by unconstitutional methods.[17] Like Gladstone, he had voted for free trade and the increased Maynooth grant, and thus, as a

result, could expect to make little appeal to those orthodox Churchmen for whom both these issues were anathema. On June 21st., Cardwell acknowledged defeat and withdrew to fight a vacancy at Liverpool.[18]

This left Gladstone in a straight fight with Round, who already sat in the House of Commons as member for North Essex. Despite the fact that he had supported Peel against Inglis at the time of the controversy over catholic emancipation in 1829.[19] Round now became the champion of the 'no-popery' element in the constituency. This was far stronger amongst the non-resident clerical voters than at the University itself, but it included a number of Protestant High Churchmen like Faussett, Ogilvie and Vaughan Thomas among the dons.[20] Standing as such, Round was attacked by Gladstone's supporters as the representative of a 'negative Protestantism' which was completely counter to the spirit of the times, and the electors were warned that

> to send up a no-popery member will be the surest way of cutting ourselves off from the possession of any weight in the council of the nation. To return him by the suffrages of the county clergy, in opposition to the resident and lay members of convocation, will be a loud proclamation of our own incapacity to read the signs of the times and understand the real needs of this Church and Kingdom.[21]

Gladstone was very conscious of the danger that his contest with Round might develop into a religious war between holders of two incompatible principles, a possibility all the

more likely after the withdrawal of Cardwell.[22] He was particularly anxious, as a result, to dispel the popular illusion that he was now a committed member of the Anglo-Catholic group within the Church. On June 17th., he attempted to make his position clear in a letter written to J.S. Wortley. The crucial issue in this connection was his vote in the Oxford Convocation in 1845 against the motion to condemn W.G. Ward's The Ideal of a Christian Church which set out in most extreme language to emphasize the essential catholic nature of the Church of England. His vote had given the impression that he supported the ideas and opinions expressed in it. His criticism of the book in the Quarterly Review should have left no doubt, nevertheless, how strongly he disagreed with Ward and the party he represented. The reason for his vote against the censure motion was that it implied the personal dishonesty of Ward, and this was a question that could not be judged by such a human tribunal. Gladstone went on to make it clear that if he was returned he would be bound to represent the interests of the Church as a whole, and thus "if the complexion of my leading supporters and the course of events were such as to stamp that character (of party) upon me, I would at all hazards and disadvantages withdraw."[23] At the same time, Gladstone was determined not to be elected under false pretences by disguising the change in his opinions

concerning Church-State relations, and thus perhaps regaining the support of that class of clergymen whom he had alienated by his vote on Maynooth in 1845.[24] He told Robert Phillimore, himself "a High Churchman of the old type",[25] that it was now impossible to regulate the connection between Church and State according to the abstract principles which he had previously maintained.[26] He refused to commit himself on what was the predominant issue in the minds of most of the electors, the question whether the Irish Catholic clergy should be endowed by the State, and whether this should be done out of the surplus funds possessed by the Established Church of that country, On July 21st., he wrote a severe letter to the Rev. J.W. Warter, warning him[27] of the dangerous consequences of persisting in a negative and repressive policy towards the other religious bodies in the community; he argued in particular that

> the stern adherence to an exclusive policy - the stern and inconsistent adherence to it, for consistent now such adherence is not in any single case, and scarcely can be - is, I say, utterly fatal to any further beneficial use of the principles of connection between Church and State.[28]

Gladstone developed this argument further in a letter written to the chairman of his Oxford Committee, the Rev. Richard Greswell. He realized that his opinion on church matters might prove far from acceptable to the electorate now and as they were developed in the future. He could not, however, during these revolutionary times, merely

stand on the defensive, and he went on to maintain:

> I earnestly desire that the University may through her representative endeavour to ally herself with the spirit and movement of the time, so far as there is a hope of turning it or keeping it turned to good. I am deeply convinced of the great danger and evil to the Church which must in these times result from the policy of mere defence and negation... . It is not for the sake of what is vulgarly termed expediency that I desire to see Churchmen turn their attention in their political sphere more to what directly and inwardly concerns the Church, than to what affects her externally and what mainly concerns other bodies of Christians... . But I am sensible that to adopt the policy of the Church to the exigencies of this changing time is a problem of the greatest difficulty, requiring high qualifications, and opening the way through any false step to the greatest danger. When I contemplate the obligations of a member for the University, such as I have conceived them, and compare them with all that I know of my incapacity to discharge them, I feel how easy it will be in the event of my defeat to find reasons why it is wise that such should be the issue of the contest.[29]

It was not surprising that, on reading such sentiments, Greswell who was usually the most sanguine of individuals,[30] wrote back in haste that

> as the Oxford election, though virtually decided in your favour, has not yet come to its actual termination, I have not thought it advisable to publish the letter further, at least just at present.[31]

Gladstone had no hesitation in showing during the 1847 election how far he had now advanced in his religious opinions towards that theory of 'religious liberty", which he was to develop fully over the next few years, and which was always to bedevil his relatinns with the majority of his

constituents. Luckily from his point of view, however, the outcome of the contest at this time did not depend on the votes of the mass of clerical graduates. It was still necessary for each elector to attend in person at Oxford if he wished to exercise his right to vote. The great inconvenience caused by the loss of time and the considerable expense of travel made this impossible for most of them, and thus the result of the election was inevitably decided by the residents. The ultimate explanation of Gladstone's victory in 1847, must, therefore, be sought in the complex situation which existed in the University itself at this time.

Mark Pattison once wrote that if a man had gone to sleep in Oxford in 1846 to wake again in 1850 he would have found himself in a completely different world.[32] One most striking example of the changes which took place during this period was the radical shift in the balance of power between the Anglo-Catholic and Liberal groups within the University. After the shock of the secessions to Rome, the Tractarian remnant could no longer hope to exercise the same influence as previously. In some moving pages of his great biography, Liddon has described the isolation even of Pusey at this time, who was especially distrusted by churchmen like William Palmer because he refused to denounce openly the heresy of the Roman Catholic Church.[33] It was made clear to Pusey

himself that he must make no attempt to guide undergraduates in religious matters.[34] The leaders of the younger generation of these Churchmen found themselves equally helpless in University affairs. Charles Marriott, whose saintly character did much to restore their reputation before his premature death in 1855, was at this moment in despair. He was bitterly resentful of what he considered Newman's desertion, leaving them to face alone "the extremity of distrust, proscription and inquisition".[35] R.W. Church, who had inspired the last moral victory of the Tractarians, the proctorial veto on the attempts by the Heads in 1844 to censure Tract 90, was for the greater part of 1847 away from Oxford, travelling through Southern Europe.[36] It is significant that both Church and Mozley believed that the opportunity to further their cause would henceforth be found in London rather than in the University.[37]

While the Tractarians were demoralized, the Oxford Liberals had entered into their Golden Age. It was the ideas and principles of Thomas Arnold which provided their inspiration. Men like W.C. Lake at Balliol and A.H. Clough at Oriel who had been educated at Rugby in the great days of his headmastership, now possessed much influence in the University. In 1844, his favourite pupil, Arthur Stanley, published an exceptionally successful Life of Arnold, which made the principles of his churchmanship, with their emphasis

on the need to reconstruct a truly national church including members of all denominations, more widely known than ever before. Closely attached to Stanley, although not an old Rugbeian, was Benjamin Jowett. In 1844 and 1845 the two friends visited Germany, where Jowett in particular was considerably impressed by the new thinking of that country's theologians. As a result, he was to lose steadily the dogmatic contents of his own faith, until he came to believe merely "in the existence of God and the Christ ideal". Pusey, indeed, was to deny that Jowett was a Christian in anything more than intention. It was such liberal dons who now possessed the same sort of appeal for the contemporary undergradutes that Newman had over an earlier generation. Moreover, even though they were still in a minority in Convocation, they were able to exercise a greater power in University affairs than their numbers really justified. This was especially so after 1846 when it became known that they had close links with the Whig Government of Lord John Russell.[38]

The relationship between the Tractarians and the Liberals at Oxford was an extremely complex one, which does much to explain the confused political situation at the University during the mid-Victorian years. The main common factor between the two groups was their desire for University reform, but they were far from agreeing about

the specific reforms which were required. In particular, as in the eighteen-thirties, many Liberals were determined to end religious tests in the University. This was partly due to the great difficulty men like Jowett had in subscribing to the Thirty-Nine Articles in any but a 'non-natural' sense, partly to the desire to admit Dissenters to the University so that it could become a national institution once again, as Arnold had hoped. This inevitably awoke memories of the controversies of the eighteen-thirties, and Pusey, for one, could never accept these demands. It was on these grounds that he refused to sit with representatives of the Liberal dons on Gladstone's election committee in July 1847, even though he was prepared to vote for him.[39]

In spite of this, the younger generation of Anglo-Catholics were to find it far easier to co-operate with the Liberals than their seniors had. One reason for this was the better personal relationships that existed between men like Stanley and Church, for example, than that between Newman and Hampden or Arnold and Keble. Although he recognized the great differences of opinion that existed between them, Church could still acknowledge at the end of his life how much there was to praise in Stanley's character and beliefs.[40] Even more important than this, however, was the fact that on another aspect of university reform they found themselves

in complete agreement. The actions of the Heads in condemning Pusey's sermon on the Eucharist as heretical, without allowing him a judicial hearing in 1843, and also in attempting to impose a new university test, which would have made impossible the holding of Catholic views by Oxford graduates, in the following year, had appeared to both groups a dangerous abuse of their autocratic power and completely contrary to the spirit of the age.[41] Both Anglo-Catholics and Liberals were determined, therefore, to reform the constitutional structure of the University so as to limit the power of the Hebdomadal Board. The most important implication of Gladstone's victory in 1847 was that it marked the successful first stage in their joint campaign against the Heads.

When the supporters of Round and Gladstone finally cast their votes at the end of a most strenuously fought contest, it was the former who received those of the majority of the Heads, which had been promised to Cardwell before his retirement.[42] They did so in part because, according to Stafford Northcote, they would prefer to be "represented by an old woman rather than by a young man who thinks."[43] On the other hand, many of the Liberal residents now came out in support of Gladstone.[44] The whole struggle was transformed as a result. Instead of being, as Gladstone had once feared, fought on the question of his reputed

Puseyite tendencies, it was now one between the Hebdomadal Board representing the Heads, and the college tutors.[45] The outcome was a victory for the latter, their candidate, Gladstone, receiving a majority of 153 over his opponent, even though it must be acknowledged that Round, a nonentity compared to Gladstone in public opinion, received 824. Northcote was, nevertheless, justified in being jubilant at the result. He saw with considerable insight that it had given Gladstone a solid basis of support at the University, which was, indeed, to secure his seat there for the next eighteen years:

> It has brought together the younger men without distinction of party and has supplied the elements of a very noble party which will look to you as their leader; I think men of all kinds are prepared to trust you and though each feels that you will probably differ from them in some particulars, each seems disposed to waive objections for the sake of the general good he expects.[46]

Mozley was even more exultant:

> First, we have bowled out eleven Heads of Houses and Cardwell. Secondly, we have bowled them all out again and Round. And thirdly - which is spice for the simply malignant to relish - Round has himself lost his seat in Essex in consequence.[47]

This rejoicing at a victory in a cause that had at once time seemed hopelessly lost, though certainly natural, was nevertheless premature. Gladstone's tenure of his Oxford seat was to be seriously challenged in the next few

years. In part, this was due to the steady development of his religious opinions which left many of even those who had supported him in 1847 far behind. At that time, indeed, it had been the admiration they felt for him as a person rather than their approval of his religious principles that had persuaded the elder generation of Anglo-Catholics to vote for him. For Keble he was

> Pusey in a blue coat: & what more can be said for any layman?... I am so sure of him that I don't at all mind here and there a speech or a vote whc. I can't explain.[48]

Pusey was less enthusiastic. He told Gladstone later that he had voted for him on this occasion out of personal affection and regard, and because of his confidence in his principles. At the same time he had been well aware that he was not likely to agree with all his future actions.[49] Gladstone, himself, understood this feeling, but was unable to do anything to appease it. On his first visit to Oxford after his success, he felt it necessary

> to make a speech, which was somewhat gloomy in its forebodings. He talked of changes and movements in a way not gratifying to established institutions; and the difficulties in which men in Parliament would be placed.[50]

Such forebodings were soon enough justified. Gladstone's vote in favour of the removal of Jewish civil disabilities was a particular cause of offence to many of his constituents, who were unable to appreciate his reasons for so doing.[51] The Rev. A.W. Haddan, who had played a

leading part at Oxford in 1847, now reported that feeling was such that for some time to come he would have little chance of re-election should he be compelled to stand.[52] Greswell warned him of the likelihood that discontent in the University would prevent him from being nominated for a D.C.L. degree at the summer commemoration in 1848, the traditional award for newly elected representatives.[53] Only the fact that Gladstone made a most favourable impression on the Vice-Chancellor when he met him at a party given by Sir Robert Inglis, prevented this public censure being made against him.[54] He had, nevertheless, to face the expression of some disapprobation at the ceremony itself, in the form of 'non-placets', in order that it might not be said, so Greswell told him, that "the members of the University are either favourable, or at least not unfavourable to the Jew Bill."[55] Similar dismay was felt at Gladstone's vote against the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, which many Churchmen felt an entirely justified retaliation against a very serious danger to the Church. Gladstone's appeal to the principle of religious liberty again did little to persuade them otherwise.

At the same time Gladstone did much to alienate Liberal opinion at the University by his uncompromising opposition to the proposal of the Whig Government in July 1850 to set up a royal commission of inquiry into conditions

at Oxford. While appreciating the need for some basic reforms in the existing system, Gladstone nevertheless felt that the interference of the central government in this matter would be a most serious attack on the freedom of a local institution. For their part, the Liberals believed that, in asking for reform to be left to the University itself, Gladstone had greatly underestimated the strength of the reactionary elements there, especially of the Heads. After hearing a mass of evidence, the Commission finally produced its report in May 1852. The timing of this was most unfortunate from Gladstone's point of view, coming as it did just before the General Election of that July when, as representative for Oxford, he was bound to make clear his views upon it.

In the years after his election in 1847, therefore, Gladstone succeeded in antagonizing the two groups amongst the resident dons, on whose support his triumph had mainly depended. His position amongst his constituents as a whole was still further weakened by the steady deterioration in his relationship with the Conservative Party of Derby and Disraeli, the political party which, as Beresford-Hope once said, had almost a prescriptive right on the loyalty of all Churchmen.[56] Unlike the two senior leaders of the Peelites, Sir James Graham and Lord Aberdeen, Gladstone, indeed, after the death of Peel in 1850, had hoped for re-union with the

Conservatives.[57] His experiences during the first Derby Administration of 1852 soon, however, destroyed whatever sympathy he might possess for that Party in its current contemporary state. He disapproved especially of both their economic and religious policy; as he wrote to Lord Aberdeen, "protection and religious liberty are the subjects on which my main complaints would turn; shuffling as to the former, trading on bigotry as to the latter."[58] He found most distasteful the strong erastian element in the religious thinking of most Conservatives. This had become apparent to him already when in 1850 he had proposed an increase in the number of Bishops so they might more satisfactorily perform their essential work for the Church. In order to quieten the criticism of the Dissenters, he suggested that the new Bishops should have no seat in the House of Lords. This immediately provoked a bitter opposition from those Conservatives who were more concerned about the political privileges of the Bishop as a vital factor in the link between the Church of England and the State than in their spiritual functions.[59] Gladstone was to find the same spirit behind the policy of Sir John Pakington as Colonial Secretary in Derby's Government itself, in particular when the two men came in sharp conflict with each other over Gladstone's Colonial Church Bishopric's bill, which would have given the Church of England overseas far greater

freedom to manage its own affairs. Pakington denounced this as an attack on the Royal Prerogative, and forced its withdrawal.

On their side, Conservatives were greatly annoyed by the apparent responsibility of Gladstone for the one serious defeat their Government suffered in the House of Commons before the General Election in July. This occurred when on May 10th., Disraeli proposed that the four parliamentary seats made available by the disfranchisement of Sudbury and St. Albans for their record of bribery and corruption during elections should be immediately given to the West Riding of Yorkshire and to South Lancashire. Gladstone was the only other speaker on the motion. He charged the Government with sharp practice by offering the seats to the county electors as prizes at a time when the voting strength of the two parties were almost equally balanced. He accused them of breaking the understanding reached with the Peelites when they took office the previous February that they would be left unchallenged as a minority administration until the General Election, but only on the understanding that they would not introduce any controversial measures. His demand that only a Government with full political power should settle this particular matter was carried by a vote of 234 to 148.[60] This was a serious blow to the reputation of the Government on the eve of the

election, and members of the Conservative Party were enraged at the part Gladstone had played in engineering it. According to Northcote, it was this which persuaded them to take a leading role in the unexpected opposition he had to meet in his attempt to win re-election for Oxford during this election.[61] The Guardian noted that two ministers in the Conservative Government, Henley and Beresford, voted against him, and it warned Derby that this might well lose him the votes of Gladstone's supporters in the still unfinished county elections.[62]

Before the election, therefore, Gladstone knew that, if there was any contest, he would probably have to face the hostility of some Churchmen, Liberals and Conservatives as a result of his actions since 1847. On the other hand, because of the well-established university tradition that its members were never challenged when once elected, he should not have had to meet such a trial of strength. On May 1st., however, Greswell heard rumours of the organization in London of an opposition to him at the forthcoming election. The leading figure behind this was Sir Brook Bridges, M.P. for Kent, who had been the chairman of Round's London committee in 1847.[63] Greswell was nevertheless at first optimistic that Gladstone would not have to meet any dangerous challenge. He described the committee set up by Bridges as 'ultra-protestant', 'anti-Puseyite', 'anti-

Maynooth'.[64] Its bias was made clear in its first choice of a candidate. This was J.C. Colquhoun, one of the most extreme Low Churchmen in the Conservative Party.[65] Greswell happily told Gladstone that he had nothing to fear from such a rival. According to the Vice-Chancellor "it was impossible to find a gentleman connected with the Low Church party who could be brought forward with any chance of resident support."[66] Greswell told Gladstone that the most determined opposition to him in the University as distinct from London came in fact from the few ultra-Liberals, especially Jowett of Balliol, due to his outright condemnation of the Royal Commission in 1850. Even these had told him that they would prefer Gladstone to any candidate likely to be selected by Bridges's committee.[67] Greswell also believed there was little to be concerned about in the charge of 'Puseyism' that was now being widely circulated against Gladstone. This could easily be discounted by having his Oxford committee work in close co-operation with that of his colleague, Sir Robert Inglis, who was the last man to be accused of such a vice. Despite all these considerations, Greswell nevertheless suggested that it would still be best to avoid a contest if at all possible, even if only to maintain the tradition of an unchallenged university representation.[68]

By May 16th., however, the situation was transformed

when Bridges's committee, conscious of the weakness of their candidate, persuaded Colquhoun to retire and Dr. Marsham, Warden of Merton, to stand in his place. Marsham was a Tory High Churchman, who maintained the strict principles of the Constitution in Church and State. He represented those who accused Gladstone of having abandoned these principles on which he had in fact been elected in 1847. At that time, he still enjoyed the reputation, however undeserved, amongst the electorate of being their staunch champion. His votes on Jewish emancipation, Papal Aggression and the Colonial Church had subsequently shown how far he had advanced towards a theory of 'religious liberty' that must ultimately result in the disestablishment of the Church of England. His critics could see no development since 1847 that could justify such a reversal of opinions. Gladstone's argument that the use of the secular committee of the Privy Council as a final Court of Appeal in the Gorham case had invalidated his earlier theories on Church-State relations was in no way valid, as that very Court had existed, at least in theory, during the eighteen-thirties when he had first formulated them.[69] It was on this ground that Gladstone no longer held the principles on which he was elected in 1847 that his opponents justified breaking the tradition of 'no contest'.

These were arguments that Gladstone's supporters had

to take seriously. The Guardian, which once again placed its full authority behind him, devoted a considerable amount of space to their refutation. It had to admit that it still disagreed with Gladstone's judgement on the Jewish question, urging that only when the Church of England was completely separated from the State could Jews be safely admitted to Parliament. Nevertheless, it asked his constituents whether they could sincerely claim to have agreed with all of even Sir Robert Inglis's views. On the more positive side, the Guardian was prepared to give its unqualified approbation to the more general principles of 'religious liberty', the freedom of the Church to develop her own internal energies which would still be consistent with the safe preservation of her connection with the State, that Gladstone was now developing.[70] As for the candidature of the Warden of Merton,, it could see various reasons why Dr. Marsham should never have accepted the invitation to stand: he was not eminent in the same way as Gladstone undoubtedly was, he would certainly revive the split between members of Convocation and the Heads, he would not have the time to fulfil his functions both as a Head and also as a member of Parliament at one and the same time.[71] Gladstone himself was also most anxious to defend his reputation for consistency, and the Guardian published his statement made to Greswell that he sincerely believed.

> there was no incompatibility between the principles of full religious freedom and the maintenance of the National Church in connexion with the State, both of which I am now and ever will be constantly attached to.[72]

Despite such arguments, the opposition to Gladstone at Oxford became more pronounced. His supporters were especially dismayed when the majority of the Heads announced their support for the Warden of Merton. They did so for two reasons. First, their traditional loyalty to the Conservative Party had been affronted by Gladstone's responsibility for the Government's defeat on May 10th.[73] Secondly, an inspired rumour was circulated that Gladstone had fully approved the report of the Royal Commission on University Reform, which, if totally put into effect, would gravely impair their authority.[74] Actually, Gladstone's attitude towards the Report was, in fact, far from clear. In June he had told A.P. Stanley that, while he was now completely convinced of the necessity of reform, he was still most reluctant to ask for more than an enabling act which would allow the University to reform itself.[75] Such views had very little appeal for the extreme Liberals, and Benjamin Jowett refused to vote for him at this election partly for this reason. Jowett had, however, even more personal reasons for not supporting him:

> I feel a strong dislike to that over-conscientiousness of his, which, instead of walking in the great highway of political truth and honesty, is always

> winding round to his own interest and coming out at odd places where nobody expects him. Were it not for this I think him a noble fellow. At present he is too good to be trusted.[76]

The hostility of the heads, the doubts of the Liberals, the alliance of the 'high and dry' and 'low and slow' church parties at Oxford on Marsham's committee,[77] all these were factors which appeared to have weakened Gladstone's position at the University since his success in 1847. Indeed, at one stage of this contest, the situation seemed so desperate that Gladstone offered to stand down, in order to avoid "a political struggle complicated and embittered by theological controversies".[78] It soon became clear, however, that, contrary to all expectations, Gladstone's return was in no real doubt. Against the wishes of Marsham's Oxford supporters, the Warden's London committee nevertheless demanded a poll, despite the evidence of straw votes that his position was hopeless.[79] The result was an even more decisive victory for Gladstone than it had been in 1847. Inglis received 1369 votes compared to 1700: Gladstone 1281 to 997: Marsham 931 to Round's total of 824.

There were two main reasons for this unexpectedly easy success. The first was the unqualified support given to Gladstone by John Keble, who still had a great influence amongst the country clergymen. In particular, Keble published a widely read pamphlet which must have swung many votes in his favour. It was true that Keble remained

remained unable to justify the vote for the removal of Jewish disabilities, which was certainly the critical issue for most of the electors. He urged them to remember, however, that Gladstone, as a man of affairs, had a far greater competence than they did to judge the practical aspects of this question.[80] He went on to deal with the charge that Gladstone could not be considered a 'Protestant' with a fine irony. If the word was defined strictly as 'a Christian of the Western Church not in communion with Rome', then no one could deny Gladstone's right to claim the title. If defined vaguely as one who asserted the absolute right of private judgement, or who held a peculiar notion of justification, or who deferred excessively to State authority in religious matters, it would also exclude most of the other members of the University.[81] Finally, Keble defended spiritedly Gladstone's opposition to the Ecclesiastical Titles bill:

> in his claim for religious liberty for the Church (which must also be given all Dissenters, both Protestant and Roman), he is doing more than any other statesman to maintain what remains of the old English Constitution in respect of the alliance between Church and State.[82]

All this made a most effective counterblast to the propaganda of the English Review.

The second cause for the failure to unseat Gladstone at this election was the opposition's lack of dynamic leadership. The man who might have provided this, as he in

fact did six months later, was Archdeacon Denison. At this time, however, although Denison had lost confidence in the general policy now being followed by Gladstone in religious matters, he still had heartily approved of his opposition to the Ecclesiastical Titles bill, a measure he thought would prevent any further co-operation between the Protestant and Catholic Churches which would be essential in the near future to meet the danger from the secular state.[83] For this reason, while still refusing to add his name to anything which would imply positive approval for Gladstone, he told Robert Phillimore that he was prepared to sign the declaration then being circulated against breaking the tradition of uncontested elections at the University. He did so because he approved of Gladstone's doctrine of "religious liberty or equality or by whatever name this necessary evil goes".[84] Denison was to maintain this neutral position throughout the election, a fact which was of great assistance to Gladstone's campaign.

When the result of the election was declared, the Rev. A.W. Haddan, the Secretary of Gladstone's Oxford committee, sent him a careful analysis of the voting, with the warning that his position was still most insecure despite his apparently easy victory.[85] Haddan calculated that only between thirty and forty of those who had supported him in 1847 had actually changed sides as a result of his Jewish vote. At least three hundred more, however, had abstained

from voting for this reason, and four out of five who had supported him nevertheless disagreed with him over this issue. Here then was a source of discontent that more effective leadership might have used in order to ensure his defeat. Again, Haddan was convinced that at least three quarters of those who voted for Gladstone were at the same time supporters of the Conservative Government, because they believed it to be the only alternative to a Whig-Radical coalition. He prophesized that Gladstone would be in serious danger of losing his seat if he made any combination with Russell or Cobden for political reasons. Finally, Haddan emphasized the great disapproval felt at Oxford for the report of the Royal Commission. It would thus be most unwise for Gladstone to endorse the principles of the report in the hope of attracting more support from the Liberal resident members, only forty of whom, after all, had voted for him at this time. Haddan had, in fact, little confidence in the benefits to be derived from any alliance with that group. Notwithstanding this advice, Gladstone made it clear that he was indeed changing his opinions on this matter. His opposition to the Royal Commission in 1850 had been because he could not agree to the idea of Government interference in university affairs, and it was certainly not a denial of the need for extensive reforms. He was not prepared to maintain his opposition to state

intervention if the university authorities refused to initiate these reforms themselves.[86]

Haddan's analysis of the position at Oxford after the election was to prove a most judicious one. The extent of the disapproval felt for many of Gladstone's acts even by those who continued to vote for him was soon made clear in a letter written at this time by Sir William Heathcote:

> It has sometimes seemed to me that you stand too much at the exact antipode to poor old Inglis in your practical parliamentary conduct. I mean that while he, laying down certain principles, seem to be contented if he can but state these without advancing a step towards their practical application, and would almost seem to prefer a life of perpetual protest, you on the contrary are so full of a statesman's appreciation of practical difficulties and advantages and of all the best modes of dealing with the temper of the House of Commons as to be seen sometimes as if you had no faith in your own principles. Moreover, in cases where there is a doubt, I question whether you give the benefit of that doubt to the known opinions of your constitutents which is their due beyond what can be claimed by other constituents.[87]

Haddan was to prove equally correct in the second warning he gave Gladstone, that if he joined any combination with the Whigs or Radicals, he would be faced by an opposition at Oxford far more intense than that he experienced in July. Confirmation of this prophecy came in fact a mere six months later. Now Gladstone was not merely responsible for the defeat of the Conservative Government in the House of Commons. By his slashing attack on Disraeli's budget, he had been undeniably the chief instrument of that Government's

fall on December 17th. By his readiness to accept office as Chancellor of the Exchequer in the new Ministry under Lord Aberdeen, he had done much to make possible its replacement by a coalition of Whigs, Peelites and Radicals. These two facts could not but shock the conservative sentiments which were still so strong amongst his constituents. It was not surprising that Archdeacon Denison could burst forth in his wrath that "from this time I can place no confidence in you as Representative of the University or public man."[88] More disturbing was the fact that J.C. Coleridge could tell Stafford Northcote that many of Gladstone's oldest friends were now dubious whether they could continue to support him:

> Nothing but an absence from opposition can save us from defeat. The defections are numerous and important, especially so, I think, Sir William Heathcote, who declines acting in any way. Unless someone is started today or tomorrow, we are safe for the time at any rate... but Parliament will soon be dissolved, and if that happens we shall lose Gladstone at Oxford.[89]

For a time, it seemed that Coleridge's hopes of no contest on this occasion would be fulfilled. On December 31st., Greswell could still assure Gladstone that, according to his information, no opposition would be made to his re-election, which was made necessary by his acceptance of office in the Coalition, and on the following day, Gladstone left London for his estate at Harwarden.[90] It soon became clear, however, that Greswell had not been fully informed

of what was going on, for on the 31st. itself, a meeting of 'the Friends of the last Administration' had met in London and had chosen as their candidate to oppose Gladstone Lord Chandos, heir to the Duke of Buckingham, a junior minister in Derby's Government and reputedly 'a determined Protestant'.[91] On January 1st., 1853, Charles Lempriere, sometime Fellow of St. Johns and a Conservative Party agent, who had been a moving spirit behind these proceedings, passed through Oxford on his way to persuade Chandos to accept the nomination, and he could not resist spreading the news amongst his friends at the University. Robert Phillimore, the only Gladstonian left there during the vacation, heard the gossip and raised the alarm. The next day, Chandos refused to make a definite decision before consulting his political colleagues in London, but Lampriere, convinced that he would finally accept, gave an overfavourable account of his interview to Dr. Wynter, the President of St. Johns, who agreed to chair an Oxford committee on his behalf. On Monday, January 3rd., however, Chandos announced his firm resolve not to stand. This decision left both the London and Oxford committees set up by Gladstone's opponents in a serious predicament, since they had already issued circulars bearing his name. After a desperate search for another candidate, late that night they persuaded Dudley Perceval to stand. The next day, Denison proposed Perceval as a candidate in the Oxford Convocation,

amidst protests from Gladstone's supporters that "a fraud had been practised on the University". It was in this strained atmosphere that the poll was to drag on for an unprecedented period of fifteen days.

Dudley Perceval, the son of the Prime Minister assassinated in 1812, once described himself as

> of the good old High Church school as it was understood before the days of the Oxford Tracts or rather of Tract 90: equally opposed to Bureaucratic Erastianism and Popish encroachments - but looking to the revival of Convocation as the only true method of stemming the latter.[92]

He was well aware that his membership in the National Club, the haunt of the extreme Low Churchmen, would do much to deny such claims to high churchmanship, even of the traditional kind, in the eyes of many of the Oxford electorate. He defended himself by maintaining that he only remained a member of that club "for the sake of keeping their views in order", with, he claimed, considerable success.[93]

The nomination of Perceval in opposition to Gladstone revived the alliance between the Conservative Party, the Low Churchmen and the Protestant High Churchmen which was first formed to challenge Gladstone in July 1852. This time, however, they pressed home their attack much more determinedly. In the first place, it was generally assumed that Gladstone's speech against Disraeli's budget proposals on December 17th., had been chiefly responsible for the overthrow of Derby's Government. This had angered not only the

political partisans of the Conservatives, but also those members of the University who had expected so much from the use of church patronage in the hands of Lord Derby, who had been from the previous autumn both Prime Minister and Chancellor of the University: "Loaves and fishes, livings and Bishoprics, all knocked over. Hence the angry feeling, speeches and letters of even good and pious men."[94] Gladstone did his best to justify the stand he had taken in the critical budget debate in a letter written to Sir William Heathcote, who was for the first time threatening to withhold his support from Gladstone: he wrote

> All that I have done, whatever questions or doubts may arise as to results, which are with God, has in my view flowed...simply and directly from the absolute dictates of duty.

Certainly, Gladstone went on, he would have preferred to rejoin the Conservative Party rather than form an alliance with the Whigs, and he had even been prepared to accept Disraeli as a colleague. What had finally prevented this was the budget, "a most dishonest, profligate system of finance":

> If you ask me what I mean by financial dishonesty in a Minister, I mean such things as these: relieving the present at the expense of the future; promising what he cannot perform: inviting the people to spend what they have not got: and exciting popular avarice without the slightest inkling of knowledge whether he can lull it or not.

Gladstone had thus felt compelled to vote against the Conservative budget, and having thereby helped to defeat the

Government, it seemed to him his duty to assist in its replacement if invited, especially as foreign affairs were in so critical a state. His refusal to have done so would have seriously weakened Lord Aberdeen's position.[95]

Political considerations were therefore one motive behind the opposition to Gladstone's re-election. The Guardian, indeed, in its anxiety to place him in the best light possible, strongly maintained at one time that they were the only motive, that the hostility against Gladstone was "a mere outbreak of the lowest political and party animosities", the result of the manoeuvres of the election agents at the Carlton Club.[96] Its claim that no religious considerations were involved at all was, however, firmly rejected by Archdeacon Denison, who had now assumed the leadership of the opposition. His determination to unseat Gladstone, although partly influenced by his regret at the defeat of Derby's Government, was in the main the measure of his disapproval of Gladstone's religious policy over the last few years, and in particular the frustration caused him by Gladstone's most evident lack of enthusiasm for the crusade against the educational policy of the Whig Government since 1847:

> He has never in any one single instance from the Spring of 1847 up to this time given me any manner of support in or out of Parliament. I am obliged to go further still and to say that by his hesitating, uncertain and most discouraging manner of dealing with the whole question in Parliament,

> he has done more to damage the cause than any man living.[97]

Denison maintained that the events of December 1852 had done more than merely aggravate this long-standing grievance. The charge against Gladstone was no longer restricted to "negation of support".[98] He had taken the positive step of joining a Cabinet which could only be described as "a flagrant piece of political immorality".[99] Because of Gladstone's imperative need for the support of the Whigs, he would be unable from now on to resist their nefarious schemes, especially their ambition "to undermine and finally to destroy by law the Parochial School system of England".[100] Denison was certainly by no means alone in feeling that Gladstone would lose his independence of action by joining the Coalition. Pusey confirmed to him that it was the presence of Russell in the Cabinet which was the cause of most disquiet amongst his supporters:

> Lord J.R. is a heavy weight. His Durham letter, his avowed purpose to 'liberalize the Church through the Bishops, etc. have made him obnoxious to Churchmen more than any other. It is Lord J.R., not you, against which [sic] people are voting; or, if they are indifferent, it is Lord J.R. who makes them indifferent.[101]

Pusey nevertheless still hoped that "a few hearty words about the Church and some general terms about Conservatism would, I trust, rally people again".[102]

Gladstone was not, however, prepared to make such vague pledges to his supporters, but he insisted that his

past record in defence of the interests of the Church was sufficient answer to these charges. He would certainly never have accepted office in the Coalition if he had not been sure that Church legislation and appointments were as safe in the hands of Lord Aberdeen as they had been with Lord Derby.[103]

> Both I believe have fair and equitable intentions towards the Church... and with my view of Lord Aberdeen's sagacity and virtues, I freely accept the responsibility of having taken office under a Prime Minister, who, though he will recommend Bishops to the Crown, has never for himself renounced his connection with the Presbyterian Church.[104]

During the first weeks of January, Gladstone wrote in this sense to those of his former supporters who were now wavering in their allegiance to him. Churchmen of authority, like Pusey and Wilberforce, did the same on his behalf.[105] It became clear, however, that Gladstone was fighting for survival at Oxford. He had soon fallen well behind in the polling, and his committee were forced to issue a frantic appeal for support. Although his position now steadily improved, the outcome remained in doubt until the last. At the end of the extended period of polling, Gladstone was to retain his seat, but only with a considerably reduced majority of 1022 votes to 898.

His success against great odds was due to two reasons. In the first place, Denison overplayed his strong hand, The 'behind the scenes' intrigues in the selection of the

opposition candidate did much to justify the charge that he was more interested in unseating Gladstone than in choosing a fit representative for the University.[106] He and his party made such bitter charges against Gladstone's principles and morals that there was soon a reaction in his favour. Sir William Heathcote, indeed, was to apologize for his lack of sympathy at the start of the contest:

> If I had been able to foresee the sort of attack which was to be made on you or the disgraceful tricks by means of which that attack (even supposing that it had been in itself quite profitable) was to be conducted, you may be sure that I should never have hesitated for one moment in doing anything or everything for you.[107]

Denison found that his tactics had lost him even the support of the Bristol Church Union, hitherto his stronghold. Without referring to him by name, the Union passed on January 10th., a resolution deploring the fact that certain Churchmen had become identified with the interests of the Conservative Party.[108] The reputation of the Heads suffered equally from their apparent involvement in these unscrupulous manoeuvres. For the third time they had tried to defeat Gladstone, and now they had failed in most discreditable circumstances. There can be little doubt that it was his experiences of their hostility during these elections that did much to persuade Gladstone of the need to restrict their autocratic power in the University, even if this meant relying on the authority of the Government to compel them

to accept the necessary reforms.[109]

There was at the same time a second and more fundamental reason why Gladstone secured his re-election in January 1853. Although they were only a minority of the electorate, it was still the resident members at Oxford who controlled the result of the polling. Not even Denison could persuade the country members of Convocation to attend in a large enough number to outvote them. It was Gladstone's great achievement to take full advantage of this fact and to build up a sufficient amount of support amongst the Liberal and the Anglo-Catholic residents, two parties which J.B. Mozley could still describe as hating each other,[110] in order to secure his election. At the start of the contest, the Liberals indeed were reluctant to commit themselves to Gladstone, and Jowett remained hostile throughout: as the struggle became more bitter, however, the majority of them came to his support.[111] Even more impressive was Gladstone's success with the Anglo-Catholics. This was not entirely due to the fact they shared the same church principles. Indeed, on many issues, there was a considerable difference of opinion between them, this being especially so, as Gladstone himself emphasized, in the case of Pusey, the leading representative of the original Tractarians at Oxford.[112] In spite of this, Pusey was prepared to work actively on Gladstone's behalf during the campaign because

of his confidence in him as a public man.[113] For very similar reasons, as Stafford Northcote told Gladstone, the younger generation of these Churchmen would support him despite the inconvenience caused to academic life by these elections.[114] J.B. Mozley believed that the impact made by Gladstone on the minds of the young Anglo-Catholics had created what he described, without further defining the term, as "a High Church Liberalism [which] bids fair to be the order of the day".[115]

After Gladstone's success against this most determined challenge, his prestige at Oxford in 1853 and 1854 was high. The strength of his position seemed to be confirmed by the election of Sir William Heathcote as the second member for the University after the resignation of Sir Robert Inglis on the grounds of ill-health in January 1854. Heathcote, "the perfect type and pattern of the English country gentleman",[116] had been a pupil of John Keble at Oriel between 1818 and 1821, and the continuing friendship of the two men was strengthened when in 1835 Heathcote presented Keble to the parish of Hursley in Hampshire, where he was the local squire. As a result, he was considered a committed Tractarian in his religious sympathies.[117] He was also a close personal friend of Gladstone, and had been the chairman of his London committee during the three previous elections.

It was not surprising that Denison warned Dudley Perceval that Gladstone's position at Oxford would become unassailable if such a 'Gladstonian' were elected to replace Inglis.[118]

In actual fact, this popular impression of Heathcote was somewhat misleading. He made it clear that he did not agree with many of the Anglo-Catholic beliefs, being, in particular, much more ready to support the union of church and state and the royal supremacy than they were.[119] He was indeed considered by many of the residents as merely the representative of the country gentry amongst the electorate, and they themselves would have much preferred Roundell Palmer to have been elected instead.[120] His undeniable admiration for Gladstone did not prevent him from fearing that his "mystical refinements" at times badly distorted that statesman's judgement.[121] Above all, a wide political gulf was now opening between the two men. Heathcote represented himself as an independent Conservative, but he was nevertheless on very easy terms with the Derbyites. As we have seen, he almost severed his relations with Gladstone when he became a member of the Coalition. Despite the hopes of Stafford Northcote,[122] the political partnership between the two men as representatives of the University in the House of Commons was to prove almost as uncomfortable as that between Gladstone and Inglis had been. It remained

true, nevertheless, that the unopposed return of Heathcote in January 1854 was justifiably considered a triumph for Gladstone's faction at Oxford, with even Mozley considering that it had given "the Puseyites" possession of the whole of the University representation.[123]

In these years, Gladstone also managed to reconcile the differing opinions of Anglo-Catholics and Liberals at Oxford on the issue of University Reform, to such an extent, indeed, that the passing of the Oxford University Reform Act of 1854 marked the great achievement of High Church Liberalism at Oxford itself. Liberals and Anglo-Catholics had proved themselves able to work together effectively[124] for a common purpose. This was, however, to prove the high water mark of their co-operation, and from now on the tide turned against it. This was due in part to the very success of both groups in increasing their strength at the University. They were now both strongly represented on the new Hebdomadal Council set up as the result of the Reform Act. The Liberals benefited from the patronage of Palmerston's Government. The return of A.P. Stanley to Oxford in 1854 as Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History, a man of great personal charm and an attractive preacher, did much to win support for their cause amongst the undergraduates. On the other hand, Pusey the representative of Anglo-Catholicism at the University, discovered that his influence there was reviving as the

bitterness caused by the controversies of the eighteen-forties diminished, that on certain questions he could now carry the Hebdomadal Council with him and that his sermons were once again attracting the attention of the young men.[125] The two groups were thus in a much more favourable position to act independently of each other and, perhaps inevitably, the relations between then grew more strained after 1854.

The electoral fortunes of Gladstone in the University constituency do much to illustrate this development. After the collapse of the Coalition in January 1855, he had first joined and then resigned from its successor Government formed by Lord Palmerston. His party organizers warned him that he would have little chance of re-election if, as expected, Palmerston appealed to the country in the near future. According to Heathcote, the crucial issue was the concession made in the University Reform Act which enabled Dissenters to graduate from Oxford. This had been warmly welcomed by the Liberals whilst being bitterly opposed by the Anglo-Catholics. Keble, in particular, thought that Gladstone should have resigned rather than accept the majority decision in the Commons on this issue. Although he was still prepared to vote for him, it was only "as it were <u>in faith</u>", and not because he was able to justify in any way what had occurred, and he was certainly no longer willing to sit on Gladstone's committee.[126] Others of his

friends like Bishop Wilberforce thought it would be in his best interests to resign his seat rather than wait to be ignominiously defeated.[127] Heathcote himself, after a conversation with Stafford Northcote about Gladstone's political future, reported that they had both decided not to recommend him to withdraw, but this was because of their great personal regard for him rather than their feeling he could survive another contest.[128] It appeared as if the alliance between Liberals and Anglo-Catholics which had brought about his victory in 1853 had now collapsed, and that Gladstone could no longer hope to hold his seat.

When the general election was finally held in April 1857, however, the situation had radically changed. Gladstone's sustained opposition to Palmerston in the last parliamentary session, had reunited in his support High Churchmen of all shades of opinion, including both Anglo-Catholics and Protestant High Churchmen. Further, for the first time his course of action had been most satisfactory to his Tory constituents. There was no longer any danger from a revived coalition between Archdeacon Denison and the Derbyites which had proved so serious in January 1853. It was true that the Evangelicals at Oxford, strong supporters of Palmerston because of the nature of his church appointments, planned to run in opposition to him Lord Blandford, a church reformer who had recently broken with Lord Derby and announced

his support for Palmerston. According to the Saturday Review, the choice of Blandford was an attempt to combine Liberals and Evangelicals in the electorate against the supposed Conservatives and Liberal-Conservatives. It urged, however, that nothing should be done to disturb the existing Liberal - Liberal-Conservative alliance, which had just made possible a measure of reform, adding probably 'centuries to the existence of the University".[129] In any case, the union of Peelites and Derbyites had disarmed half the previous opposition to Gladstone, making the idea of a contest ridiculous,[130] and Gladstone was returned unopposed. His continued hostility towards Palmerston, especially during the long drawn-out controversy over the divorce bill in 1857, strengthened still further his position at Oxford, and once again in the general election of April 1859 he was returned unchallenged. At this time, indeed, it was not Gladstone but Heathcote who seemed more likely to resign his Oxford seat in the near future, in his case for reasons of ill-health.[131]

In spite of this, the month of June that same year saw one of the major crises in Gladstone's career, and a most serious threat against him at the University. On the 11th, he had voted with the Conservatives on the motion of confidence, the loss of which was to bring about the downfall of Derby's second administration: on the 16th., he was in

office as Chancellor of the Exchequer under Palmerston. This appeared an act of utter inconsistency to most of his contemporaries, and it was not surprising that the usually sympathetic Guardian maintained that "his friends deserve an explanation".[132]

On June 17th., Gladstone wrote to Provost Hawkins of Oriel a letter to justify what seemed to him still an obviously right decision.[133] Because of the critical European situation, he had felt it his duty to accept Palmerston's offer of office, especially as this had been made to him even despite his previous support of the Conservatives. He agreed with Palmerston and Russell moreover in their policy towards the two major issues of the day, Italian unification and Parliamentary reform, the second of which the Conservatives had proved themselves incapable of settling when in office. He would be reunited as a member of the new Cabinet with men with whom he had acted harmoniously under Aberdeen in 1853 and 1854, and, even if the Government now contained more extreme Radicals as well, the fact must be faced that no contemporary Ministry could stand which did not include a wide range of opinion. In this letter, he was repeating arguments which he had already made to Heathcote, to whom he added the plea that he could no longer remain politically isolated, and there seemed no hope now that he would ever be able to join the Derbyites.[134] The proposal was that the

Provost should have Gladstone's letter printed in order that it might be distributed amongst the Oxford electorate. When he showed it around in manuscript, however, Hawkins found that it did not convince even Gladstone's acknowledged supporters, and it took considerable pressure from Greswell to persuade him to print it at all.[135]

Hawkins's fear that Gladstone's explanation would not serve its purpose was a well-founded one. It certainly did not placate the aggrieved Conservatives, who now once again provided the driving force behind the opposition to his re-election. They selected as their candidate Lord Chandos, the same man who had placed them in an embarrassing position by refusing to stand in January 1853, but who was now convinced of the need to expel Gladstone.[136] It was a matter of much concern to Gladstone and his supporters to deny that this opposition reflected the official policy of the Conservatives, for they realized the great influence possessed in Oxford by Lord Derby as Chancellor of the University. Thus the Guardian, which once again had swung round to the support of Gladstone, dismissed it contemptuously as the work of "the junior ministers of the late Government from which Lord Derby completely disassociates himself".[137] There was, indeed, some justification for it to do so, for on June 17th., Stafford Northcote, who was becoming a person of influence in the Conservative Party, told Gladstone that Derby was recommending

that there should be no opposition to him at this time.[138] Gladstone nevertheless asked Northcote to persuade Derby to disown publicly the Conservatives who were on Chandos's committee lest his silence be mistaken for approval.[139] This placed Northcote in a difficult position. He had still been ready to promise Gladstone all the possible assistance he could give him in private, including his vote, even while he felt that his membership of the last Conservative Administration now prevented him from organizing Gladstone's campaign as he had done previously.[140] He believed, therefore, that Derby would regard any request he made on Gladstone's behalf as special pleading.[141] Moreover, as leader of the party, Derby could not censure his colleagues in public, however much he might disapprove of their actions.[142] As a result, Frederick Lygon, Sotheron Estcourt and Seymour Fitzgerald continued to work against Gladstone without rebuke, and, according to the Guardian, the Conservative whip was being used freely on behalf of Chandos.[143] That paper was to see the defeat of Chandos as

> a blow justly deserved by that policy of personal animosity which has so often been the discredit of the Conservative party under its present organization.[144]

Gladstone's letter to Provost Hawkins did little either to relieve the fears of Churchmen who had previously supported him. They were not convinced by his claim that he was merely following the precedent set when he took office

in the Coalition Government of December 1852. At that time a Peelite Prime Minister with Peelites forming almost half the Cabinet set a limit to the influence of the Whigs on Government policy. Now, Gladstone and the three Peelite colleagues who accompanied him, the Duke of Newcastle, Sidney Herbert and Edward Cardwell, would be outvoted on controversial matters. Above all, they were deeply concerned about the fact that church patronage would once again be in the hands of Palmerston as Prime Minister. They could not fail to note that in his letter to Hawkins Gladstone made no mention of this matter which had proved such a serious cause of offence to them during Palmerston's first Administration.

Samuel Wilberforce as Bishop of Oxford was well aware how strong was the anxiety felt especially by the clerical members of the University electorate over this issue. He warned Gladstone that his success depended on his ability to make it known that he had reached an understanding with Palmerston on it.[145] Gladstone replied:

> I believe that I should be either setting a bad precedent or following an equally bad example were I to make my opinions on Lord Palmerston's past exercise of church patronage the criterion of my political opposition or support... . Again, the head of a Ministry would compromise both his dignity and his duty were he willing to enter into any such compact on such a subject. Further, were he spontaneously to give any indication with respect to the use of the prerogatives of the Crown, you will agree with me that it could not be disclosed with propriety to a constituency

> on the eve of an election, even though it be the constituency of the University of Oxford. I think I have sufficient evidence that Lord Palmerston's intentions on this point are fair and just. Nor can there by any objection to your stating them in confidence to the Warden of All Souls or any like person. But confidence implies strict and narrow limitations, and I cannot for any consideration authorize a statement of this kind to be generally circulated.[146]

According to one hostile observer, Wilberforce showed he possessed far fewer scruples in this matter than Gladstone. It was charged that the Bishop took advantage of Gladstone's vague hint about his confidence in Palmerston's good intentions to inspire a widely-spread rumour among the clergy in his diocese that Gladstone would in fact have full responsibility for church appointments, thus doing much to secure his re-election.[147]

In the event, after a hard contest, Gladstone was to retain his seat by a majority exceeding that he had received in 1853, the figures being 1050 votes to 860. His surprisingly decisive success was in part due to the willingness of the Oxford Evangelicals, hitherto amongst the most fanatical of his opponents, to give him their support after he had become the colleague of a Prime Minister who still commanded their fervent loyalty.[148] It was also during this election that for the first time he won the votes of the majority of the Liberal dons at the University.[149] Gladstone's victory proved above all that the Anglo-Catholics, in spite of their serious doubts about his decision to join Palmerston's

Cabinet, had still not lost their confidence in him. The Guardian, in particular, was able to offer many reasons why they should continue to trust his judgement. It argued that Gladstone must now join one or other of the two main groups in Parliament, if he wished to remain in political life at all that he had done as much as any other man to support Derby's Government during the crucial debate on its reform bill in the early months of 1859 which was to lead to its downfall, and that he was therefore entitled to join the only political combination which could provide the strong government that the country so desperately needed. It also confessed itself, perhaps with less sincerity, unable to perceive any fundamental difference between the nature of this Administration and that of the Coalition under Lord Aberdeen, which many High Churchmen had been prepared to accept.[150] Gladstone's cause was furthered strenthened by the readiness of John Keble to make his customary declaration of faith in his good intentions. He told the readers of the Guardian that "I have no doubt that he has good reasons for the line he has taken, whether we can understand them or not."[151]

The result was a most satisfactory outcome to the election. It remained true that Gladstone's position at Oxford was more precarious than this might suggest. What struck contemporaries most was that the strongest opposition to him came from those who had most recently graduated

as Masters of Arts, which proved that he was failing to maintain his influence over the younger generation, hitherto his greatest triumph card.[152] Another disturbing fact from his point of view was the rising cost of this election. Due to the need for extravagant advertisements on his behalf in the Times, the expenses came to over £1000, and, apart from a generous contribution from Roundell Palmer, most of this fell on Gladstone himself.[153] It was not surprising, therefore, that Gladstone seriously considered relinquishing his seat at Oxford after receiving an invitation to stand at a bye-election for South Lancashire in 1861. The request to do so was all the more attractive in the light of the University Elections Act, which became law on August 1st., 1861. This gave the University electors the privilege, unique at that time, of recording their votes by post, and would apparently benefit those of the country clergy who had been prevented from voting by the expense of attending in person to do so. It seemed that Gladstone would henceforth have to pay even more attention to clerical prejudices if he wished to retain his seat.[154] Despite these considerations, he nevertheless decided at this time not to exchange Oxford for South Lancashire, mainly because of a warning from Greswell, who had family connections at Denton, near Manchester, that the Lancashire Conservatives were organizing a powerful opposition to him.[155]

Gladstone's decision to remain as member for Oxford University, the constituency most concerned about religious issues, was to cause him serious difficulties during this period. It meant that his every speech and vote on these matters was scrutinized with close attention and considerable suspicion. At a time when the very existence of the Church of England seemed threatened by an aggressive Dissent, High Churchmen of all shades of opinion found it impossible to maintain a sense of proportion in their judgement of his actions. As a result, Gladstone was to find himself subject to severe public criticism when he was struggling to reappraise his own ideas on church policy.

One of the reasons why Gladstone had joined Palmerston's Cabinet in 1859 was his belief that by doing so he could become the spokesman for what he considered the essential interests of the Church of England. He wanted above all to be in a position where he could protect the spiritual nature of that Church. He was convinced that this could only now be effectively done by winning and retaining the confidence of the Liberal Party as a whole. He had to persuade its members in particular that his devotion to the Anglican Church did not compell him to offer an immoderate defence of the temporal privileges of establishment, which he himself now felt as irrelevant for its proper work in the community. It was Roundell Palmer who was to give the most

perceptive account of Gladstone's thinking during this period, an account which at the same time showed his own doubts about its wisdom:

> for many years he had clung to the belief that the best hope of doing good to the Church was to make it the main aim to retain the confidence of Churchmen; and he did not undervalue it now. But he was now sure that it was chiefly by retaining the confidence of the Liberal Party that any good was to be done to the Church in its highest interests. The best things which had been done to the Church in our time was the restoration of free speech in Convocation, and the emancipation of the Church in the colonies, both due to Liberal Governments. In this he seemed to me to give the Liberal Party more credit for liberality towards the Church than was really its due. In the colonies, if what had been done had been beneficial to the Church, it had certainly not been done for that reason; and it was notorious that Gladstone's Whig colleagues in permitting Convocation to meet had yielded to his influence against their judgement.[156]

Another of Gladstone's supporters, Bishop Wilberforce, showed that he had similar misgivings about his policy in this respect. One particular cause of tension between the two men was the proposed qualification for offices bill of 1863. Its purpose was to abolish one of the many minor grievances which so irritated the Dissenters by compelling them when assuming a municipal office to make a declaration that they would never use their authority to injure or weaken the Church of England in any way. This meant in practice little more than preventing them from attending the social functions of their sects wearing their robes of office, and Gladstone told Wilberforce that to insist on this declaration

would be an attempt to preserve the privilege of establishment rather than to protect the spiritual interests of the Church:

> if this Bill is not supported, it is better to profess a thorough-going obstructiveness at once, and to say that nothing shall be yielded except to force, for that is what the whole matter comes to... . We shall simply be doing in our day what Eldon and Inglis did in theirs. I must say, this is not my idea of stewardship.[157]

Wilberforce was not, however, to be convinced by this contention. He did not agree "that our strength is in the affection of the people rather than in the legal defence of the Church Establishment, for that seems to sacrifice our whole position."[158] He would not therefore vote for the bill, especially if this meant opposing the decision of the majority of his episcopal colleagues in the House of Lords. The most that he would promise Gladstone was to abstain from voting.[159] As it happened, his abstention made no difference to the vote in the Lords, as that House rejected the bill by 69 to 52, leaving the issue unsettled until Gladstone was to come to power himself as Prime Minister.

If Wilberforce and Palmer were unable to accept Gladstone's belief in the need to make minor concessions in order to preserve the essential interests of the Church, it was not surprising that those High Churchmen who had already lost their confidence in him could never believe in the sincerity of his motives. The Church and State Review, in

particular, was by 1863 convinced that his policy was determined solely by political and not by religious considerations. In order to achieve his ambition, of becoming Prime Minister Gladstone was in fact seeking the support of political Dissent by working closely with its chief representative in the House of Commons, John Bright.[160] Such fears were apparently confirmed when a year later, during the debate on the proposal to extend the franchise to the six pound householder, Gladstone was to make his declaration of faith that "every man who is not presumably incapacitated by some consideration of personal unfitness or political danger is morally entitled to come within the pale of the Constitution."[161] For the Saturday Review, this was proof that he had been converted to "the most extreme and pernicious form of Radicalism: universal suffrage".[162]

On this specific issue of the extension of the franchise, most Anglo-Catholics were able to take a more judicial view of Gladstone's declaration than did the Protestant High Churchmen. This was in part due to the care taken by Gladstone's supporters to make clear that, when read with the explicit qualifications, it promised in fact only a moderate increase in the number of voters, which would do little to upset the balance of power between the various classes in the community.[163] Even more important was the fact that these Churchmen now believed that the Church would benefit rather

than suffer by further electoral reform. It was pointed out that the parochial experience of clergymen like Walter Hook in the new industrial towns had proved the validity of this.[164] It was significant that Pusey, in many ways the most reactionary amongst the older generation of Anglo-Catholics, could nevertheless write to the Guardian that, while the true strength of the Church undoubtedly came from within itself, the recent experience of the Church in France had shown that such an secular matter as the extension of the franchise might well prove of considerable assistance to it.[165] For such reasons, Gladstone's support for further electoral reform did not provoke the same opposition from Anglo-Catholics as it did from the Protestant High Churchmen. At the same time, they were extremely concerned about the possibility that he was planning to make himself the leader of "a small but formidable radical party in the House of Commons".[166] Even those who agreed with him that the Anglican Church suffered rather than benefitted from its establishment could not bear the thought that he was apparently hoping to achieve this leadership by tolerating a series of attacks on the privileges still possessed by the Church.

By April 1863, the discontent felt by many High Churchmen for Gladstone's equivocal attitude towards political Dissent had reached such a peak that Archdeacon Denison

decided that the time had finally arrived to expel Gladstone from his seat at Oxford. He was to suffer an initial set-back when the man he believed would have the best chance to do so, Sir Stafford Northcote, firmly refused to stand in opposition to that statesman. When during that same month Denison attended a meeting of Conservative M.P.'s to discuss the situation, he found them so discouraged by this development that they were only prepared to act in the unlikely event of Gladstone resigning his seat. By his eloquent pleading, he managed to persuade them of the need for more aggressive action, and they finally decided unanimously to ask Gathorne-Hardy to oppose Gladstone at the next election.[167]

Hardy was undoubtedly the strongest candidate whom Gladstone had yet faced. Evangelical by unbringing, he had since been converted to high church views.[168] He was to confirm his reputation as a rising man in the Conservative Party with a fighting speech in the censure debate of July 1864.[169] He was an inveterate opponent of Gladstone, having specially obtained his M.A. degree at Oxford in order to be able to vote against him.[170] Nevertheless he took some time before deciding to accept the invitation to stand. This was mainly due to the fact that his own seat at Leominister was by no means secure, and he wanted to devote his energies to retaining that, unless he could be assured

that his return for Oxford was certain. As late as May 25th., 1865, he was to declare that he had never been a candidate and was still not one, even though in fact he had allowed his name to be used by Denison's committee without demur.[171] Neither Gladstone's opponents nor, indeed, his supporters were at all hesitant about starting their election campaign, even before knowing whether there would be an opposition candidate. During 1864, the correspondence columns of the Guardian became a battle ground, in which Gladstone's reputation and record was powerfully attacked and stubbornly defended.

Gladstone's critics maintained in the first place that he had never exercised his authority in the Cabinet in order to safeguard the interests of the Church. They compared his silent acquiescence in Russell's and Palmerston's motions to abolish Church Rates with his most effective threat to resign from the Government unless he had their support in his quarrel with the Lords over the Paper Duties. Lord Robert Cecil bitterly commented that the interests of the Church were less to him than the doctrines of free trade, and that he would never stake his political career over a church issue.[172] Secondly, they accused Gladstone of actively supporting many of the Dissenter's anti-Church measures. In 1863, he had voted for the second reading of Sir Samuel Morton Peto's Burial Bill, which proposed to

permit not only the burial of Dissenters but also the reading of their services in Anglican churchyards. In 1864, he supported the second reading of the Oxford University Tests Bill, which would have admitted Dissenters to fellowships of colleges and allowed them to take part in the government of the University. In 1865, although he did not vote for the motion demanding the disestablishment of the Church in Ireland, he still went out of his way to admit he found the position of that Church most unsatisfactory.

Those who supported Gladstone could not deny the factual basis of such charges, but they complained that the circulars issued by Hardy's committee gave a completely misleading impression of the reasons why Gladstone had acted in this way. The position was far more complex than had been suggested, and none of Gladstone's support had been given without reservations. For example, the Burials Bill had first been introduced in the House of Commons in 1862, when its second reading had been unopposed on the understanding that it would proceed no further until a select committee of the House of Commons had considered the full implications of it. This committee included a number of influential Conservatives, all of whom were prepared after careful deliberation to accept the first clause of the proposed bill, which would have made possible the burial of a Dissenter in a Church of England grave yard without the incumbent of the parish being

obliged to read the Anglican burial service over him. This was in fact a measure of relief to those clergymen who had conscientious scruples about performing the service over those Dissenters, especially the Unitarians, whom they doubted to be Christians at all. The bill also contained much more controversial clauses which would allow Dissenting ministers considerable privileges within the Anglican churchyards. When the bill was reintroduced in 1863, after having been studied by this committee, Gladstone had voted for its second reading because he shared the general approval for the first clause and on the understanding that he would oppose the third reading unless these further clauses had been sufficiently amended in committee. Disraeli, however, realizing the harm that would be done to Gladstone's reputation at Oxford by his vote, was able to enforce the defeat of the bill on this second reading. This he achieved by an alliance with those parliamentary Dissenters like Trelawny who felt that their case for the abolition of Church rates would be greatly weakened if they were allowed to perform their own services in the church yards. The Guardian argued that it was in fact Disraeli and not Gladstone who had acted in this matter for reasons of political expediency, sacrificing the interests of the Church as he did so.[173]

Gladstone's vote for the second reading of the University Test bill in 1864 had been equally misjudged. He

himself had understood the purpose of this bill was to put the Dissenters at Oxford on the same footing they enjoyed at Cambridge, where they could take their M.A. degrees, but were still denied the right to take part in the government of the University. He felt therefore that to oppose it would be merely a policy of indiscriminate resistance against a justified grievance. At the same time, Gladstone realized that the drafting of the bill had not made it sufficiently precise about what would be the status of the Dissenters who had taken their higher degrees. Since this was not rectified when the bill was discussed in committee, he had had no hesitation in voting against its third reading, and thus helping to bring about its defeat. When Goschen introduced another bill the following year with the declared aim of ending the monopoly of the Church of England over the government and teaching functions of Oxford, he firmly opposed it from the start.[175]

The Guardian also claimed that his abstention from voting on the motion for the disestablishment of the Irish Church was not evidence that he in fact supported it. Gladstone certainly agreed with its first clause which stated that the present position of the Irish Church was unsatisfactory, but not with the second which demanded immediate action from the Government to correct it.[174] Unfortunately, Gladstone's speech on this motion gave the impression that he

was out of sympathy with the Establishment not only in Ireland, but also in England. It became indeed the greatest stumbling block for his supporters, and many political observers believed that he had thrown away his seat at Oxford by making it.[176]

To the charge that Gladstone had never been willing to risk his political career in defence of the Church, his supporters replied by comparing to his great advantage his efforts on behalf of the Church with those of the leaders of the traditional Church Party, Derby and Disraeli. They recalled once again the refusal of Derby to sacrifice his own convenience to lead a determined opposition to the Divorce Act: they asked what the Conservatives had done for the Church when they had been in office during the eighteen-fifties: they commented sarcastically on the nature of Disraeli's churchmanship, especially as shown by his belief that Christianity was founded on the Judiac tradition.[177] They even contrasted the regularity of Gladstone's and Disraeli's church attendance.[178]

It was, however, the two most venerated figures of the Anglo-Catholic revival, Pusey and Keble, who expressed the strongest support for Gladstone at this time. Pusey, while admitting that he did not always agree with his actions, maintained his complete confidence in him as a person, in his "conscientious motives, high principled sagacity and

righteousness".[179] Keble had more profound reasons for continuing to support him. He believed that, in a time when the revision of church-state relations were inevitable, Gladstone's policy remained the best hope of preserving her spiritualities and doctrine with the least sacrifice of her temporalities.[180] His action of the Burials bill proved especially how clearly he now distinguished between the Church and the Establishment, that this issue was concerned with state privilege and not doctrine or dogma, giving the Church an opportunity to make concessions in an inessential matter.[181] Keble ended by repeating his determination never to oppose Gladstone at Oxford:

> Were I asked to add my name to that list (of his opponents), I should answer No! - a thousand times No! - for Prudence's sake, for Justice's sake, for Oxford's sake, and most of all for the sake of the Church.[182]

Despite all the efforts made by his supporters, this time the opposition proved too strong for Gladstone, and he was to lose his seat by 1904 votes to 1724. This was a particularly grievous blow for Stafford Northcote, who had been so involved in Gladstone's career as member for the University. Although by this time he had no longer any confidence in Gladstone's political principles, and could no longer vote for him personally, he was still so attached to him that he gave his proxy to Edwin Palmer to be used on Gladstone's behalf if the outcome turned on a single vote.

"My present relations to you", he told Gladstone, "sometimes seem to me harder than I can bear", to which Gladstone consolingly replied:

> The separation caused by politics, though a visitation, is not as bad as those caused by death or religion, which practically almost comes to a death.[183]

The most searching analysis of the causes for Gladstone's defeat was made by Edward Urquhart, a fellow of Balliol and one of his most determined opponents. Urquhart was an Anglo-Catholic, and a great admirer of Pusey and Keble, and he was thus most anxious to justify his oppotition to them on this matter. He was especially sensitive to the charge that the campaign against Gladstone had been conducted with unscrupulousness.[184] He argued that the attempt to make political capital out of Disraeli's Jewish ancestry had in fact been far worse than anything said or done on his side.[185] Urquhart also argued that the new system of postal voting had not had that decisive effect on the result that had been expected, although it had certainly made possible the participation of a larger number of the electorate than ever before. His analysis of the poll showed indeed that the postal voters were almost equally divided in their support for the two candidates, and it was those who voted in person who had provided the majority for Hardy.[186]

Urquhart identified two main reasons for Gladstone's

defeat. First, he had lost the support of some of those who had voted for him in 1859. It was calculated that some ninety-eight voters transferred their support in this election from Gladstone to Hardy. Some of these were Evangelicals who had been convinced by the Record newspaper that he was the leader of a party which was trying to Romanize the Anglican Church in England and to disestablish it in Ireland.[187] More seriously, this defeat proved that he had lost the confidence of many High Churchmen at Oxford who had previously supported him. Urquhart reckoned that of such Churchmen in residence who voted in this election, at least half were for Hardy and many of the remainder abstained. It was now only the Liberals who continued to give unanimous support to Gladstone as they had in 1859.[188] The second major reason for Gladstone's failure to retain his seat held even graver implications for the future. This was his comparative inability to win the support of the younger generation at Oxford, which had hitherto been his greatest strength. Of those who had been added to the electoral register since 1859, he secured only 547 votes to Hardy's 689.[189] In view of this, it proved of little satisfaction to prove that he had the support of those of the greater intellectual distinction, as shown by the number of first class graduates and university prizemen amongst them. As with Peel in 1829, this was not sufficient to save

him from defeat.[190]

On July 17th., 1865, Gladstone received the news that his defeat at Oxford was certain. The next day he travelled to Manchester, where he had already been nominated as candidate for South Lancashire. He opened his campaign that afternoon in the Free Trade Hall, where his first words were:

> At last, my friends, I am come among you, and I am come among you 'unmuzzled'.[191]

This phrase captured the public imagination. Some regarded it as conclusive proof that Gladstone had even before his defeat realized that he was in a false position at Oxford, and that he should therefore have resigned long ago. Others dismissed it as an example of Gladstone's unfortunate passion for rhetoric, as it was made during the excitement of an electioneering speech. His supporters defended it on the other hand as a precise statement of his new position, because previously, as the University representative, he had by tradition been unable either to canvass his constituents or to defend his policy before them.[192] For Gladstone himself, however, these words were merely the introduction of a speech in which he expounded the principles which had guided him in the past, and which he intended to follow for the future. He had no hesitation in asserting his continued

love for Oxford, even though she had now rejected him and though he was well aware of all her faults. He believed that his main work was now the building of a bridge between the England of the past which Oxford represented, and the England of the future which he saw foreshadowed in the Lancashire community with its

> development of industry, growth of enterprise, progress of social philanthropy, prevalence of toleration, ardent desire for freedom.[193]

The Saturday Review, in its comments on Gladstone's electoral fortunes at this time, emphasized equally strongly that South Lancashire would prove to be the best constituency for that statesman to represent in the future. The Review had come to fear Gladstone as the leading exponent of those democratic and radical principles which it saw as the greatest threat to the stability of the contemporary English society. As member for South Lancashire, it hoped that he would be now far better placed to fulfill the potentialities for statesmanship, which it had always recognized in him without the need to placate the more extreme of his supporters. The Review based this hope on the fact that, because of its nature, South Lancashire was exceptional amongst parliamentary constituencies. On the one hand, it was sufficiently democratic to be in harmony with a man in whom popular feeling was so strong: on the other, it contained still powerful conservative forces in its great landed families

and its immigrant Roman Catholic population that would provide the necessary restraining influence on him.[194]

The Review's optimism about Gladstone's future development as a politician was nevertheless by no means unqualified. Despite this, it expressed nothing but contempt about the manner in which he had been dismissed by the Oxford University electorate. It did not deny that many of his actions had been contrary to the most deeply held principles of a large number amongst that electorate. This could not justify the defeat of a man who alone could ensure the safety and the security of the University in the future by placing her in harmony with the general sentiments of the nation without destroying at the same time her essential character.[195] The rejection of Gladstone by 'the non-intellectual and anti-intellectual part of the constituency' would convince public opinion that the University was still dominated by its reactionary elements. It would mean in particular the end of that alliance between Liberals and High Churchmen which

> had just resulted in improvements which have probably added centuries to the existence of the University.[196]

But, as the Review sadly concluded, what was the good to argue with elderly country clergy?[197]

The Saturday Review was not alone in its belief that the defeat of Gladstone at Oxford marked the triumph of the

reactionary forces there, and especially of

> the Tory High and Dry section of the Oxford electorate... the most fanatically retrograde party in the whole country.[198]

Gladstone himself was most conscious how completely out of sympathy he was now with many of their cherished beliefs, and that he could therefore expect nothing but their most determined opposition in his political career. As he told Christopher Wordsworth at this time, their principles

> are intuitions to you, and men like you, who have sucked them in with their mother's milk. They are the foundation on which you build. My case, let me say, is a different one. I was born and bred in an uninfluenced habit of life; and in my case every one of these things are the product of the working of my own mind singly.[199]

It was the establishment of the Church of England which remained the most controversial issue dividing Gladstone from Churchmen who thought like Christopher Wordsworth. Gladstone, indeed, still believed that this could offer substantial religious and temporal benefits to the community. His appreciation of the changing conditions of the times in which he lived had, however, forced him to reappraise his scale of values in this regard. He could no longer maintain as he had done in his early book on church-state relations the essential necessity of establishment, for he was now convinced that in certain circumstances this might endanger the spiritual nature of the Church. If there ever developed in England "the worst of all forms of false religion, that

in which the civil power is the ultimate authority in the matter of religious truth", then he would be prepared to sacrifice the establishment of the Church in order to preserve that truth.[200] But he did not believe that there was any immediate likelihood that he would be faced by such a decision. Despite the Erastian principles held by the Conservative Party that he believed would be such a threat to the Anglican Church were that Party returned to office again, despite the violent propaganda of the political dissenters against the Establishment, Gladstone could still hope that the privileged position of the Church of England might be secured for a long time to come, at least so long as its members were prepared to abandon the petty but most irritating temporal advantages that they possessed over other religious denominations. For Gladstone in 1865, arguments over disestablishments were still no more than academic.[201]

Protestant High Churchmen, on the other hand, were convinced that such hopes were based on a facile optimism that ignored the reality of the contemporary situation. They felt that Gladstone did not appreciate the strength of the challenge from the Established Church, and that any sign of temporization, such as he himself had shown during the debate on the Irish Church, would only encourage its opponents to further excesses. Still maintaining the principles of

the Protestant Constitution in Church and State as the surest guarantee of a stable and civilized community in England, they saw any further retreat from them as a surrender to revolutionary forces. For these reasons, they were prepared to oppose Gladstone wholeheartedly in his bid for re-election at Oxford, and give their support to Gathorne-Hardy as the representative of orthodox conservatism.

There was, therefore, much truth in the contention that the defeat of Gladstone was in part due to the revival of the reactionary element in the University. The analysis made by Urquhart of the actual voting proved, however, that to explain it merely in such terms was a misleading oversimplification. What was shown most clearly by the result of this election was the split which had now developed amongst the Anglo-Catholics. During it, Gladstone had succeeded in retaining the loyalty and affection of those who had played such a large part in University affairs during the eighteen-fifties, which were strong enough to overcome their doubts about many of his political acts, as a senior Minister in Palmerston's Government. They justified their continuing support by stressing the essential soundness of his church views, and by arguing that he must be left to fight the battle for the Church in his own way.

They were, nevertheless, unable to pass on their faith to the new generation of Oxford Anglo-Catholics who

had graduated after 1859, and whose defection was to prove so fatal to Gladstone's cause in 1865. This younger generation saw his decision to join Palmerston as gross political immorality designed only to further his own political career. They considered as obviously special pleading his belief that the only way to protect the essential interests of the Church was to refuse to defend the indefensible privileges of the Establishment. They were convinced that in so arguing he was seeking to justify concessions to the Dissenters in return for their valuable political support. They were determined above all not to allow him to take advantage of the loyalty of High Churchmen as an instrument to advance his political ambitions.

Gladstone's defeat at Oxford did much to prove that the Anglo-Catholics were now split into two wings, one of which had recovered its innate Conservatism while the other was still struggling to maintain that High Church Liberalism which had developed during the previous two decades. In doing so, it was also to illustrate the relationship between these Churchmen and the Conservative and Liberal Parties. It remains to discuss the implication of this for the political thinking of High Churchmen in general.

NOTES: CHAPTER VII

[1] The first paragraphs of this chapter have been based on the article by Professor J.B. Conacher, "Mr. Gladstone seeks a Seat', Report of the Canadian Historical Association, 1962, pp. 55-67.

[2] See Chapter III of this thesis.

[3] Northcote to Gladstone, January 21, 1846. Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. Mss. 44216, ff. 36-37. Quoted in Conacher, 'Mr. Gladstone seeks a Seat', Report CHA, p.65.

[4] A. Lang, Life, Letters and Diaries of Sir Stafford Northcote, first Earl of Iddesleigh, 2 vols. (London, 1890), I, p. 37.

[5] See Northcote letter to his father, February 24, 1838. Ibid., I, pp. 33-34.

[6] Northcote to Farrer, September 8, 1844. Ibid., I p.67.

[7] Northcote to Shirley, October 18, 1841, Ibid., I, p. 52.

[8] Northcote to Shirley, June 30, 1842, Ibid., I, p. 57.

[9] Ibid., I, p. 65.

[10] Wordsworth to Barter, undated. C. Wordsworth, Annals of my Life, 1847-1856 (London, 1893), p. 36.

[11] Mozley to Church, August 6, 1847. A. Mozley (ed.), Letters of the Rev. J.B. Mozley (London, 1885), p. 183. This with his letter to his sister Anne written on May 20, 1847 (Ibid., p. 182) provides a most interesting account of this election.

[12] Guardian, May 12., 1847, p. 297.

[13] Mozley to Church, August 6, 1847, Mozley, Letters, p. 183.

[14] Mozley to Anne Mozley, May 20, 1847, Ibid., p. 182.

[15] Gladstone to Manning, May 14, 1847, Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. Mss. 44247, f. 336.

[16] Conacher, 'Mr. Gladstone seeks a Seat', Report CHA, 1962, p. 66.

[17] Guardian, May 12., 1847, p. 297.

[18] W.R. Ward, Victorian Oxford (London, 1965), pp. 141, 144.

[19] A Few Words to the Country Parsons touching the Election for the University of Oxford by One of Themselves (London, 1847), p.5.

[20] Ward, Victorian Oxford, p. 143.

[21] A Few Words to the Country Parsons, p. 13.

[22] Gladstone to Manning, May 24, 1847, Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. Mss. 44247, ff. 337-340.

[23] Gladstone to Wortley, June 17, 1847, D.C. Lathbury (ed.), Correspondence on Church and Religion of William Ewart Gladstone, 2 vols. (London, 1910), II, pp. 10-12. See also, Ibid., II, pp. 376-378, 381.

[24] English Review, III, 1845, p. 436.

[25] Dictionary of National Biography, XV, p. 1072.

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27 Gladstone to Phillimore, February 26, 1847, Ibid. II, p. 9.

28 Gladstone to Warter, July 21, 1847, Ibid., II, pp. 14-16.

29 Gladstone to Greswell, July 30, 1847, Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. Mss. 44181, ff. 5-6.

30 Mozley, Letters, p. 185.

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32 M. Pattison, Memoirs (London, 1885), p. 244.

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38 Ward, Victorian Oxford, pp. 128-135: Pattison, Memoirs, p. 239.

39 Liddon, Pusey, III, p. 174.

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44 Ward, Victorian Oxford, p. 144.

45 Northcote to Gladstone, August 2., 1847, Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. Mss. 44216, f. 103.

46 Ibid., f. 103.

47 Mozley, Letters, p. 184.

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65 Ward, Victorian Oxford, p. 171.

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114 Northcote to Gladstone, January 13, 1853. Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. Mss. 44215, ff. 199-200.

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CONCLUSION

"THE HIGH CHURCH ARE NOW BROKEN TO BITS "

Pusey's despairing response to the defeat of Gladstone at Oxford was the measure of his failure to achieve what he had set his heart on.[1] It also reflected the frustration of High Churchmen caused by their inability to establish a common front in the confused political and religious situation of the mid-Victorian years. By 1846, these Churchmen as a whole had lost their confidence in the Conservative Party as the defender of what they considered the essential interests of the Church of England. This was due in part to their dismay over the increasing emphasis being plaed on the Eraastian element in Peel's Conservatism, in which it was made clear that the Church was subject to the State rather than its equal partner. Their disillusionment was completed by the disintegration of the Conservative Party itself over the two issues of Maynooth and Protection. As a result, they had to reappraise their attitude towards the dominant Liberalism of the time, which was to find its political expression in the Governments of Lord John Russell and Lord Palmerston. In doing so, however, the High Churchmen

could not avoid bringing into prominence the fundamental difference of opinion which now existed between them over the value of church establishment. There could be little agreement on issues in which this principle was at stake between the Protestant High Churchmen who still believed that the Established Church alone could guarantee the Christian nature of English society, and the Anglo-Catholics who feared that the apostolic character of that Church was degraded, and might be destroyed, by its establishment. It was because of this that these Churchmen proved unable to act as an united political group.

Protestant High Churchmen, in particular, continued to distrust the Latitudinarian principles which they saw behind the policy of the Whig Government. They believed these to be most evident in its educational measures, which they considered proof of the intention to create an undenominational system in which the influence of the Church of England would be ended. In the eighteen-fifties, indeed, it was only their distrust of Disraeli that prevented these Churchmen from reviving their alliance with the Conservative Party. They were, therefore, happy to welcome without too close an examination, that statesman's announcement in the following decade of his newly-discovered belief in their traditional principles of Church and State. It was Disraeli's skill in winning the confidence of the Protestant High

Churchmen that did much to consolidate his position as the leader of the Conservatives.

The reaction of the Anglo-Catholics to the situation created by the break-up of Peel's Government in 1846 was to prove more complex. In the succeeding years, circumstances were to involve them closely in Liberal politics. In particular, the crises which developed in Church-State relations during this period inevitably emphasized the one aspect of their thought, the desire for 'religious liberty' for the Anglican Church with its corollary of greater toleration for other sects, that was in most accord with Liberal principles. Because of the difficult situation of the Peelites, moreover, these Churchmen had to accept, even though they might regret, the decision of their leading political representatives to form a coalition with the Whigs in 1852 and to take office in Palmerston's Ministry in 1859. Finally, they had found it necessary to secure the alliance of the Liberal resident dons at Oxford in order to strengthen their position in the struggle with the Heads. As a result, it could be argued by the end of the decade that it was now possible to reconcile the highest church views with Liberal political principles by "associating the high sacramental idea of the Church and her destiny, with a political creed based on broad popular views".[2]

It soon became clear, nevertheless, that such

optimism about the future of High Church Liberalism was unfounded. Even in the eighteen-fifties, its inherent weaknesses had been made apparent. It had proved difficult to establish a working agreement between the High Church and Whig members of the Coalition Government, especially over the issues of church patronage and a free Convocation. Anglo-Catholics had also in no way disguised their hostility towards Palmerston during his first Administration, which did nothing to make easier their later relations with him. It was, however, in the years after 1859 that many of these Churchmen, in dealing with the new problems that arose, began to doubt the pertinence of Liberal principles. The controversy over church establishment was, in particular, transformed. Hitherto Anglo-Catholics had been concerned primarily to rescue the Anglican Church from the control of the State because this threatened its spiritual nature. Now the great danger came from the attack of Dissent on the privileges of the Established Church. It was the very vigour of this attack which provoked a powerful conservative reaction on the part of the younger Anglo-Catholics especially. As a result, they again became convinced that the apostolic character of the Church depended on maintaining its privileged position in the community.

Lord Robert Cecil for one had no doubt about the political conclusion to be drawn from this development. It

confirmed his belief that the basic issue in English politics still remained, as it had been in the days of the Solemn League and Convenant, the struggle between Church and Dissent, and that it would remain the principle division between the two main parties. No politician could remain neutral on this issue, and thus his choice of party must be accepted as a true indication of his position on it. For this reason, no sincere High Churchmen could be a supporter of the Liberal party that was by its tradition committed to the cause of the Dissenters.[3]

By the eighteen-sixties, therefore, the conception of High Church Liberalism made little sense in political terms for those who thought like Cecil. At the same time, its ideological inconsistencies were to be made explicit. This was the result of the failure of the most sustained attempt to reconcile Liberal and High Church principles in these years. In 1855, A.J. Beresford-Hope had founded what was to become the finest of mid-nineteenth century periodicals, the weekly Saturday Review, with this very purpose in mind. The first decade of the Review's existence was to prove clearly the difficulty of this task, and the strain it put on those attempting it, whether they were Liberals or High Churchmen.

Beresford-Hope's political ambitions had suffered a setback when he failed to win re-election to the House of Commons in the July 1852 general election. The following

year he had stopped contributing his Letters on Church Matters to the Morning Chronicle, which had done much to keep him in the public eye, and had retired to his family estates, where he had care of his stepfather, Viscount Beresford, of Peninsular War fame.[4] On the death of the Viscount, Beresford-Hope resumed his active interest in contemporary affairs, and, in particular, became responsible in association with J.D. Cook, who had lost the editorship of the Morning Chronicle after its commercial failure in 1854, for the establishment of the new journal.[5] He hoped that this would prove to be

> a paper not bound to any party, but written by a combination of Peelite Conservatives and moderate Liberals, and to be the mouthpiece of the middle moderate opinions of thoughtful and educated supporters.[6]

There is little doubt that the immediate success of the Saturday Review was due to the journalistic genius of its editor, Cook. He brought into its service contributors of the greatest literary talent, such as H.S. Maine, Goldwin Smith, Vernon Harcourt, Fitzjames Stephens and, for a time, Lord Robert Cecil. At the same time, it cannot be denied that Beresford-Hope's expectation that its pages would provide a platform for both High Church and Liberal principles were by no means fulfilled. It was once said, indeed, that Cook only managed to preserve his partnership with his proprietor "by keeping the paper as much as

possible out of theological controversies".[7] In order to understand this difference of opinion between the two men, it will be necessary to consider in what ways the Review's conception of Liberalism affected its attitude towards religious matters, and especially towards the Church of England.

The Saturday Review took it for granted that national opinion in England was essentially liberal in tendency.[8] It nevertheless acknowledged that it had considereble difficulty in defining exactly the meaning of this term. When it attempted to do so early in its history, it was first forced to eliminate all the popular slogans whose continued use now seriously distorted the understanding of its contemporary significance. To talk about 'free trade' in this connection, for example, had no more relevance than references to 'the Glorious Revolution'. 'Electoral and social reforms' were also principles over which there was no longer any unanimity amongst those who called themselves Liberals.[9] When it sought a more positive definition, however, it could only suggest that Liberalism was primarily an attitude of mind, the readiness to test all intellectual matters by the use of reason rather than by reliance on authority, whether this be secular or ecclesiastical,[10] "the judgement of the common sense of the educated part of the World".[11] For this reason, the Review believed that the

best way of identifying a Liberal in the eighteen-fifties was by his support of a foreign policy aimed at the promotion of that sort of constitutional government abroad which alone could create the conditions under which such freedom of thought was possible.[12] It saw as its great enemies both the authoritarian states of Europe and also the new Democracy, whose success it believed would inevitably result in the worst tyranny of all, that of an illiterate majority over the educated minority. It replied to those who maintained that such fears were exaggerated by pointing to developments in France after the national referendum taken in 1850, for "in Louis Napoleon we see virtually Manchester Democracy on the steps of power, and we may learn at once what relation Manchester Democracy bears to civilization".[13]

For the Saturday Review, therefore, Liberalism might be best defined as the judgement of educated men applied to the ever-changing circumstances in which they lived. It maintained as a necessary deduction from this that the best social institutions were those which allowed their members complete freedom to exercise this judgement. It was for this reason that, of all religious communities in England, it had the greatest respect for the Established Church, for

> in the interests of Liberalism, of progress, of intellect and sense (to put religious considerations aside)... the Church of England... admits of infinite variety of practice and tolerates great differences of opinion... it is as

> comprehensive and liberal a religion as the world has ever seen.[14]

The Review believed that this was the result of the high standard of its clergy, who were "the fairest, best educated and most elastic of the religious profession".[15] Above all, they did not form a caste with its own values and principles, set apart from the rest of the community. The English clergy were in the main educated at the same institutions as their social equals, they did not suffer from the considerable disadvantages resulting from an imposed celibacy, the majority of them received a decent living from their benefices, and they had a close link with the neighbouring gentry through the wide-spread system of lay patronage.[16] There was, consequently, little dislike for the English parson in English society, and certainly no incentive for the clergy to attempt to impose their authority over the laity in matters of opinion.

The Saturday Review believed, nevertheless, that there was one great danger facing the Church of England. This was the possibility that it might by its intellectual failure alienate the educated class of the country. It was this fear that formed the strongest link between its typical contributor and this Anglo-Catholics in the Church, for there seemed little doubt that the great proportion of Anglican learning was concentrated within this latter group. On the other hand, the Review saw the Evangelical Party as being formed from

> comprehensive and liberal a religion as the world has ever seen.[14]

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"the semi-informed, semi-educated, semi-religious portion of the population".[17] The Review was especially dismayed by the intellectual quality of the men appointed by Palmerston to senior positions in the Church during the early stage of his long premiership. Chosen from the ranks of the Evangelicals, they were "sectarian, bigoted and persecuting"[18], "with no taste, little self-denial and hardly more learning than is required for speaking fluent and grammatical English."[19] If by mischance such men won a dominating influence within the Anglican Church, and especially if this meant the expulsion or the withdrawal of the Anglo-Catholics, then that Church could no longer expect the confidence and support of the educated layman.

It was this belief of the Saturday Review that the presence of Anglo-Catholics within the Church of England provided the best guarantee that it would remain the Church of the intellect and intelligence of the country that did much to promote the alliance between that school of religious thought and the Liberalism that it represented that its founder, Beresford-Hope, had desired. The developments of the eighteen-sixties, however, were to emphasize that this alliance depended on the admiration of the Review for the personal calibre of the Anglo-Catholics than on its approval of the principles which they represented. In particular, the controversies over church establishment and the publication

of Essays and Reviews proved how widely it differed from the older generation of these Churchmen.

In the first place, the Review showed little sympathy with those who doubted the value of establishment. It was certainly true that it had no hesitation in proclaiming its enthusiastic support for religious toleration for non-Anglican bodies in the community. It was ready, for example, to describe the Roman Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829 as "the most generous and most politic of laws enacted in the statute book".[20] Again, it could not disguise its scorn for that type of mentality that became the victim of 'No-Popery' scares because of its purely emotional fear of Roman Catholicism. Even in 1860, it could still recall with satisfaction the ignominious downfall of Lord John Russell due to his attempt to make political capital out of this fear by his Ecclesiastical Titles Act of 1851.[21] It reserved its most bitter contempt, however, for the re-curring attempt to abolish the state grant to Maynooth; this was "an annual craze", "a real insult to the country", "a mock duel", "a playing at Parliament". It was one of its main charges against Disraeli that, while he had too much sense to believe in the reasonableness of the proposed motion, he was not above taking advantage of it for party reasons, and had too little straightforwardness to vote according to his convictions.[22] In such matters that required

a spirit of toleration in order to be handled judiciously, the Saturday Review was in complete sympathy with the feelings of the Anglo-Catholics.

It was not, however, prepared to support any measures which would strengthen the position of these non-Anglican bodies. It refused to do so on the ground that they were so alien in nature to the English mind that their success would do much to turn the educated classes against all religion.[23] This was the result of the spiritual intolerance of the Roman Catholic Church on the one hand and the intellectual inadequacy of the various Dissenting sects on the other. These, it argued, owed their origin to nothing more than the accidental quarrels of the seventeenth century, and they only remained in existence during the nineteenth because of local social jealousies and enmities, especially of the parish priest in the country districts. If these were ended, then English Dissent would soon vanish as "the light of argument" was brought to bear on its tenets.[24]

It was for these reasons that the Saturday Review completely rejected the whole conception of 'religious liberty' which was being so strongly advocated by many leading Anglo-Catholics at this time. It could see no justification for what it described as "free trade in religion".[25] The inevitable result would be the disestablishment of the Anglican Church, and to bring about "the

triumph of the Conventical as well as the Pope", which must end in lowering the standard of civilized life in England.[26]

The second issue on which the Saturday Review was to differ fundamentally from the Anglo-Catholics was the permissable extent of toleration within the Church. It was forced to recognize that many of them would in the last resort prove as intolerant in their attitude to some of the intellectual developments of the age as any other orthodox Churchmen. The publication of Essays and Reviews brought this matter to a head by forcing the Anglo-Catholics to make clear the limits to the freedom of thought they were prepared to allow the members of the Church of England. It placed the Saturday Review in a difficult position since it had always eulogized their toleration in such matters. It is easy to trace in its pages the dilemma faced by those of its contributors who, on the one hand, wished to maintain their own well-publicized principles, but who, on the other, knew that its proprietor, Beresford-Hope, had instructed the editorial staff not to express any support for the Essayists.[27] This dilemma was, indeed, to bring about the resignation of some of its most brilliant authors between 1861 and 1863.[28]

It was not until March 2nd., 1861, that the Review saw fit to make its first comment on the issue, and then,

as it admitted itself, with the greatest hesitation. It would have much preferred to leave the whole matter to "the good sense and honest feeling of the English people".[28] While it recognized that the publication of Essays and Reviews was bound to give just offence to orthodox Churchmen, it was, nevertheless, concerned how much the controversy proved that

> the clergy of the Church of England require to be much more thoroughly educated and placed more on a level with the progress of theological discussions and opinions in an active minded age ... it showed their deep ignorance of what has been going on in the last half century.[30]

As High Churchmen began to take a more extreme position against the Essayists, the Review was itself forced to modify its denigration of the intellectual capabilities of the English clergymen in order to get into accord with the well-known sympathies of Beresford-Hope. In May it was congratulating its readers that "the Church of England is, as all Churches must be, a little behind the age in a good many things. We rather like to fall across something behind the age."[31] It was nevertheless clearly not happy about the need to compromise in this matter, and its satisfaction was obvious when the issue was finally resolved in 1864. It maintained in fact that it had never been more than "a storm in a teacup", which however had done the Church considerable harm. With the treatment of Jowett in mind, it could express its hope that

> we have nearly arrived at the conclusion of that period of small persecutions...during which the Church has probably lost much ground in the affections and the belief of the more educated classes.[32]

These two controversies over church establishment and Liberal theology did much to prove how unsatisfactory, both politically and intellectually, the High Church Liberalism which had developed during the eighteen-fifties had become for most High Churchmen and Liberals alike. As the defeat of Gladstone at Oxford University in 1865 showed, this was most marked amongst the younger generation of the Anglo-Catholics. The older representatives of these Churchmen who still retained their friendship and loyalty for that statesman now found themselves in an isolated position. It was this that caused Pusey to lament the disintegration of the High Church party as such.

The Churchmen who contined to think as Pusey did were to find themselves in even more difficult circumstances after Gladstone had become Prime Minister in 1868. They were to suffer their most grievous loss when the following year Pusey himself was finally forced to confess that he could no longer support Gladstone. For him, the breaking point was reached with the appointment of Frederick Temple, a contributor to Essays and Reviews, as Bishop of Exeter.[33] Despite this loss of their most revered member, the Liberal Anglo-Catholics were, nevertheless, still prepared to

remain loyal to Gladstone during his first great Administration between 1868 and 1874. The Guardian, in particular, were still prepared to defend such measures as Irish Church disestablishment and the repeal of University tests on the grounds that they furthered the cause of 'religious liberty'.[34] Again, the issue which was to bring Gladstone out of his retirement from politics in 1876, the campaign to end Turkish atrocities against the Balkan Christians, appeared for a time to have reunited High Church opinion as a whole behind him.[35] In the end, however, he was unable to consolidate his influence over these Churchmen. By 1885 even his most devoted follower, Dean Church, had joined the great majority of the educated classes within England who had withdrawn their support from him because they feared he was surrendering to the forces of violence and demagogy. Gladstone's failure to carry Irish Home Rule completed the process which had started with his defeat at Oxford in 1865, when he was accused of conceding too much to the claims of the Dissenters.[36]

The collapse of High Church Liberalism by 1885 seemed to justify Lord Robert Cecil's belief that it was a sign of divine madness. As he had long ago told the readers of the Quarterly Review, he was sure that

> just as in ruder times, insanity was looked upon as the mark of the protection of heaven, so in these days the simultaneous belief in two or

> three inconsistent sets of opinion is held by many to be the sure sign of a peculiar conscientiousness... . An alliance between the Church and Liberalism can never be permanently the dream of more than a few very eccentric minds.[37]

It was certainly true that the Liberal Catholicism of the latter part of the nineteenth century was very different from that High Church Liberalism that was born as the result of the disintegration of the Conservative Party in 1846. It is hard to tell, indeed, whether representatives of this older tradition like Pusey and Gladstone were more shocked and dismayed by the theological principles of Lux Mundi or by the social radicalism of the Christian Socialist Union, both of which appeared in the same year 1889.

NOTES: CONCLUSION

[1] Pusey to Churton, July 25, 1865. H.P. Liddon, Life of Edward Bouverie Pusey. 4 vols. (London, 1895), IV, p. 200.

[2] Guardian, December 7, 1859, p. 1032.

[3] Lord Robert Cecil, 'The Church in its Relations to Political Parties', Quarterly Review, CXVIII (1865), passim.
Like all the opinions of that subtle mind, Cecil's religious principles are hard to define. It would seem at this time that they were of an Anglo-Catholic nature. See especially, Lady G. Cecil, Life of Robert Marquess of Salisbury. 4 vols. (London, 1921-1923), I, pp. 24, 85, Chapter IV. There is very little relevant material for this period in the Salisbury Papers at Christ Church, Oxford.

[4] H.W. & I. Law, The Book of the Beresford-Hopes (London, 1930), pp. 148, 223.

[5] M.M. Bevington, The Saturday Review, 1855-1865: Representative Educated Opinion in Victorian England (New York, 1944), pp. 16-20.

[6] Law, Book of the Beresford-Hopes, p. 214.

[7] By C.H. Pearson in his Memorials, quoted by Bevington, Saturday Review, p. 35.

[8] See for example, Saturday Review, XII (1861), p. 83.

[9] Ibid., I (1855), p. 156.

[10] Ibid., XVII (1864), p. 527.

[11] Ibid., XIX (1865), p. 162.

[12] Ibid., I (1855), p. 157.

[13] Ibid., XI (1861), p. 326.

[14] Ibid., IX (1860), p. 399.

[15] Ibid., p. 305.

[16] Ibid., XVII (1864), p. 527.

[17] Ibid., II (1856), p.713.

[18] Ibid., X (1860), p. 659.

[19] Ibid., II (1856), p. 713.

[20] Ibid., IX (1860), p. 69.

[21] Ibid., p. 109.

[22] Ibid., I (1855), p. 485.

[23] Ibid., XVII (1864), p 335.

[24] Ibid., XIV (1862), p. 672.

[25] Ibid., IX (1860), p. 569.

[26] Ibid., p. 305.

[27] Bevington, Saturday Review, p. 32.

[28] Ibid., p. 33.

29 Saturday Review, XI (1861), p. 221.

30 Ibid., XI (1861), p. 446.

31 Ibid., p. 286.

32 Ibid., XIX (1865), p. 218.

33 Liddon, Pusey, IV, p. 198.

34 W.R. Ward, 'Oxford and the Origins of Liberal Catholicism in the Church of England', Studies in Church History, I (1964), p. 248.

35 Ibid., p. 251: R.T. Shannon, Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation, 1876, (London, 1963), pp. 171-190.

36 B.A. Smith, Dean Church: the Anglican Response to Newman (Oxford, 1958), pp. 219-224: See also, J. Roach, 'Liberalism and the Victorian Intelliengtsia', Cambridge Historical Journal, XIII (1957), pp. 58-81.

37 Cecil, 'The Church in its Relations to Political Parties', Quarterly Review, CXVIII (1865), pp. 212-213.

APPENDIX

HIGH CHURCH MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT 1841 - 1865

Sources of information:

Guardian: especially June 26th., 1850, pp. 618-621 and April 15th., 1857, p. 290.

C.F.P. Dod, Electoral Facts from 1832 to 1853 (London, 1853).

F.H. McCalmont (comp.), Parliamentary Poll Book from 1832 to 1885, (London, 1886).

Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3d series

The identification of the Peelites and the Independent Conservatives in the 1852 - 1857 Parliament was kindly supplied by Professor J.B. Conacher.

I: THE 1841-1847 PARLIAMENT

Conservatives:

Sir T.D. Acland	T.H.S.S. Estcourt	A.J.B. Hope
C.B. Adderley	Henry Fitzroy	Earl of Lincoln
T.W. Bramston	W.E. Gladstone	Sir W.C. James
Lord Castlereagh	Sir William Heathcote	Lord John Manners
T.S. Cocks	J.W. Henley	H.K. Seymer
Baillie Cochrane	Sidney Herbert	A.S.O.B. Stafford
Lord Emlyn	Lord Afred Hervey	Spencer Walpole

Liberal-Conservative:

A.H. Oswald Lord W.J.F. Powlett C.B. Wall

Liberal:

Sir G.R.B. Pechell Lord P.J. Stuart

Analysis of Voting on the increased Grant to Maynooth:

In support of the Bill:

Conservatives:

Acland	Emlyn	Hervey
Adderley	Fitzroy	Lincoln
Bramston	Gladstone	Manners
Castlereagh	Herbert	

Liberal-Conservative:

Oswald Wall

Liberal:

Pechell Stuart

Against the Bill:

Conservatives:

Henley Stafford

Analysis of Voting on the Repeal of the Corn Laws

In support of the Bill:

Conservatives:

Cochrane	Gladstone	Hervey
Fitzroy	Herbert	

Liberal-Conservatives:

Wall

Liberals:

Pechell Stuart

Against the Bill:

Conservatives:

Acland	Emlyn	Henley
Adderley	Estcourt	Manners
Bramston	Heathcote	

Liberal-Conservatives:

Oswald

II: THE 1847-1852 PARLIAMENT

Protectionists:

Sir T.D. Acland	Sir W. Heathcote	H.K. Seymer
C.B. Adderley	J.W. Henley	A.S.O'B. Stafford
T.W. Bramston	Lord Lewisham	Spencer Walpole
Lord Emlyn	Lord J. Manners	
T.H.S.S. Estcourt	M. Portal	

Conservatives:

T. Collins	S. Herbert

Liberal-Conservatives

Lord Castlereagh	W.E. Gladstone	Lord W.J.F. Powlett
T.S. Cocks	Lord A. Hervey	F.R.H.W. Prosser
Baillie Cochrane	A.J.B. Hope	C.B. Wall

W.J. Evelyn	Earl of Lincoln	
H. Fitzroy	A.H. Oswald	

Liberal:

W. Monsell	W. Scholefield	Lord P.J. Stuart
Sir G.R.B. Pechell	Sir J. Simeon	W.P. Wood

Analysis of Voting on the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill

In support of the Bill:

Protectionists:

Acland	Henley	Seymer
Bramston	Lewisham	Stafford
Emlyn	Manners	Walpole

Liberal-Conservatives:

Cocks	Fitzroy
Evelyn	Hervey

Liberals:

Wood

Against the Bill:

Protectionists:

Portal

Conservatives:

Herbert

Liberal-Conservatives:

Castlereagh	Hope	Prosser
Gladstone	Oswald	Wall

Liberals:

Monsell

Pechell

III: THE 1852-1857 PARLIAMENT

Derbyite Conservatives:

C.B. Adderley	Lord J. Manners	A.S.O'B. Stafford
Lord R. Cecil	T.J. Miller	W. Walpole
J.W. Henley	M. Portal	
Lord Lewisham	H.K. Seymer	

Independent Conservatives:

Sir T.D. Acland	T.H.S. Estcourt
T.W. Bramston	W.J. Evelyn
T.S. Cocks	Sir W. Heathcote
Lord Emlyn	

Peelite:

H. Fitzroy	Lord A. Hervey	G.E.H. Vernon
W.E. Gladstone	R. Palmer	C.B. Wall
S. Herbert	Sir R.J. Phillimore	

Liberal-Conservative:

Lord W.J.F. Powlett

Liberal:

A. Gordon	W. Monsell	W. Scholefield
F.S.G.N. Greville	Sir G.R.B. Pechell	W.P. Wood

Note: Phillimore was described as both a Peelite and a Liberal in these years.

Analysis of Voting on the University Reform Bill

In support of the Bill:

Peelites:

Fitzroy	Hervey
Gladstone	Vernon
Herbert	

Liberals:

Monsell	Pechell

Against the Bill:

Derbyite Conservatives:

Cecil	Seymer
Henley	Stafford
Portal	Walpole

Independent Conservatives:

Acland	Estcourt
Bramston	Evelyn
Cocks	Heathcote

Peelites:

Phillimore

Analysis of Voting on Heywood's Amendment

In support of the Amendment:

Liberals:

Greville	Scholefield
Pechell	

Peelites:

Vernon

Analysis of Voting on the University Reform Bill

In support of the Bill:

Peelites:

Fitzroy	Hervey
Gladstone	Vernon
Herbert	

Liberals:

Monsell	Pechell

Against the Bill:

Derbyite Conservatives:

Cecil	Seymer
Henley	Stafford
Portal	Walpole

Independent Conservatives:

Acland	Estcourt
Bramston	Evelyn
Cocks	Heathcote

Peelites:

Phillimore

Analysis of Voting on Heywood's Amendment

In support of the Amendment:

Liberals:

Greville	Scholefield
Pechell	

Peelites:

Vernon

Against the Amendment:

Derbyite Conservatives:

Adderley	Portal
Cecil	Seymer
Henley	Walpole

Independent Conservatives:

Acland	Estcourt
Bramston	Evelyn
Cocks	Heathcote
Emlyn	

Liberal-Conservatives:

Powlett

Peelites:

Gladstone	Palmer
Herbert	Phillimore
Hervey	

IV: THE 1857-1859 PARLIAMENT

Conservatives:

C.B. Adderley	T.H.S. Estcourt	S. Northcote
T.W. Bramston	Sir W. Heathcote	G. Sclater-Booth
Lord R. Cecil	J.W. Henley	H.K. Seymer
B. Cochrane	F. Lygon	S. Walpole
T. Collins	Lord J. Manners	
Lord Emlyn	T.J. Miller	

Liberal-Conservatives:

W.E. Gladstone	S. Herbert	R. Palmer

Liberals:

Sir A.H. Elton	E.H. Knatchbull-Hugessen	
H. Fitzroy	Earl of Lincoln	W. Scholefield
F.S.G.N. Greville	Sir G.R.B. Pechell	

V: THE 1859-1865 PARLIAMENT

Conservatives:

C.B. Adderley	Sir W. Heathcote	S. Northcote
T.W. Bramston	J.W. Henley	G. Sclater-Booth
Lord R. Cecil	F. Lygon	H.K. Seymer
B. Cochrane	Lord J. Manners	S. Walpole
T.H.S. Estcourt	T.J. Miller	

Liberal-Conservatives:

W.E. Gladstone	S. Herbert	R. Palmer
	Lord A. Hervey	

Liberals:

H. Fitzroy	E.H. Knatchbull-Hugessen	
F.S.G.N. Greville	W. Monsell	Sir G.R.B. Pechell
	W. Scholefield	

Analysis of Voting on the Abolition of Church Rates Bill

In support of the Bill:

Liberal-Conservatives:

Hervey

Liberals:

Greville	Monsell	Scholefield
Knatchbull-Huggessen	Pechell	

Against the Bill:

Conservatives:

Adderley	Heathcote	Northcote
Bramston	Henley	Sclater-Booth
Cecil	Lygon	Seymer
Cochrane	Manners	Walpole
Estcourt	Miller	

Liberal-Conservatives:

Gladstone	Palmer

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Greswell	(44181)
Haddan	(44183)
Hawkins	(44206)
Heathcote	(44208)
MacColl	(44242)
Manning	(44247)
Northcote	(44216)
Wilberforce	(44343)

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Sumner	(42195)

Stanmore Papers. Especially his correspondence with

Wilberforce	(49210-49213)

Iddlesleigh Papers.

Public Record Office

Cardwell Papers. Especially his correspondence with

Gladstone	(30/48/49)
Goulburn	(30/48/50)

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Lord Northbourne's Diary

Pusey House, Oxford

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Bodleian Library, Oxford

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